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Writing a dissertation never seemed a natural thing for me to do, but this is the part I have been 
looking forward to for years: the part where I can express my gratitude to the people who have helped 
to realise it, by sharing with me their knowledge, skills, brainwaves and wisdom. At the very 
beginning of my research, in a stage when the road ahead was quite obscure, Rüdiger Seesemann 
discussed with me a number of possible paths of exploration into the history of Islam in Africa, and 
also into the Herskovits Library. Along the way, the references, interest and critical questions from 
Hamid Bobboyi, Dmitry Bondarev, Geert Jan van Gelder and Murray Last have been of much help, 
and it is a joy to thank them here. Walter Young I thank for his interest and his explanations of the 
terminology of logic that the subject of this study, Muḥammad al-Wālī, sometimes used. To all of 
them I am grateful for their practical help and inspiration. 
 
If, in the past years, I have not become a true historian, I have at least come to share a sentiment that is 
fundamental to that profession, that is gratitude for the kindness of librarians. For their hospitality, 
trust and endless variety of services, I wish to thank the librarians of the Melville Herskovits Library 
of Northwestern University in Evanston (Illinois), David Easterbrook and Esmeralda Kale and their 
staff, as well as the staff of the Leiden University Library, especially of the Special Collections 
Reading Room, and Salisu Bala, co-ordinator of the Nigeria Arabic Manuscript Project of the Centre 
for Historic Documentation and Research at Ahmadu Bello University in Kaduna, Nigeria. The library 
of the Africa Study Centre in Leiden is a category in itself, thanks to the indefatigable helpfulness, 
going far beyond professionality, of Ella Verkayk and her colleagues. They deserve many, many 
thanks and high praise. 
 
This book is not only the result of hard labour. Sheer luck, godsends and happy coincidences have 
played an important role, and I would like to mention three. Coming across the rare manuscript - Or. 
3862, here in Leiden - of a scholarly text from the region to which I have pledged my heart about 
twenty-five years ago, was the first. Then came the friendship of Djimet Seli, now dean of the Faculty 
of Humanities of the University of N’djamena, whom I met in a different context. I am deeply 
indebted to him for arranging meetings for me in the Chadian village of Abgar, where al-Wālī once 
lived, and even more for the many discussions we have had and will hopefully continue to have on 
issues of culture in Chad. Perhaps the most surprising coincidence was that my good friend Maḥmūd 
Nasr, accountant and entrepreneur in Cairo, turned out to be a disciple of the ṣūfī shaykh and Nigerian 
historian Ibrāhīm Ṣāliḥ Yūnus al-Ḥusayni, who has a home in Cairo too. I thank Maḥmūd for his 
initiative to interview Ibrāhīm Ṣāliḥ on topics he knew were of interest to me, and the shaykh himself 
for sharing his knowledge again in this way. 
 
Parts of this book were presented as articles or as presentations at seminars and symposia in Leiden, 
Naples, Tilburg, Cambridge and Cape Town. The comments and questions from colleagues in fields 
that vary from Africa to authorship have helped me more than I can describe to sharpen my argument 
and open up new views. The same is true for the discussions in the learning community in Leiden, and 
notably in the branches of the Leiden University Centre for the study of Islam and Society (LUCIS), 
Leiden University Centre for the Study of Religion (LUCSoR), Leiden Institute for Area Studies 
(LIAS) and the Leiden Global Interactions programme (LGI). It is a privilege to be a part of this 
community. Most of all I am obliged to the leaders of the Leiden Global Interactions programme, who 
have given me the opportunity, and generous facilities, to embark on my own research project, as part 
of the larger effort. I also thank the Leiden University Fund/ van Walsem for sponsoring a research 
visit to Chad, and the University of Hamburg (Manuskriptkulturen in Asien, Afrika und Europa) for 
sponsoring my participation in a workshop at the University of Cape Town. 
 
Once this dissertation had taken the form of much text divided into somewhat equal portions, I have 
benefited from comments of Nico Kaptein and of my former boss Pieter van Dijk, which have 
contributed to the final shape of this work. Jelle Bruning and Arnoud Vrolijk have helped to find 
solutions for the translation of some of the more complex formulations in al-Wālī’s legal treatise, 


























































A note on transcription and dates 
 
The transliteration of Arabic words follows the system that is used by many journals such as the 
Journal of Islamic Studies and the Journal of Islamic Africa. This includes words that have been 
incorporated in the English language, such as jihād, ‘ulamā’, ḥarām and ṣūfī, which are printed in 
roman type. Words that are foreign to the English language are printed in italics, including for instance 
the singular of the word ‘ulamā’, that is ‘ālim (scholar). In order to not distract the reader with formal 
matters any more than necessary, I have chosen to write ḥadīth as an Arabic word known in the 
English language, and use the anglicised form of ḥadīths as its plural. Finally, the names of some 
places and persons in contemporary Chad – such as Abgar Alim or Ahmat Saleh – are written in the 
way people there usually spell them today, in Latin script without diacritics.  
The dates in this book are dates of the Common Era. This complies with a convention in modern 
scholarship on Islamic history in West Africa. The manuscripts which have formed the point of 















































































1 The question  
 
The subject of this study is the work of Muḥammad al-Wālī, a seventeenth-century Muslim scholar 
from central sudanic Africa. The scope is well defined; the period, it would seem, conveniently 
removed from ours by the transformations wrought by modernity and colonialism. But it is not. Today 
‘Islam’ in Sahelian countries is associated with serious problems. Interpretations of Islam are used to 
underpin the political ideology of groups in northern Mali, northern Nigeria, the Central African 
Republic, and Darfur who feel that it is high time to ‘restore’ the religion and relations of power in 
these countries to what they imagine them to have been in a pre-colonial past, when Islam stood for 
cultural and social superiority, supra-regional exchange, and civilisation. These groups pursue their 
goals by the most violent means and in some cases the reactions to this violence have been no less 
extreme. Across the region, relations between those for whom a Muslim identity is paramount, and 
those alongside or among whom they live have reached unprecedented levels of tension. One question 
that has inspired this research, then, is: What is the background to these present relations?   
 
The seventeenth century was important in the history of Islam in the region. During it, after having 
been present for centuries on a much smaller scale among elites, the religion spread to many more 
people in the countryside. This vulgarisation changed relations and forms of social life, and led to 
shifting identities and forms in which Islam was professed. In spite of this significance, little research 
has been done into this period, partly because of the paucity of archaeological and textual sources. 
Those textual sources that have been preserved are one-sided: they were written only by Muslims, for 
the simple reason that non-Muslims had no script. Moreover they were written almost uniquely by 
learned men. All the same, these learned men, who were often also religious leaders of their 
communities, worked not in isolation but in a historical, social and scholarly context that is thus 
reflected in their work. They can therefore be ‘addressed’ to give us more insight into the motivations 
of others and the development in their environment, and that is what this study intends to do, at least 
regarding one of them. 
 
Muḥammad al-Wālī b. Sulaymān b. Abī Muḥammad al-Wālī al-Fulānī al-Baghirmāwī al-Barnāwī al-
Ash‘arī al-Mālikī (fl. 1688) was a relatively prolific author, who was regarded as one of the most 
important scholars in his own time and place. At a time when the frontiers of Islam were shifting, his 
success was forged in work he did on the boundaries between cultures, between Muslims and non-
Muslims, of learned peers and unlettered believers, of cosmopolitan and local attitudes, and oral 
culture and literacy. Much of the scholarship by his contemporaries and predecessors in West Africa 
was in theology, and so was al-Wālī’s. I approach theology not as a clearly delimited field of 
scholarship, but as a product of the society in which it develops, in the way Josef van Ess considers it 
in his monumental Theologie und Gesellschaft.1 Theology is directly related to the religious 
expressions – expressions which have to do with human interactions with a culturally postulated, 
unfalsifiable reality2 - on the part of people in certain cultural and historical circumstances. The 
emphasis of the present study is on the cultural postulation and the historical circumstances, not on the 
relation between religious expression and religious experience. Thus al-Wālī is studied more as a 
scholarly author, than as a theologian. 
                                                     
1 J. van Ess, Theologie und Gesellschaft im 2. und 3. Jahrhundert Hidschra: eine Geschichte des religiösen 
Denkens im frühen Islam. Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 1991-1997. 
2 Cf Van Beek and Blakely’s definition of religion from an anthropological point of view in W.E.A. van Beek 
and T.D. Blakely, ‘Introduction’ in W.E.A. van Beek, T.D. Blakely and D.L. Thomson, Religion in Africa. 
London: James Currey, 1994. 
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And as an author he is seen as a spokesman for his cultural environment. Defining culture is a 
precarious enterprise, as we know ever since Kroeber and Kluckhohn for instance counted 150 
definitions of the concept.3 Many of these refer to a community’s ways of living and notably to the 
ways in which they ascribe meanings to their life and society, their symbols, values, institutions and 
practices. What is important for us here is the relationship between, on the one hand, a culture that is 
collectively formed and exists in a collective consciousness and in related representational form and, 
on the other, an individual author.  
 
Al-Wālī´s interest for us lies in his dual role in registering social and cultural shifts on the one hand, 
and, on the other, of contributing to the collective self-representation of seventeenth-century Muslims. 
It is for this reason that a study of al-Wālī’s work can yield a better understanding of his time and 
environment. Thus, although I concentrate on Muḥammad al-Wālī, it is not he himself that is the 
ultimate object of this study. Indeed, while I do look at his strategies as an author, I do not regard him 
in the first place as a causal agent in history, but as a mirror of social developments, including 
conflicts, and of changing values. 
 
This approach is based on the idea that all scholars who wish to be recognised as such, do two things: 
they address issues that are of relevance to their environment and seek recognition of their scholarly 
qualities on the highest possible level. The question this study asks can therefore be more explicitly 
formulated as follows: What was it that gained al-Wālī a reputation as a great scholar in his immediate 
environment? How did he position and fashion himself as a scholar; in other words, how did he treat 
local concerns as well as the standards and traditions of scholarship? How did he pick his role on the 
boundary between cultures? What, in al-Wālī’s view, were the issues relevant to his audience, and to 
what extent can his work provide insights into the worldview of common people in his immediate 
environment?   
 
The answers I fashion will help us to get to know the work of a significant scholar who has remained 
obscure until now. A close analysis of his two main texts will demonstrate how al-Wālī skilfully 
combined elements from theological and logical trends in global Islam with the hic et nunc motives of 
his local environment. In particular, a focus on two things will be uncovered: a preoccupation with 
defining who was a bad (rather than a good) Muslim, and a concern with the status of ‘ulamā’ or of 





The focus of the questions I have formulated above is guided by the paths that have been opened by 
scholars working over the last fifty years in particular. For instance, when I say central sudanic Africa, 
I refer to the region J. Hunwick indicated in the second volume of The Arabic Literature of Africa 
(ALA) as comprising today’s northern Nigeria and Cameroun, southern Niger and (western) Chad.4 
This region shares an ecological system (as R. Loimeier emphasises), a history and indigenous cultural 
traits.5 Perhaps the most remarkable feature here is the domination, over a period of a thousand years, 
by rulers from a single dynasty that had its capital first north of Lake Chad, in Kanem, and then west 
of it, in Bornu. The main local languages in the region (such as Kanuri, Kanembu, Barma) belong to 
                                                     
3 A.L. Kroeber and C. Kluckhohn, Culture. A critical review of concepts and definitions. Papers of the Peabody 
Museum no 47, 1952. 
4 J.O. Hunwick e.a. The Arabic Literature of Africa. II: The Writings of Central Sudanic Africa. Leiden: Brill, 
1995. 1-15. 
5 Studying the history of Islam in Africa as a whole and over the longue durée, Loimeier distinguishes four 
ecological regions, ‘all oriented toward a major system of rivers or lakes: the lands in the Atlantic west, oriented 
toward the rivers Senegal and Gambia [...]; the lands converging on the Niger, the nīl ghāna of the Arab 
geographers [...]; the lands converging on Lake Chad and the Shari [...] and, finally, the lands converging on the 
Nile [...]. R. Loimeier, Muslim Societies in Africa. A historical anthropology. Bloomington: Indiana University 
Press, 2013. 3.  
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the Nilo Saharan language group, as distinct from the populations from neighbours who speak Afro- 
Asiatic languages (such as Hausa, Kotoko, Buduma or Tubu). Islam reached these parts as early as the 
ninth or tenth century, via the Fezzān in the north and via Berbers from the Sahara to the northwest.  
 
Historians often consider central sudanic Africa to be part of West Africa—that is, the band of savanna 
lands south of the Sahara, from the Atlantic coast to Lake Chad; that part of Africa that Arabic 
geographers called Bilād al-sūdān (the land of the blacks). There are good reasons for that. West 
Africa has known a number of great empires (more than the regions to the east of Lake Chad), that 
were sustained by and at the same time stimulated the exchange of goods and knowledge with North 
Africa, but also with each other. Along the trade routes, the influence of the Almoravids, who ruled 
the Maghrib and al-Andalus in the eleventh century, expanded as far eastwards as Lake Chad, but no 
farther. This vast inland sea, as well as the rivers (notably the Chari and the Logone) that feed into it, 
flowing from south to north, formed a natural border that was not easily crossed. Until the eighteenth 
century the groups of Arabs who came from east Africa with their cattle, did not venture west of Lake 
Chad.6 Modern researchers have consequently stressed the relations between central sudanic Africa 
and West Africa. However, there were of course contacts with neighbours to the east. Although there 
were no important trade routes from the Lake Chad region eastward, pilgrims to the Ḥijāz travelled not 
only via the Fezzān and Tripoli, but also along a route through Darfur and Sinnār, that is cutting 
through today’s Republic of Sudan. These contacts have been researched only sporadically. 
Exceptions are for instance articles by J. Lavers and by R. Seesemann7, which make clear that there is 
certainly more to be learned in this respect. The cultural unity we now perceive around Lake Chad, 
and the separation we apply in academic studies, is partly coloured by our modern bias, and notably by 
a divide that was sharpened by colonial practice, between the geographical ‘spheres of influence’ of 
the French and the British empires. These turned central sudanic Africa into the extreme and not too 
representative margin of both realms. However, when, at the beginning of the nineteenth century, 
Muḥammad Bello wrote the chronicle of his own homeland in what is today northern Nigeria, he did 
refer to Wadai en Fūr, in the east of today’s Chad and the west of modern Sudan. As for al-Wālī, at 
least as much is known about his orientation towards Cairo, the Ḥijāz and Ottoman scholarship as 
about the influence that scholars from West Africa and the Maghrib had on him. Nevertheless, the 
present study does reflect the bias just described, in that it approaches Bornu and Baghirmi 
predominantly as part of West Africa, and the correspondence in the learning traditions of West Africa 
– including central sudanic Africa – that Hall and Stewart and many others have examined, are also a 
point of departure for the study of al-Wālī’s work.8  
 
Until 1950 little was known about the Arabic writings of Africa south of Egypt and the Maghrib, 
Hunwick wrote in a paper about the background to the publication of the four volumes of The Arabic 
Literature of Africa, and he referred primarily to a lack of knowledge among western Arabists and 
historians.9 As for central sudanic Africa, however, in the last decades of the colonial period and 
shortly thereafter it the curiosity of Europeans was aroused – and there also arose excellent 
opportunities for cooperation with African experts. Their shared enthusiasm resulted in a small 
                                                     
6 J.C. Zeltner, Histoire des Arabes sur les rives du lac Tchad. Paris: Karthala, 2002. 
7 J.E. Lavers, ‘Diversions on a journey or the travels of Shaykh Ahmad al-Yamani (1630-1712) from Halfaya to 
Fez.’ In: Y.F. Hasan and P. Doornbos eds., The Central Bilād al-Sūdān. Khartoum:  Khartoum University Press, 
1981, 216-233. R. Seesemann, ‘Where east meets west: the development of Qur’anic education in Darfour.’ In: 
Islam en sociétés au sud du Sahara. Revue annuelle pluridisciplinaire. No 13/décembre 1999. Maisons des 
Sciences de l’Homme, Paris 1999. 
8 B. Hall and C.C. Stewart, ‘The historic “Core Curriculum” and the Book Market in Islamic West Africa.’ In: 
Krätli & Lydon, The Trans-Saharan Book Trade. Leiden: Brill, 2011. 
9 J.O. Hunwick, Arabic Literature of Africa: Project and Publication. Evanston: Northwestern University 
Program of African Studies, Working Papers, 2005; See also B. Soares, ‘The Historiography of Islam in West 
Africa: an Anthropologist’s View’ In The Journal of African History 55, 1 (2014), 27-36, for a recent, broad and 
challenging overview of themes and interests in the studies of historians, Arabists and anthropologists. 
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outburst of publications by men (all were men) whose names still dominate the field, around the 
towering presence of Hunwick himself.10  
 
In that period A. Bivar and M. Hiskett were the first to publish a very thorough survey of Arabic 
literature from Nigeria, covering the beginning of the nineteenth century, when the enormous literary 
production by the leading family of the Sokoto jihād heralded a new phase, ‘The Arabic Literature of 
Nigeria to 1804’.11 It is a review of genres and topics in central sudanic scholarship, and it indicates 
influences from writers and schools in other regions of the Muslim world. The emphasis is on the late-
fifteenth-century al-Maghīlī (who was in fact not from the region, but who had considerable influence 
on it), on al-Hajrami (fl. ca 1700) and on the late eighteenth century shaykh Jibrīl b. ‘Umar, the most 
important teacher of ‘Uthmān dan Fodio, the leader of the Sokoto jihād in the first years of the 
nineteenth century. Bivar and Hiskett had not come across Muḥammad al-Wālī. A logical follow-up to 
their survey was Hiskett’s article on a tradition of reform that he saw unfolding over centuries among 
scholars in the region. His analysis is particularly useful for an understanding of al-Wālī. Fifty years 
later, Hall and Stewart presented another survey, on a larger scale. Based on the catalogues of libraries 
in all of West Africa, from Mauritania to Nigeria, they determined what the ‘core of the core 
curriculum´ was in the teaching tradition of Islam in the region. A brilliant by-product of their research 
was the online publication in the first decade of the twenty-first century of the West African Arabic 
Manuscript Database, which brings together the catalogues of eleven West African collections (almost 
20.000 manuscripts) and which will no doubt stimulate future research.12  
 
Since the start of the colonial period, many orientalists and historians have been especially interested 
in the medieval West African states, in the different jihāds that took place there, and in the transition 
to colonial rule. The availability of sources, too, has led to a strong emphasis on the ruling elite and on 
the nineteenth century. For central sudanic Africa in particular, much attention has been paid to the 
Sokoto sultanate and to the Hausa kingdoms that were incorporated in it in the first decade of the 
nineteenth century, as well as to the enormous collection of chronicles, treatises and sermons produced 
there.  
 
The oldest centre of power and learning in the region, Kanem and then Bornu, has received less 
attention. The history of the early centuries of its Sefuwa dynasty, starting with the ninth century, was 
unearthed by Dierk Lange, through a most penetrating analysis of its so-called king-list.13 L. Brenner 
supplemented this history with a study, based on a variety of sources from historical accounts to songs 
of praise in different languages, and of travel reports from European explorers. The study concentrated 
on the last century of the dynasty’s rule, starting with when the scholar al-Kanemī successfully led the 
diplomatic as well as the military resistance against Sokoto’s expansion, and ending just at the end of 
the nineteenth century, when Bornu was, first, overrun by locusts and then overrun by Rabah, the 
famous warlord from present-day Sudan.14 One type of written source that is unique to Bornu, the 
maḥrams (charters of privilege) that the Sefuwa rulers granted to Muslim scholars, allowed Hamid 
Bobboyi to investigate the relations between Muslim scholars and power.15 Most recently Dmitri 
Bondarev has published a number of studies on the calligraphed and annotated Qur’āns for which 
                                                     
10 For instance M. Hiskett, Emir Abdullah Ibn Muḥammad, A.D.H. Bivar, M. Last, the wazir of Sokoto Junayd 
b. Muḥammad al-Bukhārī, L. Brenner, M.A. al-Hajj, P.E. Lovejoy. Cf H.J. Fisher, ‘The Fulani Jihād’. (Review 
of Tazyīn al-Waraqāt by `Abdallah b. Muḥammad, transl. M. Hiskett.) In Journal of African History. 7, 2 (1966), 
344-347. 
11 A.D.H. Bivar and M. Hiskett, ‘The Arabic Literature of Nigeria to 1804. A provisional account.’ In Bulletin 
for the SOAS, University of London. Vol. 25, 101/3 (1962) 104-148. 
12 www.westafricanmanuscripts.org 
13 D. Lange, Le diwan des Sultans du (Kanem)-Bornu: chronologie et histoire d’un Royaume Africaine (de 
la fin de Xe siècle jusqu’à 1808). Wiesbaden: Franz Steiner Verlag, 1977. 
14 L. Brenner, The Shehus of Kukawa. A history of the al-Kanemy dynasty of Bornu. London : Oxford University 
Press, 1973. 
15 H. Bobboyi, ‘Relations of the Bornu ‘ulama’ with the Sayfawa rulers: the role of the maḥrams’. In Sudanic 
Africa.  IV, 1993; 175-204. 
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Bornu has been famous in a good part of the Arabic world, and on the particular tradition of tafsīr that 
developed there.16  
 
A specific field of interest, almost naturally since it concerns those who first speak to the historian, has 
been formed by Muslim scholars. It has yielded studies, from which the present one will draw 
extensively, of the social and political roles they played (for instance, Levtzion 1985, and Bobboyi 
1992 and 1993), of their status and professional practice (for instance Wilks 1986, Hunwick 1970, 
Lavers 1981, Stewart 1976, and H.T. Norris 1990), of their modes of thought (for instance, Brenner 
1980, 1985a, 9185b, and 1987) and of their use and acquisition of books (Last 2011). Nevertheless, 
relatively little of the central sudanic tradition of Arabic writing has been examined from the point of 
view of intellectual history, the perspective that the present study will explore.  
 
The way in which the Sokoto jihād has been studied illustrates how approaches have developed, to the 
point where intellectual history is a logical next step. At the end of the colonial period, the character 
and the motives behind the jihād were a central topic of discussion. Were the motives purely religious 
and social, as the revolutionaries themselves claimed, or were they political and even racist (Dan 
Fodio’s family and the Sokoto elite were Fulani and dethroned Hausa kings), as Y. Urvoy or J.S. 
Trimingham (1949 and 1962 respectively) would have it? After Nigeria gained independence, views 
changed. Paden and Hiskett both saw the jihād as a social conflict.17 The latter especially argued that 
the jihadist accusations against the Hausa rulers that they had abused the population, were well 
founded, and that their ambition to right social wrongs by enforcing Islamic law was sincere. J. Willis 
went a step farther and said that the Fulani were everything but racist, and that in fact they were the 
first among whom African Islam began ‘to shed some of its ethnic particularism, and the brotherhood 
of Islam took precedence over bonds of kinship’.18 It was quite an idealistic point of view, but by then 
the question had lost its attraction.  
 
A new question was taken up: whether the Sokoto jihād and a series of others that took place in 
different places in West Africa between 1675 and approximately 1850, were part of a larger revivalist 
movement in the Muslim world of that time. Yes, said N. Levtzion, they were part of a world-wide 
wave of renewal and reform in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. He rejected – as had Hiskett 
before him - the suggestion that they were all linked to the Wahhabiya movement, but argued that all 
of them were part of the development of ṣūfī networks, which were themselves a driving force behind 
the reform movements. The Fulfulde speaking jihadists were Qadiriyya ṣūfīs. Levtzion held that, just 
as in India, Egypt and elsewhere, the grievances of peasants in the Hausalands were articulated by new 
sufist leaders, their devotion expressed in mystical verse. Thus ‘the history of Islam in Africa becomes 
more meaningful when viewed in a worldwide context, and not in isolation.’19 Others however, such 
as Hiskett and later K. Vikør, have been more interested in understanding the particular social, 
political and intellectual background of the African reform movements. In a short article on the topic 
Vikør argued that, even if a worldwide pattern of reform existed, the jihāds of Dan Fodio in the 
Hausalands and that of ‘Umar Tall in West Africa a few decades later, were in the first place inspired 
primarily by local situations, but that their scholarly leaders and their followers drew elements from 
                                                     
16 D. Bondarev, ‘Qur'anic Exegesis in Old Kanembu: Linguistic Precision for Better Interpretation’ In Journal of 
Qur'anic Studies, 15 (2013): 56-83. D. Bondarev, ‘Multiglossia in West African Manucripts: The Case of Borno, 
Nigeria.’ In Manuscript Cultures: Mapping the Field, eds J.U. Sobisch, J.B. Quenzer, D. Bondarev. Berlin: De 
Gruyter (in press).  
17 J.N. Paden, Religion and Political Culture in Kano. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1973.  M. 
Hiskett, ‘Introduction’ In C.L. Temple, Native Races and their Rulers. London: Frank Cass & Co, 1968, A 
History of Hausa Islamic Verse. London: University of London, 1975. 
18 J.R. Willis, Studies in West African Islamic History. I: The Cultivators of Islam. London: Frank Cass, 
1979. 3. 
19 N. Levtzion, ‘Islam in African and Global Contexts: Adventures in Comparative Studies of Islam’ (first 
presented in 2001).  In Islam in Africa and the Middle East. Studies on Conversion en Renewal. Aldershot: 
Ashgate Variorum, 2007. VII, 12. 
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the global ‘library’ of Muslim models and ideas.20 This is a metaphor that perfectly fits the study of al-
Wālī. Al-Wālī’s particular case could never be exemplary for any model of the historical development 
of Islam in Africa. But if we try to understand his intellectual choices, he can nevertheless, throw more 




3.  Intellectual history and philology 
 
Not many studies that have been published of particular works or authors from central Sudanic Africa 
try to link their ideas to social and intellectual developments at the local and the more global levels, or 
to place such works and authors in the global traditions of Islamic learning. (See the works by 
‘Uthmān dan Fodio, and by his brother and his son, which are once again an exception.) It is in this 
connection that the present study aims to make a contribution to our understanding of a period that is 
shrouded in mist. My aim is to interpret the relations between texts by al-Wālī and their various 
contexts. Interpreting texts is the business of different disciplines such as literary criticism, philosophy 
and history, notably intellectual history, when ‘great texts´ are concerned. I will forego a consideration 
of definitions of ‘text’ and limit myself to the simple fact that our starting point here lies with written, 
scholarly treatises, while popular and oral narratives and discourse are involved as part of the context. 
In assigning ‘greatness’ to one and another text, a distinction is often made between documentary texts 
and ‘worklike’ texts, whereby the documentary text is factual and constative, while a worklike (or 
performative) text is, in the words of D. Lacapra, ‘critical and transformative, for it deconstructs and 
reconstructs the given, in a sense repeating but also bringing into the world something that did not 
exist before in that significant variation, alteration or transformation. With deceptive simplicity, one 
might say that while the documentary marks a difference, the worklike makes a difference.’21 
Intellectual history works with both aspects, but with a strong preference for the second. Thinking of 
authors such as Freud, Marx and Nietzsche, LaCapra argues that the greatness of worklike texts lies 
not so much in the confirmation or reflection of common concerns, but more in the exceptional way in 
which they address commonplace themes, employ and contest ordinary assumptions, reinforce and 
subvert tradition.22 Seen through this lens, al-Wālī’s work has, I believe, made a difference, even if it 
does not stand the test of ‘greatness’ in all respects. However, the purpose of consulting intellectual 
history here is not to weigh al-Wālī, but to draw inspiration from its methods in order to understand 
the history of ideas in society.  
 
Because of its focus on ‘great texts’ or the work of intellectuals, intellectual history has been accused 
of elitism, of assuming that intellectual activity is the exclusive domain of great thinkers and that it is 
only to be found in great books.23 As a response, the discipline was sometimes understood as applying 
to all cultural production, in which case, however, it would just be another name for cultural 
anthropology. The debate in the last two or three decades about what intellectual history should take as 
its domain has resulted in formulations that are widely shared. First, intellectual history works with 
texts that have been influential, whether they have been read by many people or not, and the idea that 
text, or what an author was doing, can only be understood in context – political, social, linguistic, 
literary and so on.24 It is interested, not in the history of thought, not as a history of concepts abstracted 
from text (tracing ideas over time, as a form of history ‘in the air’), but in a history of thoughts and 
ideas of individual thinkers, speakers and writers, who, making conscious choices, created, transmitted 
                                                     
20 K. Vikør, ‘Jihad in West Africa: A global theme in a regional setting’. In L. Manger (ed.), Muslim Diversity. 
Local Islam in a Global Context. Richmond: Curzon Press, 1999. 80-101. 
21 D. LaCapra, Rethinking intellectual history: texts, contexts, language. London: Cornell University Press, 
1983. 30. 
22 LaCapra 1983, 28-29. 
23 A. Brett, What is Intellectual History Now? In What is History Now? D. Cannadine ed. Houndsmill: Palgrave 
Macmillan, 2002. 113-114. 
24 Q. Skinner, On intellectual history and the history of books. In Contributions to the history of concepts. I, 
I, (2005), 29-36. 
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and transformed them.25 It is the transmission that is especially productive, notes A. Grafton.26 In the 
following pages, al-Wālī appears as someone who made his own choices, and was informed and 
motivated by traditions, his travels, his education, social environment and so on. His intentions can of 
course not be fully understood, but there is enough information to enable and encourage an 
interpretation.  
 
Secondly, intellectual history is concerned with collective representations and practices, with 
mentalité. It starts from the notion that we perceive the world we inhabit through a particular structure 
of cognition, that can be recognised in written text, but also in the context of concepts, images and 
‘states of perception’. If it is assumed that social groups construct reality in their own way, by means 
of intellectual configurations, and that they tend to perpetuate them in institutionalised forms, a good 
way of tracing this social imagery is by examining the motives in text and context.27 It is at this point 
that intellectual history is most related to social history. Central representations that this study will 
investigate are that of the central truth of a global religion versus the certainties of local religions, as 
well as that of the ‘imitator’ - the superficial Muslim who is insufficiently devoted to a certain type of 
religious authority - as an unbeliever (in chapter 5), and that of the unbeliever as filthy and unable to 
control his whims and passions (in chapter 6). 
 
The intellectual history of what may be called the Cambridge school adds to this, thirdly, a 
fundamental inspiration that is lucidly expressed by Q. Skinner, who speaks for me when he remarks 
that we are interested in such an approach, because ‘we are interested in the history of the moral and 
political concepts that are nowadays used to construct and appraise our modern world.’28 ‘To 
understand such concepts [...] we need to find out when and how and why the vocabulary in which 
they are expressed arose, what purposes this vocabulary was designed to serve, what role it played in 
argument.’29 If ideological forces that were at work in the original construction of concepts can be 
uncovered, that can be of great practical value, because it can enable us to rethink their meaning now. 
An important question in the present study is how the image of the Muslim in central sudanic Africa 
developed or how in text and textualised reality the Muslim was distinguished from others.   
 
Now let us move from the practical value to the practical questions that intellectual history proposes to 
ask. In his essay ‘Rethinking Intellectual History and Reading Texts’ Lacapra lists six particular 
questions and discusses their meaning for historical understanding. Four of them are especially 
relevant to this study. They are not repeated explicitly in the following chapters, but their influence 
will be easily recognised. The first has to do with the relation between the author’s intentions and what 
the text actually does, or discloses or brings about, paying strict attention to the possibility of tension 
or even contradiction between the two. Secondly, there is the question about the relation between the 
author’s life and his texts, not just about the people who may have influenced him, but about his 
known or unknown motivations. This ‘psychobiographical’ perspective is a hazardous one that 
harbours the risk of speculation, but it is in fact a common assumption in all sorts of studies that 
feature a biographical chapter about an author. The third question concerns the relation between social 
processes and the origin and the interpretation or impact of texts, including the relation between 
written text and more or less formalised modes of discourse. The fourth addresses the relation between 
text and levels of culture, and leads, for instance, to the investigation of attitudes in a text towards the 
values of a culture. It entails attention to communities of people who shared a certain discourse. Great 
texts typically circulate on the level of ‘high’ culture or an elite. This is certainly true of al-Wālī’s 
texts, since common people, without a thorough Muslim education, did not read (or speak) Arabic. 
                                                     
25 Brett 2002, 113-119; Lacapra 1983, 34.  
26 A. Grafton, ‘Introduction: Notes from Underground on Cultural Transmission’ in S. Blair and A. Grafton 
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analysing meanings, symbols, references etc as if it were a text, comes from Clifford Geertz, The Interpretation 
of cultures, 1973.  
28 Skinner 2005, 33. 
29 Skinner 2005, 34. 
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But, as will be discussed below, there are always relations between texts and ideas from different 




The questions above could not be answered without a close reading of the Arabic manuscripts, or 
without the Theorie der Aufmerksamkeit, as Roman Jakobson lovingly described the art of philology. 
‘This now defunct field’, Michael Dutton called the discipline in 2002.30 He was referring to philology 
in its older forms, when the aim of textual criticism and text edition was to dissect language in order to 
discover a genealogy of languages that would ultimately lead back to God’s own language and truth, 
and later (towards the end of the nineteenth century) to provide more scientific means to translate 
God’s truth into other languages, an ambition even more closely associated with ‘the epistemic 
violence of imperialism’.31 Dutton also indicated the possibilities that another type of philology might 
open up, which would start from the need to ‘enter into the people’s way of thinking and feeling’ (as 
had already been argued one hundred years earlier) and from the need for contextualisation and 
attention to processes of signification.32 He was not the only one to think in this direction. In the same 
year, philosophers and classicists in Heidelberg raised the question ‘What is a philological question?’33 
Two direct pleas, however, for the revaluation – or rescue - of philology as the best method for access 
to the past, really struck a chord across the literary sciences: Sheldon Pollock’s essay ‘Future 
Philology?’ and Edward Said’s lecture ‘The Return to Philology’.34 For both, philology must be about 
not jumping to conclusions, but making oneself aware of the meaning of texts, words, metaphors in 
the context of other texts, genres, rhetorics, historical development and so on, because they all 
influence the meanings of a text one seeks to understand, and have all influenced the author’s choices. 
The importance of this approach lies in its being the ground of humanistic practice, in the words of 
Said, who (with the same idealism as Skinner) argued forcefully for an attitude of attentively 
‘receiving’ texts and investigating their meaning in order to resist the ‘prepackaged and reified 
representations of the world that usurp consciousness and preempt democratic critique.’35  
 
The basis of the theory of philology is the notion of a strong relationship between words and reality. In 
1970 Franz Rosenthal began his book Knowledge Triumphant by stating that ‘[c]ivilizations tend to 
revolve around meaningful concepts of an abstract nature.’36 He concentrated on the concept of 
knowledge or ‘ilm in Arabic and, the true philologist that he was, he often returned to the various 
meanings that have been attached throughout the formative centuries of Islam to the root of that word. 
Thirty years later, Said pushed farther and asserted that ‘words are not passive markers or signifiers 
standing in unassumingly for a higher reality; they are, instead, an integral formative part of the reality 
itself.’37 This idea of the link between words or text and reality makes for a seamless match between 
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F. Vollhardt, F. M. Zini (eds.) Berlin: De Gruyter, 2010. 1-21. 
35 Said 2004, 71. 
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37 Said 2004, 59. Cf W. Hamacher, ‘Für – die Philologie.’ In Was ist eine philologische Frage? J.P. Schwindt 
(ed.) Berlin: Suhrkamp, 2009, 21-61; 36. 
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philology and the approach taken in intellectual history. But there is also a significant difference 
between the two.  
 
The correspondence, first, is evident when we look at the methods of philology: from the more 
philosophically inclined German philologists to practical Pollock, there is considerable agreement 
about what the practice of the modern philologist is. First, they agree that it pertains to the theory of 
textuality as well as the history of textualised meaning. Textuality refers to the place of a text in a 
genre, its relation with other texts, to the structures that were chosen for it and the motives found in it, 
which all bear on its meaning. Therefore, philology may encompass the study of ‘the history of 
manuscript culture, print culture, the logic of text transmission, the nature and function of 
commentaries, the contests between local and supralocal forms of textuality and the kind of 
sociotextual communities and circulatory spheres thereby created.’38  
 
However, the theory of philology uncovers a problem in the relation between philology and history 
that intellectual history leaves untouched, a problem Pollock explains in terms of the distinction (first 
made by al-Wālī’s contemporary Giovanni Battista Vico) between verum and certum. Where verum 
stands for absolute, ‘unadulterated’ truth, the ‘original’ meaning of a text, certum points to ‘the 
certitudes people have at the different stages of their history and that provide the grounds for their 
beliefs and actions’39, to the meaning of a text for historical actors. For Vico verum was the realm of 
philosophy, certum the realm of philology. Pollock stresses that philology is involved with both, but 
admits that certum is the preferred field. The problem now is that the objects of study which tell us 
about these certitudes, i.e. words and their meanings, change through time, between author and 
audience and between one audience and the next. To understand the meaning of words in a particular 
context, one studies other texts, practices, social relations, and so on. But the aim of a philological 
study is precisely to gain a deeper understanding of that context. It is the trap of the 
‘sprachhermeneutischer Zirkel’.40 One of the questions raised above is what the basis for al-Wālī’s 
reputation was - that is, why he was important to his audience. One reason, we can assume, is that his 
ideas were relevant to them. This implies that exploring his work will tell us something about his 
environment, while at the same time, we need to know about the environment to interpret his work. 
That is the permanent interaction the philologist has to deal with. There is no way to cut corners. 
Going back and forth is what interpreting is all about. Moreover, warns W. Hamacher, every advance 
towards the essence of a historical text leads to another step back from it as well. Each meaning found 
leads to further questions regarding ideas and views that may lie behind it.41 And these are only two of 
the various difficulties philologists acknowledge between our understanding of text and their meaning 
in history. A final one is our own historicity, the fact that we can not read texts from the past as neutral 






Intellectual history carries not only the risk of elitism, but also of orientalism, that dark cloud that any 
work in the field of Islamic studies wants to avoid. One of the orientalist flaws on which Said put his 
finger, has been the tendency to study Islam as a product of text, not of people, and to describe the 
view from a writing elite at best, of a history of canonical Islam. In the case of central sudanic Africa it 
is an important warning, for two reasons: first because it is easy to see Muslims in Africa as twice 
removed from us, as living (or having lived) far from canonical Islam, on the margin even of 
otherness; and second, because in the conditions of little literacy and very little archival material that 
                                                     
38 Pollock 2009, 949.        
39 Pollock 2009, 951. 
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we encounter in seventeenth-century Africa, it is not easy to avoid relying on scholarly texts. There are 
also two answers to this: the ‘view from the edge’ and popular history. 
 
Al-Wālī’s home environment was in the kingdom, now the Chadian province, of Baghirmi (or 
Baguirmi). From there he travelled to Cairo and the holy cities, but he came back to live and be buried 
in Abgar, now and then a remote village that was and is south-east of Lake Chad. But in the 
seventeenth century it was not as remote as we might think. For decades, western scholars have 
examined Muslim societies largely within an area studies paradigm. The Arab world was seen as the 
centre, local forms of Islam as derivations. In between bilād al-sūdān, the land of the black, and North 
Africa and the Middle East, they perceived the Sahara as a barrier. As a result, African studies have 
been conducted in isolation from the northern ‘white’ part of the continent, while Islamic studies and 
Middle Eastern Studies have taken little account of links with ‘sub-Saharan Africa’ or ‘black Africa’. 
It is a view that is now being corrected, for instance by Eric Ross, who points to the fact that the 
Sahara was for centuries intersected by trade routes, that were also travelled by scholars and migrating 
groups, and that it was only in colonial times, when these trade routes ended, that the Sahara became 
more of a barrier than it had ever been. For in fact the history of the region was marked by exchange 
across the Sahara, and most of all in the domain of religion and Islamic scholarship.43 Al-Wālī and his 
audience were indeed active mediators between models from global Islam and motifs and motivations 
from the local environment.  
 
Mediating between these levels, they did not derive a version of Islam from an ‘ideal’ model, but 
contributed to forming Islam, as R. Bulliet makes us realise in The View from Edge. Speaking of ‘the 
edge of the Muslim world’, for which the book asks our attention, Bulliet does not refer to any 
geographical peripheries. The edge, he says, ‘exists wherever people make the decision to cross a 
social boundary and join the Muslim community, either through nominal Muslims rededicating 
themselves to Islam as the touchstone of their social identity, or recasting their Muslim identities in a 
modern urban context.’44 He argued that the questions of new converts, who try to determine how best 
to live as Muslims, and the questions of Muslims from communities of longer standing in the umma 
who sought to refine their understanding, together with the answers from those endowed with varying 
forms of religious authority, have perpetually formed Muslim societies and Islam. The question-and-
answer motif was also part of other religions, he admits, but what makes it distinctive in Islamic 
religious history is the variability over time of the parties deemed capable of answering questions 
authoritatively. `No one was uniquely gifted, by virtue of office or sacrament, with the right answers. 
This absence of incontrovertible religious authority at the local, quotidian level distinguished Islam 
from other religions in the conquered lands; but the examples of those other religions, particularly as 
felt by Muslims newly converted from them, continually restimulated the desire for authoritative 
answers to questions.'45 Muslims on the edge would seek the centre, one could say, and that is what 
Muslims in central sudanic Africa did. The story told in the following pages is of Muslims who 
disentangle themselves from a non-Muslim or not-very-Muslim environment and strive for a perceived 
the ideological centre, and of a scholar who addresses them and speaks for them. Between them, they 
are forming Islam and the Muslim society of central sudanic Africa.  
 
The society in which al-Wālī lived was complex and socially stratified, and had many links to the 
outside world. We hope that al-Wālī’s texts will inform us about more than the values of his own 
social group (other educated Fulani who shared his ambition of promoting Islam), and assume that in 
his work the concerns and attitudes of the majority of people around him, of common peasants, must 
also show through. A good example of the influence of popular culture in a scholarly text can be found 
in al-Wālī’s treatise against smoking. In chapter Five this treatise will be linked to texts from very 
learned people in the Middle East, but also to texts that stem from oral discourse and that were 
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preserved by oral tradition (until today) and which I therefore call popular, as distinct from bookish. 
But to what extent does that really give access to popular culture? And what is popular culture, for that 
matter? Where does one look for it? Is it the culture of separate, socially inferior groups? Or, if it is at 
times also the culture of the elite, do we define it for instance by certain textual characteristics, such as 
the use of colloquial language?46 Since the anthropologist Robert Redford made a distinction, in his 
study of early modern Europe, between the ‘great’ tradition of the learned, the clergy and the nobility, 
a tradition that was cultivated in schools and temples, and the ‘little’ tradition of what might be termed 
‘the rest’, historians have deepened their understanding of the many ways in which these traditions are 
interdependent. For some, it has led to the conclusion that it is impossible to draw lines between 
cultural phenomena and socioeconomic groups. Others have asked how the ideas or worldview of 
people who did not write could ever be discovered. ‘We want to know about performances [behavior, 
habits, festivals, the performance of oral literature and so on], but what have survived are texts; we 
want to see these performances through the eyes of the craftsmen and peasants themselves, but we are 
forced to see them through the eyes of literate outsiders,’ as P. Burke puts it.47 And outsiders had their 
own reasons for selecting and preserving elements of popular culture, in their own context. Such 
considerations have made historians and anthropologists wonder whether the study of popular history 
is possible and, if it is, whether it is useful at all.48 
 
Burke’s own answer to the question was that it is possible. While it is inevitable that information about 
popular culture in history comes to us in a distorted way, it is, he argued, not unique to popular 
history: it is in fact the historian’s traditional business to allow for some distortion. We can 
nevertheless gain an understanding of the culture of common ‘craftsmen and peasants’, because there 
is not only a mutual dependence between ‘great’ and ‘little’ traditions, but also because the elite 
participates in the ‘little’ tradition. Nobles in Europe have participated in festivals, kings have watched 
clowns, clergy have dressed up for carnival, and the learned have enjoyed popular songs and stories 
told in marketplaces. The same was true, in general, of the ruling class and the scholars of Bornu. And 
while the common people did not understand the Latin or the fuṣḥā’ Arabic of the elite, the elite did 
speak the vernacular. ‘They were amphibious, bi-cultural, and also bilingual.’49 Popular culture in 
bygone ages can therefore be reached via witnesses or brokers between the learned and the illiterate, 
such as preachers and travellers, people who did write. But the approach will always be oblique, to use 
Burke’s term. For instance, the texts of spoken sermons were sometimes recorded and can give 
information about the way in which they were delivered. And the sermons of preachers about attitudes 
they denounced or commended, tell us about attitudes they observed. Another ‘oblique’ method to 
which Burke devotes some space is what he calls (with the historian Marc Bloch) the regressive 
method. It is natural, he explains, that fewer sources should have been preserved from centuries farther 
back in history, because less people were literate, they had less writing material, and less paper has 
survived. Of the same period as ours, Burke wrote: ‘There is therefore a strong case for writing the 
history of popular culture backwards and for using the late eighteenth century as a base from which to 
consider the more fragmentary evidence from the seventeenth and sixteenth centuries.’50 That method 
will also be modestly employed in the following pages.  
 
A masterly and thrilling example of where an oblique approach can lead, is the story that C. Ginzburg 
tells us of Menocchio, a miller from Friuli, near Bologna, in the sixteenth century. In The cheese and 
the worms, Ginzburg examines the worldview of Menocchio and the peasants among whom he lived, 
based on the records of his trial as a heretic. Comparing the conversations between Menocchio and his 
inquisitors with the records of other court cases, and also with the text of the books (about a dozen) the 
miller is known to have read, Ginzburg succeeded in unravelling how he read them, and through what 
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sort of lens. There was, writes Ginzburg ‘a screen that he unconsciously placed between himself and 
the printed page: a filter that emphasized certain words while obscuring others, that stretched the 
meaning of a word, taking it out of context, that acted on Menocchio’s memory and distorted the very 
words of the text.’51 This screen leads back to a worldview contained in the oral tradition of the class 
of common and illiterate people to which Menocchio belonged, even though millers lived (literally 
and socially) on the edges of village societies, and there were some of them who, such as Menocchio, 
could read. Menocchio’s answers to the inquisitors, and his distorted memories of the books he read, 
uncover the worldview of the European countryside at the time, which was characterised by ‘a peasant 
religion intolerant of dogma and ritual, tied to the cycles of nature, and fundamentally pre-Christian’ 
and anti-clerical. Menocchio projected the ideas he had drawn from this culture onto some of the 
‘great’ texts of Christian literature, producing a synthesis of ‘high’ and popular culture. In doing so 
came near the ideas of progressive reformers such as Lutherans, which was probably the reason why 
he was eventually convicted. Al-Wālī’s approach (and his fate) were quite different. Forging his own 
synthesis of high and low culture, he chose to represent the more orthodox views of his time, and as 
far as we know he died in his home town, peacefully and still commanding the respect of his 
community. But for the spectator of about four hundred years later, there is a resemblance between the 
two men, which encourages us to search for a similar spyhole (or screen leading back to a popular 
worldview) in the African’s work. Where Menocchio negotiated between the little and the great 
traditions of his time as a reader who speaks to us, al-Wālī negotiated between the traditions of 
common people - Muslims and non-Muslims - and the learned elite of global Islam as a writer.  
 
Another issue with respect to the relationship of central sudanic Africa with the historical heartlands of 
Islam concerns the question of the character of the religion in these regions. In the twentieth century 
increasing attention has been paid to the fact that practices, traditions and beliefs of Muslims in 
Indonesia for instance, are different from those of their co-religionists in Morocco, and that those of 
illiterate believers are different from those of scholars, and so on. From this awareness followed an 
idea of ‘African Islam’ as opposed to a ‘pure’ Islam, that can exist in Africa but that is modelled on 
practices in the region where the religion originated. The terms ‘African Islam’ and Islam noir were 
coined in colonial times by ethnologists who described it as friendlier and more open towards western 
ideas than Islam in the Middle East, but also as less ‘correct’. R. Seesemann has shown in detail how 
this image of African Islam was linked to that of rural and marginal Islam. He warns that the notion of 
African Islam versus ‘real’ Islam in Africa conceals a dichotomy of what is pure and what is 
syncretist, and what is orthodox and popular, or militant and tolerant, puritanical and emotional, or 
global and local; on closer examination these dichotomies do not fit the actual practices and 
interpretations of different groups of Muslims in Africa. They should be avoided, he writes, because 
‘what is at stake here are the pictures we draw of the development of both Islam and Africa.’52 The 
matter is all the more sensitive, because views of African Islam as marginal and deficient have also 
been propagated by missionary policies from countries such as Lybia, Sudan and Saudi-Arabia, which 
have used ‘the call to Islam’ (al-da‘wa al-islamiyya) as a political tool in the twentieth century, in 
much the same way as Christian missionary work was used by western colonialism. For them, Africa 
has been dār al-ṣulḥ, the territory of ‘compromise’ between the land of Islam and the land of war, 
where Islam must be strengthened.53 
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It is evident that such views of Islam in Africa or African Islam need to be avoided when writing about 
centre and periphery, global and local, popular and literate and other oppositions. However, any 
analysis or discourse – let alone reading it - would be difficult if all of these terms always had to be 
circumvented, defined or nuanced by scare quotes. And that will not be necessary as long as we realise 
that this study is precisely about the interconnectedness between a scholar and his more popular 
milieu, and about the exchange between forms of Islam that are recorded in written culture and lived 
in daily life in an oral environment. Terms such as popular and scholarly, local and global may serve 
the analysis, as long as they are not reified.  
 
Finally, it should be noted that in the history of Islam in Africa, Muslims there have often regarded the 
region where the religion originated, and its contemporary political centre (Istanbul in the seventeenth 
century) as a cultural and normative centre. African Muslim rulers have ascribed to themselves a 
Middle Eastern ancestry or asked for legitimisation and counsel from sultans and scholars in Turkey or 
the Middle East, and African scholars went there to study with specialists. The distance between 
themselves and this centre was sharply felt, primarily because the journey there took about three 
months. But in al-Wālī’s time and later - perhaps more than in the first centuries of these relations - a 
cultural distance was also felt. Scholars from West Africa who attended lectures in mosques and 
houses in Cairo, met with a depreciatory attitude, and their colleagues from present-day Sudan were 
called ‘barrī’, provincials.54 In the nineteenth century, the German traveller Heinrich Barth met the son 
of an influential man in Bornu who was about to leave for Egypt where he hoped to get a glimpse of a 
higher state of civilization, but also to have the opportunity to show ‘the Arabs near the coast that the 
inhabitants of the interior of the continent are superior to the beasts.’55  
 
Africans were aware of the views that existed in the Middle East of the Land of the Black as removed 
from civilization, a view that they not only fought, as Barth’s interlocutor did, but also replicated. The 
Fulani jihadists were certainly not the first who thought of themselves as people who, guided by the 
stars of Islam, had struggled out of a darkness that was still very nearby. ‘We live on the margin of the 
inlands,’ wrote the jihād’s chronicler Muḥammad Bello, ‘in the bilād al-sūdān, whose people are 
dominated by barbary and the shadows of ignorance and passions.’56 But ‘margin’ is not the best 
translation for ṭaraf here. The ancestors of the Fulani scholars of Dan Fodio’s family - Muḥammad 
Bello was his son – including our hero al-Wālī, were nomads and aspects of their culture were still 
cherished by the sedentarised Fulani who promoted Islam. They did not think of themselves as living 
on a margin, but as living on the frontier of Islam, a frontier that was a ‘limite provisoire d’une espace 
civilisée avec une zone barbare à conquerir.’57 It was a heroic position, imposing a heavy task. 
Frontiers are always fixed by priests, says Debray, and al-Wālī knew it too. For the militant religious 
authorities of the jihād, it involved establishing military stations to fight the pagans on the other side;58 
for al-Wālī, a hundred years before, it involved the establishment of symbolic sign-posts.  
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5. Sources and structure 
 
Most of the primary sources for this study originally come from Nigeria, but many of them can now be 
consulted in the Herskovits Library of Northwestern University in Evanston (NU, Michigan), where 
the collections that were assembled by and named after John Paden, Umar Falke and John Hunwick, 
are kept. Libraries in Nigeria also preserve thousands of manuscripts, and I have been very fortunate to 
have had the help of Salisu Bala who has provided me with copies of a number of manuscripts. 
Manuscripts that have been collected in Segou and other places in Mali, are now part of the collection 
‘Arabe’ of in the Bibliothèque Nationale de France (BNF). Manuscript collections in Chad are small 
and not yet catalogued. 59 The character of the manuscript collections will be discussed in chapter 3.   
 
The manuscripts used for this study were presumably written in the nineteenth century, which means 
that at least the ones with texts by al-Wālī are copies of manuscripts from the seventeenth century or 
later, and that we have no autographs by al-Wālī. By contrast with conventions in the Middle East, 
manuscripts in sudanic Africa, even the administrative and official documents from the nineteenth 
century, were seldom dated, and more often than not their age can only be estimated with the help of 
watermarks, textual and palaeographic information.60 Many of the manuscripts I studied have a 
watermark showing either three moons – sometimes with faces and in different sizes – or the name of 
Andrea Galvane Pordenone. They come from different batches of paper produced by one Venetian 
firm that existed from 1836 to 1880, and whose Tre Lune paper was popular from Egypt to West 
Africa.61 So popular was it, that, according to Last, other producers, Italian as well as Ottoman, copied 
the watermark.62 The handwriting on all these manuscripts is in the style that Brigaglia and Nobili 
identify as Barnāwī, a peculiar script that was and still is used in an area encompassing the modern 
states of Cameroun, Chad, Niger and Nigeria. It originated before the twelfth century, they argue, from 
a style directly linked to Kufic, and not derived from the Maghribī style that was long thought to be its 
precursor.63 It testifies to the ancient roots of an independent tradition of learning in this part of Africa.  
 
Exactly what this tradition was like exactly can never be determined with certainty. All our 
investigations must be affected by doubts created by the ever-recurrent stories of the destruction of 
books. It is commonly believed that during the Sokoto jihād, the revolutionaries destroyed the 
chronicles of the Hausa kingdoms they conquered.64 Bornu’s leader al-Kanemī blamed Dan Fodio for 
the fact that his warriors also destroyed books in Bornu with the pretext that they contained un-Islamic 
ideas, and Dan Fodio’s son Muḥammad Bello in his turn accused one of the Hausa kings of burning 
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books as an act of war.65 Some decades later, Umar, the son of Bornu’s extra-dynastic leader al-
Kanemī, was said to have burned the royal chronicles of Bornu. 
  
Several explanations have been offered for this vandalism. Hiskett for instance explains that for the 
Sokoto jihadists Islamic history began only with ‘the Shehu’, `Uthmān dan Fodio, and what had come 
before it was unworthy of their attention. Once they were in power, the Fulani aristocracy tried to 
recreate ‘the ethos of an exotic, Middle Eastern, Arabic speaking society’ to supplant the Hausa or 
other more local interpretations of Islamic culture. Even more outspoken, O. Meunier puts the point 
even more forcefully, arguing that Dan Fodio and his followers, who were Qadariyya ṣūfīs, destroyed 
enormous quantities of books because they wished to wipe out all traces of other ‘confessional’ 
networks, whose competition they also resented in the field of trade. Whatever was left was of course 
not safe. Wars and upheavals have perturbed life in the region frequently, right up to the present day, 
and, as one scholar in Chad said to me: “when people flee, they don’t carry old books”. Unfortunately, 
the value of these ‘old books’ has been lost to many people, because in the past decades they had no 
idea of the content. In 1911 writing in Arabic was officially banned in the French colonies in sudanic 
Africa.66 It was still taught in Quranic schools, but only at the most basic level, and most Muslims in 
Chad, Cameroon and Niger in the twentieth century could not read or write it well. It was only at the 
end of the century that reading and writing Arabic returned in the regular primary and secondary 
school curricula of (Muslim) schools in Chad. In Nigeria, where thousands of manuscripts have been 
preserved, Arabic continued to be taught throughout the colonial period.67 It is certain that numerous 
written treasures were lost, torn up or burned over the centuries. However, the stories about the 
destruction of books also show the signs of myth, and they are at least a literary trope with meanings 
that reach beyond the facts.  
 
 
Structure of this study  
 
The next chapter of the present study will discuss issues in the history of Islam in West Africa that are 
relevant to the analysis of Wālī’s work. According to his nisbas, Muḥammad al-Wālī came from 
Bornu and Baghirmi, two neighbouring states near Lake Chad, in regions which still bear the same 
names. The information in chapter 2 focusses on Bornu, which has a long and rather well documented 
Muslim history. After a historical overview, it highlights two specific issues, the meeting of Islam with 
traditional religions in Africa, and the social and cultural meanings of slavery.  
 
Historical facts about al-Wālī’s personal life are few and far in between. Chapter 3 presents the factual 
data about his origin and his works and then moves on to a discussion of his reputation, and a first 
evaluation of how that might be interpreted. It will be argued that the image that has survived of him 
today, of a great mystic, reflects a trend in Islam that was gaining increasing importance in the region, 
but that it is not the image al-Wālī wished to leave. He saw himself as a mutakallim, a scholar of 
logical theology. 
To ask how al-Wālī fashioned himself as a scholar is to ask how he positioned himself with respect to 
his environment, that is on the one hand with regard to what other scholars did or had done and on the 
other, with regard to the various models that prevailed of what it took to be a learned Muslim. Chapter 
4 is about the cultural, social and intellectual influences that are likely to have played a role in al-
Wālī’s choice of a particular model of scholarship. Some of the themes that were discussed notably 
among Ash‘arī theologians, to whom al-Wālī’s texts are in one way or the other related, are explained 
in this chapter, as background for his own point of view towards them. Regarding the social position 
of ‘ulamā’ who could boast a training in classical book-learning it is proposed that their authority as 
men of undoubted moral standing who possessed unique religious knowledge was challenged in this 
                                                     
65 Whitting 1951, 103, 105. 
66 Brigaglia 2005, 2. 
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period. A further hypothesis ensuing from this, is that al-Wālī’s prestige was partly built on the fact 
that he had an answer to this problem.  
Chapters 5 and 6 explore the relation of al-Wālī’s two most informative texts with other scholarly texts 
on the one hand, and with traces of discourse from the local environment on the other. These two texts 
are The peerless method to gain knowledge of the science of theology and Valid proofs to prohibit the 
smoking of tobacco. The first is the work that has, judging from the number of extant copies, most 
marked al-Wālī’s status as a scholar in a considerable part of central and West Africa. The second, of 
which only one copy has been found so far, is the most idiosyncratic of those of his works that have 
been preserved. Both texts will allow us to get closer to the author as well as his environment. Chapter 
5, which focuses on The peerless method, demonstrates how the status of two canonical text traditions 
was used to frame a new message that was particularly relevant to believers in central sudanic Africa. 
Highlighting an almost diametrically opposed process, chapter 6 shows how local, popular notions 
about tobacco inspired a scholarly treatise, in which al-Wālī addressed an urgent warning against the 
herb at the theological experts in the great Middle Eastern centres of learning. Both chapters show al-
Wālī negotiating between the different levels of Muslim culture in which he was at home.  
 
In the first place, however, his work responded to social dynamics in his own environment. Al-Wālī’s 
sensitivity to his local environment allows us a view of what was going on in the popular culture of 
people who did not leave written records themselves. What we see is that globalisation – the spread of 
the religion of Islam, but also for instance the globalisation of the trade in commodities such as 
tobacco – created the need to demarcate new boundaries, while, and at the same time procuring the 
notions and the narratives with which this could be realised. Al-Wālī supported the desire to 
distinguish, without complex subcategories and without any doubt, between Muslims and others, faith 
and disbelief, truth and falsehood.  
 
While chapters 5 and 6 analyse the content of al-Wālī’s major texts, chapter 7 concentrates on the fact 
that they were written in the first place and explores the significance of the fact that the author was 
situated on the intersection of orality and literacy. In particular, it investigates how he conceives of the 
relation between knowledge and the ‘ulamā’. 
 
By way of conclusion, chapter 8 reviews the elements that explain al-Wālī’s success: first, his choice 
of themes – firmness of belief and the Muslim identity, authority of the ‘ulamā’, and reason - that 
resonated with his audience; secondly, the way in which he negotiated between different levels of 
Muslim culture, demonstrating his grip on all, making new knowledge available for his readers and 
deriving authority from established traditions. Finally, it identifies al-Wālī as an eclectic author, whose 



























This chapter describes historical developments in the environment where al-Wālī lived, paying extra 
attention to two issues in the social organisation of life there, that have a bearing on his work: the 
relation between slavery and the Muslim identity and the competition between Islam and traditional 
religions. The picture that arises is one of troubled times marked by political instability, droughts, a 
movement of Islam from the urban centres to rural areas, and a changing position of scholars.  
 
 
1. A history of Bornu and Baghirmi as Islamic states  
 
A contemporary of al-Wālī, the Timbuktu historian al-Saʿdī wrote in 1655: ‘We have heard it said […] 
that there are four sultans in the world [apart from the sultan in Constantinople]: in Baghdad, Cairo, 
Bornu and Malli’.68 The glory of al-Saʿdī’s own country, ‘Malli’, was in fact bygone, but that of Bornu 
was at its zenith. The sultanate of Bornu was situated – as the province Bornu is today in a sahelian 
landscape, with mountains and plains, and soils of sand or clay.69 Through it runs the river Yobe, from 
west to east, and empties in Lake Chad. The northern part, where vegetation is sparse, is suitable for 
cattle. Nomadic Fulani and Shuwa Arabs lived there in the rainy season, from June to September and 
then moved south some time after the rains. To the south the land is more wooded, marked here and 
there by spectacular Baobab trees, and the agricultural season is somewhat longer. During the rainy 
season millet and sorghum and some vegetable crops were grown, but the soil did not produce much, 
and stocking methods did not always protect against mould, rodents or insects. At the end of the hot 
and dry season (March, April, and May), stocks would often run out, as they still do, and people went 
hungry. 
 
Bornu was populated by speakers of Afro-Asiatic (e.g. Kotoko, Buduma) and Saharan (e.g. Kanuri 
and Kanembu) languages, but starting in the fifteenth century there was a gradual convergence of 
ethnic identities into the Kanuri identity.70 Villages were typically composed of eighty to two hundred 
families when the German explorer Gustav Nachtigal (d. 1885) travelled there in the first quarter of 
the nineteenth century, and the continuity of this size into modern times allows for the assumption that 
it was probably the same in the seventeenth century. Peasants who lived there handed over part of their 
crops to the village chief, who paid the village’s taxes to the king in Birni Gazargamu, in return for 
protection in case of attacks.   
 
Birni Gazargamu was a walled town. When Barth described its ruins in 1852 (it fell to ruin after it was 
conquered by the Fulani in the Sokoto jihad, and was replaced by Kuka as the capital of Bornu in 
1814), he noted that the perimeter of the walls of ‘Birni Kadīm’ (literally the old walled city) 
measured ‘little more than six’ miles and had six or seven gates.71 At the centre was the palace of the 
mai or king, a ‘very large’ building of red brick.72 There were four Friday mosques and the town was 
divided in wards for people from different clans or villages, each of which had their own chief. 
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Common people lived in houses made of banco (mud and dung) with thatch roofs, the same as were 
built in villages. Some court-yards were lined with straw mats that were renewed every dry season, 
giving golden accents to the neighbourhoods. Evergreen trees provided shade in the streets. Within the 
town walls there was also space to raise crops in times of danger. The town’s society was stratified. 
The elite was formed by people who held a function at the royal court – positions that were all 
hereditary - and by scholars. Below them ranked specialised artisans, then people who had no other 
income then from farming. In all of these groups most people owned slaves, who, in principal, ranked 
lowest, although some held court positions and therefore power.  
 
The market of Birni Gazargamu was a final destination for caravans from Tunis, Tripoli and Cairo in 
the north, from Timbuktu, Awdaghust, Agades and Gao in the west, from Kordofan and the Nile 
regions in the east. There, labourers unloaded silk, carpets, weapons and books from the Middle East, 
paper and glass beads from Venice, leather products, copperware and tobacco from the Maghrib and 
gold and kola nuts from Asante in the south. For weeks and months on end dozens of camels, horses 
and cattle were parked on the edge of the market place. In the central sections of the market local 
goods were offered on grass mats on the ground such as vegetables, oil and household tools of 
calabash, wood and straw, baskets filled with sorghum and millet, and calabashes with milk and butter 
that cattle herders would bring in. Economic success was one of the pillars of Bornu’s grandeur.  
 
In al-Wālī’s time, Bornu was a kingdom or a sultanate (the ruler was called mai, a Kanuri word, as 
well as sultan) with an ancient Muslim history, which had started in the tenth or eleventh century in 
Kanem, northeast of Bornu. Our knowledge of those first traces of Islam south of the Sahara comes 
from Arabic authors in the Middle East and al-Andalus, who collected their data from travellers - 
mostly merchants - and recorded them on to serve commerce as well as the science of geography. 
They reveal that almost as soon as the first generations of Muslims had conquered Egypt, they started 
to explore the opportunities for trade with people on the other side of the desert, in bilād al-sūdān. 
From Egypt, a number of trade routes passed west through Ifriqya (North Africa) before turning to the 
kingdoms of Ghana in the westernmost part of the continent, and Mali in the bend of the Niger. This 
region was also referred to as ‘Takrūr’, a name that has led ‘a very mobile existence’ in Arabic 
literature, as Hunwick remarked, but gradually came to signify the western part of sudanic Africa.73 
What attracted the Muslim traders most to the western routes was gold. They sold textiles, horses and 
copper. Another route descended from Tripoli straight through the desert, via the market towns of 
Kawar and Zawīla in the Lybian region of the Fezzan, to end in Kanem, which was to become the 
cradle of the dynasty that is said to have ruled in the Lake Chad region for a thousand years, from the 
ninth to the nineteenth century.74 Al-Ya‘qūbī (d. 872) and al-Bakrī (d. 1094) knew of the existence of 
Kanem (or Kānim), south of Zawīla75, as a place that was pagan. In the ninth century Kanem was ruled 
by Zaghāwa, nomads from the Sahara who had moved south towards Lake Chad and become semi-
sedentarised when the Sahara desiccated. They subjected and mingled with the local, sudanic 
population and based their new wealth on the sale of slaves, salt and natron which they sold in Zawīla, 
where the people ‘are Muslims, all of them, and go on pilgrimage to Mecca.’76 
 
Ibn Sa‘īd (d. 1286) was the first author to mention that Kanem was Muslim and was ruled by a sultan, 
but the actual change seems to have taken place earlier, in the eleventh century. It was a result of 
commercial contacts, but how it came about exactly is not certain. The most important caravan routes 
crossing the Sahara were maintained by North African Berbers. The form of Islam they practised in 
those first centuries was Ibadism, a more moderate doctrine within Kharijism. The population of 
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Zawīlā was Ibāḍiyya and although very few direct written sources of their movements have survived77, 
it is likely that Ibaḍī Berbers, alongside their trading relationships with merchants from Kanem, 
converted the elite of Kanem. However, Kanem also had relations to the Maghrib, from where the 
Almoravids (r. 1071-1147), suppressing Ibadism, propagated an austere form of Malikism, one of the 
four main the legal schools of Islam and the one that has been dominant in Africa ever since.78 
Somewhere in the eleventh century Kanems ruling dynasty adopted Malikism as well. Perhaps 
concomitantly it claimed descent from an ancestor from the Ḥijāz, Sayf b. Dhī Yazan, and from then 
on was called Sefuwa (or Sayfuwa) after him. The Sefuwa dynasty’s history was put down in a king-
list, the Dīwān al-salāṭīn, which was recited and added to for centuries as an oral tradition, before it 
was written down, probably for the first time in the sixteenth century.79  
 
The increasing dominance of Islamic networks on the trade routes stimulated the development of the 
states of Ghana, Mali and Kanem, all three of which were, by the eleventh century, nominally Muslim:  
their rulers had Muslim names and professed adherence to Islam, but often retained traditional 
religions too, while common people were hardly knew of the new religion. The origins of the Hausa 
states, in between Songhay and Bornu, also stem from this period, but Islam seems to have arrived 
there later. Until the end of the eighteenth century, when ʿUthmān dan Fodio (d. 1817) incorporated 
them in his grand Sokoto caliphate, the historical role of the Hausalands had been limited by the fact 
that they were never united and were at times tributary to Songhay and at times dominated by Bornu-
Kanem. 
 
At its apogee in the thirteenth century, Kanem’s power reached from the province Bornu in the west to 
the Fezzan in the north. However, the state suffered from continuous attacks by the Bilala, its 
neighbours who lived near Lake Fitri to the east. Unable to put an end to the assaults, the Sefuwa 
dynasty finally moved westward, towards the end of the fifteenth century, to Bornu. In 1472 they 
established a new capital there, on the river Yobe, and named it Gazargamu or Gasreggomo or Birni 
Bornu. Kanem-Bornu, as it is often called in the literature, soon became one of the most important 
states in west and central Africa. Via Tripoli, it was connected to Egypt and other centres of what had 
been, since 1517, the Ottoman Empire, and via Songhay – successor to the state of Mali in the 
fifteenth and sixteenth century – it was connected to the routes to the Maghrib. Around 1500 al-
Hassan al-Wazzān (d. ca 1554), also known as Leo Africanus, travelled through west and central 
Sudān. He explained that all the kingdoms of the region were in fact subject to only three kings, that is 
to the king of ‘Tombuto’, whose territory was the largest, to the king of Bornu, and to the king of 
Gaoga (presumably the kingdom of the Bilala), who ruled over ‘the rest’.80  
 
‘Tombuto’ or Timbuktu was one of the wealthy cities of Songhay, indeed the greatest empire when 
Leo Africanus made his journey. Centred in the region just east of the bend of the Niger, it stretched 
from the Gambia estuary in the west to the Hausa states and often even further, to the frontiers of 
Bornu in the east. To the north, many Berber speaking, nomadic populations in the Sahara were 
tributary to Songhay. Its major cities – Timbuktu, Djenne, Gao - were situated on crossroads on the 
routes of the gold trade from Akan (in present day Ghana) and were also linked to the networks – 
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commercial and scholarly - of the Mediterranean, from al-Andalus to Cairo. Songhay’s welfare and 
learning, and then its collapse had significant impacts on political, social and cultural developments 
throughout West Africa. Both when it was wealthy and afterwards, its most remarkable contributions 
were perhaps in scholarship, in particular theology and history.  
 
In the field of theology, Songhay has left its mark on the region in various ways – firstly because the 
rich libraries and scholars of Djenne and Timbuktu attracted seekers of knowledge from other sudanic 
regions81, and secondly because one of its early rulers, Askia Muḥammad (r. 1493-1528) sought 
advice regarding good Muslim governance and good Muslim behaviour from two important 
theologians from abroad: the prolific Egyptian scholar Jalāl al-Dīn al-Suyūṭī (d. ca 1505) and the 
renowned North African jurist and exemplary exponent of austere Maghribi Malikism Muḥammad 
‘Abd al-Karīm al-Maghīlī (d. 1504) The requests paved the way for their far-reaching influence in the 
region. Both scholars grasped the chance, also to promote their ideas to other Muslim kings in Africa. 
Al-Suyūṭī did so only in writing , al-Maghīlī wrote and travelled to Gao himself to explain his views in 
person.82 He warned his interlocutors that mixing pagan practices with Islam amounts to shirk or 
polytheism, and that jihād against people who are guilty of ‘mixed Islam’ is better than jihād against 
unbelievers. He preached against illegal taxes and other exploitative practices of the political elite, but 
also against music, and when the case presented itself, in favour of jihād against Jews. On his journey 
he also spent time in the Hausalands of Kano and Katsina, and he sent two epistles to Kano’s ruler 
Muḥammad Rumfa (d. 1499). 
 
Songhay’s great prosperity ran out when, in 1591, the Moroccan ruler Mawlay Aḥmad al-Mansūr (r. 
1578-1603), in need of income, sent his soldiers to the gold-markets of Timbuktu, subjected Songhay 
and placed the sultanate under military rule in 1591.83 With that intervention, political, economic and 
ecological developments that had been building up for a long time but hidden behind the apparent 
stability of Songhay, were kindled and flared up.  
 
For a time the Moroccon army commanders kept the trade routes open and commerce continued to 
function. However, conflicts among them weakened their control and they lost power, on the one hand 
to Berber (notably Tuareg) neighbours who succeeded in seizing tracts of Songhay land, and on the 
other to mercenaries on whom they depended to fight the Tuareg. The absence of state control along 
the trade routes made way for brigands and bandits, and the lack of security seriously impeded local as 
well as long-distance trade. In the same period the Ottoman trade along the routes of northern Africa 
suffered from fierce competition around the Mediterranean with Christians from the coast of France 
and the Italian city states. Now these routes, which had been linked to the Maghrib and Songhay, were 
often cut off by conflicts and banditry. With the commercial foundation of their power gone, 
Songhay’s old ruling class could not regain authority. The cities on the western trade routes in and 
beyond Songhay saw an exodus and a decline of urban culture as a result of the declining trade.   
 
Another development that culminated in this period was desiccation. In the seventeenth century severe 
droughts were recorded. Over centuries, increasing aridity changed the relations between farmers and 
herders on the southern edge of the Sahara and gave mobile pastoral groups tactical advantages over 
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sedentary communities. When the state of Songhay disappeared, the vacuum was filled by smaller 
political formations of pastoral Southern Saharan, Arabic or Berber speaking groups, who came to 
dominate the sedentary peoples. Among the Berber populations, relations changed as well. At an 
ideological level, the competition for authority led to a separation between ‘warrior’ and clerical 
lineages, in which the former were socially superior, while both were superior to ‘black’, non-Muslim 
and non-Arabic speaking groups. 84 The clerical lineages increasingly founded their authority on their 
specialisation in Islamic religious knowledge. Politically, the changing relations in the Southern 
Sahara led to the migration of some Berber groups, who left their traditional territorial and political 
realm and turned to the south, for instance to Bornu, to look for new pastures.85 At the same time, 
small pagan kingdoms on the southern borders of the old empire of Songhay, whose rulers had for 
centuries been subjected to and exploited by the urban Muslim elites, regained their independence.  
 
The historical period after the conquest of Songhay is commonly regarded as a watershed in the 
history of West Africa. Initially however, the floods did not affect Hausa and Bornu-Kanem, or rather, 
they were at first beneficial. As a result of the decline in stability along the western trans-Sahara 
routes, part of the trade moved to the safer eastern routes. The Hausa states were relieved from the 
frequent invasions from Songhay and notably Kano and Katsina flourished, also as cities of learning. 
For the ruling elite of Bornu, the sixteenth century was a time of further expansion of its authority. 
After continued trouble with the Bilala in the early sixteenth century, Mai Idrīs Alūma (r. 1580-1617) 
was able to conquer their land as well as most of Hausaland, and to beat the Tuareg of Aïr in the 
Southern Sahara as well as the Tubu of Bilma and Tibesti. The conquest of the latter gave Bornu full 
control of the central Saharan trade routes. Diplomatic relations were maintained with Tunisia, Tripoli 
and the Ottoman rulers in Egypt. At the same time, trade to the south, to the land of the Asante, 
became more regular.86 Bornu’s conquests, but also the reinforcement of Islamic rule and the peace 
and prosperity of the time, were laid down in a chronicle by a scholar in the mai’s service, Ibn Furṭū 
(fl. 1576, 1578). The first three quarters of the seventeenth century, up to and including the reign of 
Mai ‘Alī  b. Umar (r. 1636-1676) was a period of consolidation, of power and prosperity.  
 
In this period Bornu was organised as a full-fledged Muslim state, with a Muslim administration in 
which scholars were engaged as judges, ministers and members of the advisory council to the sultan 
(who was also called caliph) and where the function of the imām al-kabīr, or imam of the central 
mosque, was a state office. Birni Gazargamu was a centre of higher learning which attracted ʿulamā´ 
from the entire Niger-Chad region.87 Especially Mai ‘Umar b. Idrīs (r. 1619-1639) and his son Mai 
‘Alī b. ‘Umar supported Muslim learning in several ways. They invited scholars to their court, and 
gave others land in more remote parts of the country, where they could settle with their pupils and 
propagate Islam. The scholars not only received financial support, they were also supported by the 
interest the Mais took in their work and their participation in scholarly discussions.88 According to the 
Diwān al-salaṭīn Mai ‘Alī himself was not only pious, but also ‘a courageous man and a great 
thinker’. His personal learning led to the belief that he could bring books from al-Azhar whenever he 
needed them, just by stretching out his arm.89 The strong scholarly network in the capital also made 
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room for the activities of specialists such as calligraphers, and the fame of the beautiful Qur’āns they 
produced spread far and wide.90  
 
But the tide began to turn. In Aïr, a rival faction of one that Bornu had supported in an attempt to 
suppress Tuareg animosities, regained power and control over the trade route to Tripoli, and resumed 
its attacks on Bornu. In 1667 – when al-Wālī must have been a young man - Birni Gazargamu was 
actually besieged at the same time by Tuareg from the north and by warriors from the pagan Jukun of 
the Benue valley south of Bornu. The city withstood the attacks, but this was a sign of the beginning 
of the political decline of Bornu’s power. Constant attacks from outside weakened its government and 
its control over vassal kingdoms and chieftaincies. As the authority of the Sefuwa dynasty dwindled, 
the power of the leaders of subjected people in the countryside increased. Having no interest in the 
trans-Sahara trade, they used their force to raid their neighbours to increase their income. The 
breakdown of security was a burden to Bornu’s peasants. Those who were not already employed by 
the government to defend the borders, had to defend their own villages and not many hands were left 
to till the land. It led to famine and there was a particularly severe one near the end of the rule of Mai 
ʿAlī.91  
 
Bornu maintained its reputation as the most powerful kingdom in central Africa until the beginning of 
the nineteenth century.92 Then the state came under considerable pressure from the new sultanate of 
Fulani Muslim reformers established to the west of Bornu, with Sokoto as its capital. The Sokoto 
sultanate attempted to incorporate Bornu as well. The Sefuwa dynasty almost succumbed, but was 
saved by the scholarly pleas - that Bornu was not a pagan country - as well as the military leadership 
of a shaykh, Muḥammad al-Kānemī (r. 1810-1837). Not long afterwards however, the last Sefuwa mai 
was put to death in the power struggle between the dynasty and al-Kānemī’s son and successor, 
shaykh or ‘shehu’ ‘Umar (r.1837-1880), the man who would later be such a generous host to the 
German travellers Adolf Overweg and Heinrich Barth (in 1851) and Gustav Nachtigal (between 1870 
and 1873). Having a new ruling family, however, did not change Bornu’s fate. Already before the 
arrival of the colonial powers, the state was losing its grip on vassal kingdoms such as those of 





Even more than Bornu, Baghirmi was the area where al-Wālī was at home. However, as opposed to 
those that Bornu suffered through, its historical vicissitudes up to the nineteenth century remain 
obscure. Written sources of information about or from the region from before that time are rare. Like 
Bornu, Baghirmi is a region of savanna land and almost entirely flat. From the south two large rivers, 
the Logone and the Chari flow to Lake Chad, merging before they reach the Lake. Trees to the south 
are numerous, but to the north there is a barren land of ‘sand and emptiness’, wrote Muḥammad Bello, 
and ‘nobody lives there, except, for part of the year, Berbers and Arabs with their cattle’.93  
 
Due to the relative impermeability of the soil, large parts of Baghirmi are inundated and marshy for six 
or seven months every year (from the start of the rainy season in July until the end of the high water of 
the Logone in February), so that communities there were and are isolated during that time. Long 
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distance traders had no business in Baghirmi and right up to the present day there have been no 
important markets in the region. In the seventeenth century, the only foreigners who ventured there 
were slave-raiders from Bornu and sometimes preachers.  
 
The populations of the region lived in villages with village-chiefs, but without political authority on a 
more central level until the beginning of the sixteenth century. From oral history it appears that the 
kingdom was founded at the beginning of the sixteenth century.94 The first Muslim king or sultan was 
‘Abdallāh (r. 1568-1608). According to a tradition recorded by Nachtigal, he invited four learned 
Fulani, who had designed and consecrated his palace in Massenya for him, to settle in four different 
villages, in order to attract people and teach Islam in his small country.95 Two of these villages were 
called ‘Abger Fellati’ and ‘Abger Shuwa’—that is, Fulani and Arab Abgar. That repartition reflects 
the historic arrival, more or less simultaneously with the Fulani, of Arabic speaking people described 
as Baggara Arabs or Shuwa Arabs, who migrated from the east (a wide area in today’s Sudan) and 
settled in Baghirmi as semi-nomadic inhabitants. (Compare the narrative in section 4 of chapter 3.) 
Eventually, their colloquial Arabic would form the basis of the Arabic spoken throughout the region, 
but in the seventeenth century, it had not yet spread to other populations. 96 However, Baghirmi started 
to be  gradually written into Islamic-Arabic history: for instance, the name of the land of its most 
important ethnic group, the Barma or Bagharma, was explained as deriving from Arabic baggar mī, 
meaning ‘a hundred cows’.97 
The sultanate of Baghirmi became a vassal kingdom to Bornu on an irregular basis, and a ‘sub-
contractor’ for slaves who had been captured among the populations living south of Baghirmi.98 At 
times it was virtually independent, but towards the end of the eighteenth century the small sultanate 
was overpowered by Wadai, another young sultanate to the east, which Muḥammad Bello believed 
had God’s support in this action, because the Sultan of Baghirmi was extremely sinful and had married 
his own daughter.99  
 
 
Relations with the Ottoman Empire. 
 
African scholars, merchants, pilgrims – roles that were often held by one and the same person – 
travelled to Mecca and Medina, to Cairo and other Middle Eastern cities on the route, which since 
1516 had belonged to the Ottoman Empire. (Slaves also travelled this route, but they have left hardly 
any traces, to their contemporaries or to us.) One of the successes Ibn Furṭū reported in the Diwān al-
salaṭīn was the visit of a diplomatic delegation from the Lord of Istanbul to Birni Gazargamu. For both 
parties, the Ottomans and the Sefuwa, the visit must have been of great symbolic significance, but it 
did not lead to further official relations between them. Bornu did not become a part of the Ottoman 
Empire. However, its rulers, scholars and believers, like those of other Sudanic Muslim regions, did 
recognise the Ottoman state as the leader of the Muslim world, its sultan as the keeper of the keys of 
the two holy cities. An undated manuscript from Bornu (Paden 76), refers to a decree that was issued 
by the sultan of Isṭanbūl, probably early in the seventeenth century, in which he prohibited smoking. It 
was dispatched to ‘all the places under his dominion’ (fī mulkihi), not only to the inhabitants of places 
that did fall under his rule, such as Mecca, Medina, Kufa and Basra, but also to Fez, Sind, India and 
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Rūm, and to Adar (‘Adhar), a name that might refer to a Tuareg town in the Southern Sahara. It is not 
quite clear how the writer of this manuscript interpreted the authority of the Ottoman Sultan, but 
apparently it did make a big impression, at least in Bornu. Ottoman politics, including the state’s 
choice of a religious ideology, must have influenced the possibilities and interests of African scholars 
to some extent.  
 
Recent scholarship has dismantled the narrative of the decline of the Ottoman Empire after the 
‘classical age’ (1300 to 1600) and demonstrated that until the nineteenth century, the Ottoman state 
successfully adjusted to political, social and institutional changes within its own borders and in the 
world around, and was economically and politically on par with Europe. Nevertheless, Karen Barkey 
observes that the seventeenth century was a period of doubt about the strength of the empire, in which 
the Ottomans fought many wars and lost a lot of territory. 100 Internally, they encountered widespread 
heterodox Muslim religious and sectarian dissent, with some forces pushing for more syncretism and 
less imperial domination, and others, notably the Kadizadeli religious reformists, pushing for 
puritanism. Barkey argues that the organisational system of the Ottomans had most trouble with 
amorphous movements, and therefore, while it had a tradition of tolerance towards non-Muslim 
populations, vigorously persecuted mystical orders. At the same time, for strategic reasons, the state 
tended to side with the puritanists. Its legitimacy became increasingly based on orthodox Sunni Islam.   
 
 
2. Spread of Islam to rural areas 
 
Ever since the introduction of Islam in sudanic Africa, the rulers of Muslim states had invited scholars 
and religious men to settle near their courts, to add prestige and baraka to their kingship. Others were 
offered land rights in rural regions, where they were instrumental in the rulers’ strategy to attract new 
settlers to underexploited land and to control remote areas. From contracts or maḥrams from Bornu 
specifically, we know that ʿulamā’ there were granted privileges such as the right to levy taxes from 
their villages, and were themselves exempt from the payment of taxes and other civic duties.101 For a 
long time, however, the influence of the ʿulamā’ on the religion of the local population, in towns or 
rural areas throughout the region was limited. In general, rulers did not expect commoners to convert. 
Although sometimes common people may have witnessed rituals of prayer, consecration or healing, 
and may have sought to be involved in them for their own interest, they usually remained pagan. 102 At 
the same time, the devotion of kings and vassal kings who employed literate Muslims, controlled 
Muslim trading activities and did professed Islam, was most often partial. Of overriding importance 
was the fact that their authority over their own people remained firmly rooted in traditional religions, 
and in their relations – directly or via priests - with territorial spirits. When they accepted support from 
Islam, they did not renounce their original religion. This implied that ʿulamā’ who depended on these 
elites – could not avoid compromise. Presenting their patrons with a diluted form of Islam, they 
accepted a role in which they accommodated their authority.103  
 
This pattern, too, changed in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, when three important, 
interrelated and simultaneous developments took place throughout West Africa: first, a call for reform 
of uncompromising Islam was made; secondly, Islam began to spread from urban centres and elites to 
more rural populations; thirdly, there was the popularisation of a strain of Islam that was propagated 
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by less learned religious experts. These developments mark the intellectual and social context of al-
Wālī’s work. How the changes took place and how they were related, have hardly been explored yet, 
but a good way to start is by looking at the ʿulamā’, who, as Levtzion pointed out, were principal 
agents of all three changes.104  
 
Until these changes, and for the sake of analysis, two types of ʿulamā’ (including imams, quranic 
teachers, qāḍīs and scholars) can be distinguished. On the one hand there were the ‘compromising’ 
ones, who lived in the political centres and rendered religious services to the ruling and royal class. On 
the other hand were those who aimed more exclusively to represent normative Islam, and could do so 
because they functioned more independently from the courts, deriving their income from commerce105 
or from the agricultural labour of students and slaves, in the case of ʿulamā’ who lived in autonomous 
Muslim communities outside of urban centres.106 The main orientation of this second group was 
towards Islam as it was taught in scholarly literature produced especially in the Middle East and North 
Africa. Through their travels, correspondence and reading, the ʿulamā’ of normative Islam often 
‘maintained a high standard of Islamic scholarship, had connections with other centres of learning in 
the Muslim world, and were concerned with the application of the Islamic law.’107 To the local socio-
political systems, however, their theology and religious practice were marginal. Now, these ʿulamā’ 
became increasingly pre-occupied with the gap they perceived between normative Islam and ‘popular’, 
‘compromising’, ‘corrupt’ or ‘mixed’ Islam, and it inspired them in their attempts to achieve reform.  
 
Reform, indeed, became the catchword of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. The theologians’ 
ambition to reform, to change the habits of believers so that they would comply with what the 
theologians saw as pure Islam and to shape society in accordance with an Islamic model could be 
combined with a desire for social change among commoners, and so become the ideological core of 
the movement that led to the establishment, from Futa Toro in the south western Sahara to the 
Hausalands, of new Muslim states that were led by religious authorities.  
 
As mentioned, until then Islam had been marginal to the socio-political systems of states that were 
Muslim in name. One result, however, of the upheavals of the seventeenth century was the articulation 
of new ideologies of social organisation. B. Hall described in some detail how for instance the Arabic 
or Berber-speaking populations of the Southern Sahara started to emphasise their Arab-Islamic 
identity when they saw the chance to gain power after the collapse of Songhay, as the ideological basis 
for their authority. A preferred way to do this was by creating genealogies that linked them to Islamic 
ancestors.108 Foundational myths, for instance about the mythical character of ‘Uqba al-Mustajab, 
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originate in this period.109 The same happened in other parts of West Africa: first Islam gained 
importance for the identity of politically dominant communities. It was partly the success of ʿulamā’ 
who had been able to promote Islam as the only source of legitimacy for rulers. Then, more 
commoners moved towards Islam, ‘because it was the way to identify oneself with the socio-political 
system and its values. Those who remained pagan, irrespective of their numbers, were relegated to the 
lowest status and to the fringes of society.’110  
 
For new converts, Islam came to represent the civilisation of luxury goods and knowledge that 
merchants and scholars brought from across the desert. It presented a culture of global dimension, 
supported by a God of global power, sustained by sciences, techniques (related to writing) and prayer 
of superior effectivity. At a practical level, Islam offered the members of the community of believers, 
the umma, access to networks of trade, to prestige and social emancipation. So more people converted. 
The rapprochement between ʿulamā’ and peasants provided the former with social and political 
arguments for reform, and with the strength that lies in numbers.  
 
But the developments also involved gradual changes that did not only strengthen the position of 
‘ulamā’. For one, as more commoners became Muslims, Islam popularised and a new variety of 
religious specialists responded to popular demands. It sometimes had a negative influence on the 
image of the profession of the scholar (‘ālim), as we will see in the next chapter. Also, as Islam gained 
political importance, rulers tended to grow suspicious of its specialists, who might always find causes 
to cast doubt on the justness of the formers´ governance. As mentioned, the rulers of Bornu had 
themselves installed ‘ulamā’ in rural communities to stimulate the growth of Islam there. However, 
these mallemtis, as such communities led by scholars were called, attracted more followers than they 
had foreseen, and were also places where ʿulamā’ who refused to compromise with the ruling class 
and their religious views withdrew. Their growing influence in rural areas became disconcerting to the 
political establishment. At a time when the state of Bornu was under continual attack from outside, the 
authorities in Birni Gazargamu became weary of many religious experts. Losing their footing, they 
came to fear the urban ʿulamā’ for the metaphysical powers they might use against patrons who could 
no longer offer them what they had been able to offer before. And they were even more concerned 
about the activity of preachers who lived beyond their direct control, among heavily taxed peasants 
ready to jump at the opportunity to cast off the yoke of their exploitation by the royal urban elite. Early 
in the seventeenth century, one generation before al-Wālī, there seems to have been a movement of 
political preaching against the Sefuwa that resulted in the withdrawal of support for the dynasty by  
local chiefs and other government ‘officers’.111 It led sultan‘Umar b. Idrīss, incited by scholars around 
him, to order the arrest of two ʿulamā’, one of whom (the Tuareg shaykh al-Jirmī) was killed, while 





Another factor that played a role in the spread of Islam and affected the position of ʿulamā’ is 
mysticism. Two ideas are characteristic of mysticism in Islam: surrender of the soul to God, and 
striving to achieve a gnostic comprehension of religious knowledge or truth. Let’s start with the 
second, gnosis. In principle, it does not exclude the approach of rational comprehension of another 
type of religious knowledge, and in practice mysticism and ‘orthodox’ religious scholarship have often 
been combined by Muslims throughout the ages. 113 The two approaches are based on the 
understanding in Islam of reality and knowledge as divided in two – existing in both the natural and 
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the supernatural world, the manifest (ẓāhir) and the hidden (bāṭin) realms. In this view, religious 
knowledge of the natural world is pre-eminently knowledge of God’s laws, and therefore the field of 
jurists and specialists of hadith, while hidden knowledge was the realm of mystics or ṣūfīs. It was 
commonly accepted that the natural and the supernatural worlds are connected in a way that is 
explained by Ibn Khaldūn: the natural world that is perceived by the senses, comprises a hierarchy of 
spheres, whose elements can be transformed into the next sphere, from the most substantial to the least 
substantial, that is from earth, matter, man and animals to water, then to air, then to fire. We perceive 
that this visible world is influenced by an invisible spiritual force—that is, the soul. The soul is in 
principle connected with another invisible level, that of angels, where it can acquire supernatural 
perceptions.114 This is what explains prophecy for instance, for prophecy is the state of direct and 
independent contact between the essence of a prophet and the angels. Knowledge at this level can also 
be attained by others, when their soul lingers in a transitory phase, for example in dreams or on the 
verge of death. Some people, such as diviners and ṣūfīs, use spiritual exercise or other methods to 
access this stage, that is to temporarily let their soul transform pass from the stage of humanity to that 
of angels and perceive what is supernatural, and sometimes called intuitive knowledge.  
 
Nevertheless, in the history of Islam, mysticism has also been regarded with at least a frown by the 
majority of more rationally inclined theologians, who sometimes pointed out, as Ibn Khaldūn did, that 
Sufism (taṣawwuf) started as a tradition of asceticism and pietism, and that striving towards intuitive 
knowledge should always be secondary to ṣūfīs. What the true ṣūfī seeks is the perception of a ‘state’ 
of complete devotion, which he reaches via a fixed path. In the final state of devotion the soul is 
transformed from its human to an angelic state, where it can behold divine truth. As the ‘veil’ of 
sensual perception is gradually removed from him, it becomes possible to perceive hidden truths. 
However, perceiving hidden knowledge is not the primary aim of the real ṣūfī, although it may come 
to him. There are those who seek removal of the veil of sensual perception, through hunger or ecstasy 
for instance, for reasons that are not ‘straightforward’, for instance because they do have personal 
prestige as a goal. What they perceive will be distorted in the manner of an image in a distorted mirror. 
Their utterances are suspect, and can lead believers astray. By definition ṣūfī knowledge can never be 
verified by others, since it depends on a subjective experience, expressed in a terminology that ṣūfīs do 
not share with the uninitiated. Therefore, as long as a ṣūfī is not known to be of excellent character, his 
utterances in a state of ecstasy deserve censure.  
 
One concept in Sufism especially raised eye-brows among non-ṣūfī theologians - namely the concept 
of waḥdat al-wujūd, the unity of creation. It implies that God is one with His creation, that He is 
incarnated in it. All the particulars of matter, colour, substance, heat and cold are there only because 
we perceive them with our senses, but if we were not there to perceive them they would not exist, 
because the world, God, and all existence would appear as one. The objections of other theologians 
ranged from the accusation that this came very close to denying God His own One uniqueness to the 
argument that it was scientific nonsense to say that something is not perceived at any given time, does 
not exist.  
 
But, as said, the ṣūfī aim of surrender to God was generally respected, and since the twelfth century it 
was not separate from Islamic religious life in general.115 Surrender to God can be reached along a 
path (ṭarīqa, pl. ṭuruq) of purification of the heart or self-annihilation (fanā’), to make room for God. 
Ideally, ṣūfīs travels this path guided by a spiritual leader or shaykh to whom they obey and who is the 
focus of their mutual solidarity. They are often organised in hierarchically structured brotherhoods, 
also called ṭuruq, around a leading shaykh. Many ṣūfī shaykhs, anywhere in the Muslim world, chose 
to live among people away from the centres (and books and libraries), where they responded to their 
needs for teaching, ritual and authoritative opinions, with the resources available to them. The fact that 
they were more responsive to the realities of life in different communities than to doctrinal assertions, 
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along with the appeal of this organised solidarity has played an important role in the vulgarisation of 
Islam in all parts of the Muslim world.116  
 
However, the history of Sufism in sudanic Africa before the nineteenth century is still largely obscure. 
For instance, although believers in the region today accord much importance to Sufism and its 
contribution to the history of Islam there, the number of works on Sufism extant in West African 
libraries is surprisingly small.117 Researchers do agree that from the fifteenth century on, ṣūfī 
brotherhoods existed in the southern Sahara among Berbers, who developed a strong tradition in 
which mysticism and jurisprudence were combined. In their nomadic communities, where a central 
political authority was lacking, the authority to mediate in conflicts lay with jurists who had 
knowledge of the written law as well as intuitive knowledge of God’s intentions.118  
 
Via Aïr and other regions in the Sahara the study of Sufism, notably the Qadiriyya form (inspired by 
the Persian mystic ‘Abd al-Qādir al-Jilānī, d. 1166) appears to have spread to other parts of the bilād 
al-sūdān. It is believed that al-Maghīlī, who advised a number of African rulers late in the fifteenth 
century, may have been affiliated to the Qadiriyya or the Shādhiliyya ṭarīqa - perhaps to both – and 
that he also propagated Sufism in Kano and Katsina when he was there. Chronicles and religious texts 
indicate that indivual ‘ulamā’ practised asceticism and had cherished gnostic ideas since the fifteenth 
century.119 In the sixteenth century, the work of the ṣūfī al-Shādhilī (d. 1258) was known in Timbuktu, 
through the comments of Aḥmad al-Zarrūq (d. 1493), a Maghribi author who also commented on the 
work of the Andalusian mystic Ibn ‘Arabī (d. 1240).120 And in the seventeenth century, in Bornu in 
particular, there may have been a shift in the tradition of Qur’ān exegesis towards more ṣūfī oriented 
tafsīr.121 
 
The traces of ṣufi brotherhoods become slightly more distinct in the seventeenth century. Some 
indicate the existence of communities of ṣūfī scholars in Bornu and in the sources we find contacts 
between these communities and ṣūfī shaykhs of the Kunta in the Aïr region, and Qadiriyya 
communities in the Nile valley.122 The most well-known of these communities in Bornu was that of 
Kalumbardo, a place about fifty miles northeast of Birni Gazargamu, which attracted increasing 
numbers of people who came there to study or receive religious services and advice. The men who 
lived in Kalumbardo were reported to meditate in the morning, and in the afternoon to pray and repeat 
the shahada, ‘beating their hands on their thighs’, which suggests rhythmical movement to reach 
ecstasy or trance.’123  
 
It was in the nineteenth century, with the emergence of the community around Aḥmad al-Tijānī (1737-
1815),124 that Sufism became so important in the region that for many believers their identity as 
Muslims was inextricably bound up with some form of adherence to a ṭarīqa. In the twentieth century, 
it was rare to find a Muslim here who did not profess adherence to the Tijaniyya or the Qadiriyya 
brotherhood, although in practice many would not have a shaykh or be initiated to the wird of either. 
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What is important to note is, that in this context and for common believers, to consider someone a 
great Muslim scholar meant to consider him a great ṣūfī scholar, or a great ṣūfī tout court.   
 
As we have noted, the different approaches to and methods of acquiring knowledge, of manifest and 
hidden laws, were not, in principle, mutually exclusive. In the course of time, however, more emphasis 
was placed on the mystical path to truth as a form of counterknowledge – that is knowledge that came 
not from books but from inspiration or divine guidance. M. Last has suggested that such 
counterknowledge offered a solution to a scarcity of books in Bornu, Kano and Timbuktu in the late 
seventeenth and in the eighteenth centuries, and at the same time that it was a way to escape the power 
of those who controlled access to key books, on law and jurisprudence, for instance.125 Mysticism as 
counterknowledge could drive a wedge between ṣūfīs and ‘official’ clerics and create a distance that 
was increased by the fact that ṣūfī communities in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries tended to 
settle on the borders of the territory that was controlled from the capital. Thus, Kalumbardo as well as 
another ṣūfī community in Gaskeru were on the ecological border between settled zones and nomadic 
life in the desert. They were uncomfortable places to live in and they were chosen to emphasise the 
renunciation of worldly concerns. However, as Bobboyi notes, they were also conducive to distrust by 
the world.126 The above mentioned shaykhs al-Waldede and al-Jirmī, who were persecuted by Bornu’s 
Sultan, had lived in Kalumbardo and are associated with political dissension from a ṣūfī background. 
Based on readings of written historical sources, such as those of Bello and M.A. Landeroin, as well as 
on interviews with modern keepers and transmitters of oral history in the region, the Nigerian historian 
Alkali believes that the Sefuwa rulers, desirous ‘to suppress any form of religious faction that might be 
detrimental to the established position of the government’, ‘were against the development of Sufism’, 
127  
 
Apart from geographical distance and political dissension, there was perhaps another reason for 
discomfort among rulers and the ʿulamā’ who were associated with them. Although Sufism and book 
learning had long gone hand in hand, and would continue to do so in many cases, the beginnings of a 
parting of their ways can also be discerned in this period. Lavers described ‘what can only be called 
“extreme” manifestations of sufism’ in seventeenth century Bornu, that were anti-intellectualist or that 
at least advocated the possibility of the displacement of scholarship as a result of the development of 
ecstatic practices.128 He explains his observation with the example of a shaykh called ‘Abdallāh b. 
‘Abd al-Jalīl (d. ca. 1677), an immigrant (Tubu according to Lavers, Koyam according to Alkali and 
The Cambridge History of Africa Vol IV) who had been allowed to settle in the remote village of 
Belbelec around the middle of the century. He was a Qadiriyya ṣūfī who was known to be favoured by 
God with miracles that sometimes happened to him. His large group of followers believed that his 
knowledge came directly from God, because he claimed that he never studied or read, but only 
meditated and prayed. He was reported to be a very humble and kind man, who converted great 
numbers of people. In this case, the established ʿulamā’ in Birni Gazargamu seem to have been 
concerned, not so much about political dissension that ‘Abd al-Jalīl fomented, but more about the 
success of his religious practice. They may have felt that the basis for their own position – their 
knowledge of the Islamic texts, even if some of them were illiterate and relied entirely on memory - 
was under attack. They convinced Mai ‘Alī to arrest him. This ‘complot’ of the Gazargamu scholars 
failed, but ‘Abd al-Jalīl was killed by Tuareg a few years later, in 1677 or 1678.129  
 
Al-Wālī was not a member of the social group of clerics in Bornu’s capital. But he had studied there 
and he must have maintained contacts with the city. News about ‘Abdallāh b. ‘Abd al-Jalīl, who lived 
and died in his life-time, must have been part of his exchanges with visitors and travellers, and the 
competition for religious supremacy was part of the background to his own thinking.  
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3. Ethnicity, religion and slavery 
 
The growth and wealth of states such as Songhay and Bornu were to a large extent based on the work 
of slaves and the profits of the sale of slaves. Leo Africanus noticed that the king of Bornu had indeed 
no other source of income to speak of than the slaves he procured from neighbouring countries.130 
Much later, European travellers learned that slaves constituted the main and indispensable labour force 
for agriculture in the region, and in some cases even served as valuta.131 It had been so for hundreds of 
years, partly for a simple and technical reason: land in the Sahel has a thin top soil, which produce 
poor yields. To feed a community, a relatively large surface of land must be tilled. What was scarce in 
this situation was manpower. It was complemented by the labour of people who were forced to work 
for the benefit of others. 132 In general, rulers could enslave and sell people from among their own 
subjects, but more often slaves were taken from neighbouring peoples. 
 
To this existing African practice were added ideas about slaves from the religion and the laws of the 
prophet Muḥammad. In Sunni Islam a slave had no individual rights and no honour, and although it 
was recommended, it was not obligatory to manumit slaves who converted to Islam. 133 Various 
authors have pointed out that the status and living conditions of domestic slaves in central sudanic 
Africa were often not so bad. For those who lived with peasants – and in Bornu it was common for 
peasants to own one or more slaves – daily life was not different from that of free men who were poor 
and bound to supply a part of their harvest, their yields from fishery or hunting or their services to a 
local chief or a king. They lived with a free family, laboured together with their owner, could marry 
into his family and earn prestige through their work.134 At the Muslim court of Gazargamu, slaves 
could attain high positions and be appointed to administrative offices which gave him authority over 
free men and women. In practice, the social division in Bornu between slaves and free men was 
vertical, and cut through the classes, as it had done in pre-Islamic Kanuri society.135  
 
On the other hand, the high status of some slaves did nothing to change the view held of those who 
were considered to be their ‘kind’ as inferior. Nor did it mitigate the disaster suffered by village 
communities which lost members to slavery, or the extremely harsh fate of those who were sold and 
made to walk through the desert to the Maghrib or the Middle East. The fear of being caught was ever-
present. Numerous sources reveal how tribes throughout central sudanic Africa carried out yearly raids 
on their neighbours, to supplement poor harvests or even just to celebrate someone’s homecoming.136 
In the longer term, it led to the disappearance of communities and ethnic groups, and to the movement 
of populations that sought refuge from raids to peripheral and hard-to-access areas such as the 
Mandara Mountains or the flood plains of Baghirmi.137  
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Slave-raids were a constant danger especially for non-Muslim populations living on the margins of 
Muslim countries. The Sharī‘a stipulated that only non-Muslims could be enslaved - in theory when 
they were captured during a jihād and refused to convert to Islam. This seemingly simple rule 
however, was not unequivocal in the African situation. The problem was to determine who was 
Muslim. In principle, the religion of the ruler was the religion of his people, and an individual was 
Muslim when his king was an acknowledged Muslim. Muḥammad Bello formulated this early in the 
nineteenth century, but the idea was much older and valid in all of West Africa. But it left much room 
for variation and discussion. On the one hand, people who maintained non-Islamic practices could 
often pass for Muslims. On the other, the Muslims of certain ethnic groups could not shake off an 
ambiguous status.138  For instance, ‘Muslim’ villages that did not pay their taxes to a Sultan, were 
easily accused of ‘kafirring’ (practising paganism) and not saying their prayers. ‘[This] is however’, 
wrote the British traveller Dixon Denham in the first half of the nineteenth century, ‘a fault which is 
generally laid to the charge of any nation against whom a true Musselman wages war, as it gives him 
the power of making them slaves.’139 In practice then, Muslim communities were not entirely safe 
from slave-raiders.140 
 
The relation between religion and being a slave was further confused by the issue of skin colour. An 
informative illustration comes from an anecdote about a man from Tuwat, who wrote to Aḥmad Bābā 
al-Tinbuktī asking him to shed light on the matter. 141 He asked whether it was allowed to own slaves 
originating from Bornu, Kano, Gao or Katsina, lands that were known to be Muslim. His doubt came 
from the fact that slaves from these countries were being sold in the market in Tuwat. Had they been 
captured by pagans, or had Muslims enslaved each other in conflict? And did it not matter whether 
people had converted voluntarily or by force. That is, was it not the case that Muslims who had been 
converted by force had less of a right to be spared from enslavement than others? ‘You should know 
that the reason for slavery is non-belief,’ answered al-Tinbuktī. ‘Whoever is captured in a condition of 
non-belief, it is legal to own him, but not he who was converted to Islam voluntarily, from the 
beginning, whether it (the nation he belongs to) be Bornu, Kano, Songhai, Katsina, Gobir, Mali or 
some of Zakzak.’142 In his view too, one’s religious identity was linked to that of the group or ‘nation’ 
one belonged to, and to what was known of the history of its conversion, with or without the sword. A 
slave who can prove that he is from a known Muslim country should be freed. Next, Aḥmad Bābā 
explained that the status of peoples who are enslavable, is not related to the colour of their skin. 
Apparently, this view was not commonly shared.  
 
Explaining his confusion, the letter-writer had also referred to a ḥadīth which is often invoked in this 
context. It relates how the black skin colour and slave status of the descendants of Noah’s son Ham 
were the result of a curse Noah had laid upon him. Did this justify the slavery of black people, Muslim 
or not? No, it was an unsound ḥadīth, wrote Aḥmad Bābā – before ending his letter with a list of 
peoples from which it was legal to take slaves, because they were considered unbelievers.  
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4. Islam and traditional religions  
 
Numerous European authors, from Heinrich Barth to Murray Last, have remarked that many 
inhabitants they met of ‘Muslim’ regions indeed claimed to be Muslim, but adhered to customs as 
blatantly pagan as worshipping idols, trees and stones or eating pork.143 Denham observed that in 
Bornu many outward signs that are usually associated with Islam had not been accepted in all parts of 
society, even in the capital. In the capital many women went about almost naked and those who 
dressed to go to the market left their heads uncovered. He noted that the entire population was 
addicted to gris-gris (amulets), and believed that the ridiculously large turbans worn at the royal court 
had to do with status and not religion. And he observed that throughout the long reign of the Sefuwa 
dynasty, kingship retained traits of the divine character it had had in pre-Islamic Kanem, where the 
mai was venerated like a god and was believed, for instance, never to need any food. Later scholars 
remarked that traditional beliefs and institutions were also integrated with Islam in more subtle ways. 
A good example is a custom of Fulani nomads that Paden learned about in the twentieth century, 
which combined the traditional age-grade system (regulating solidarity and social obligations 
according to membership in age groups) with the status of a believer. It stipulated that a man was not 
allowed to pray five times a day, and thus could not be a full Muslim, before he had a son old enough 
to herd cattle.144  
 
As for Baghirmi, when Barth visited its capital Massenya, in the middle of the nineteenth century, he 
found that Muslim institutions were hardly in place at all, and he commented on the population: ‘Their 
adoption of Islam is very recent and the greater part of them, even at the present day, with more justice 
be called Pagans than Mohammedans. They possess very little learning, only a few natives, who have 
performed the pilgrimage, being well versed in Arabic [...].’145 In al-Wālī’s time, the influence of 
Islam there was of course of much more recent date.  
 
The ‘mixing’ (ikhtilāṭ) within social and religious practices of traditional beliefs and habits with Islam 
was a thorn in the flesh of the leaders of the Sokoto jihād. Addressing his flock, ʿUthmān dan Fodio 
explained extensively what sort of behaviour, apparently hard to give up, was unacceptably unislamic 
or an unauthorised ‘innovation’ of Islam.146 Among the dozens of examples he gives are the social 
mixing of the sexes, the dancing of women at weddings, women going to the market, the greeting of 
high-ranking persons by prostration and putting dust on one’s head, wailing and other rituals at 
funerals, inheritance by the female line, and relieving oneself in the manner of unbelievers.147 Equally 
condemned were the use of Qur’anic verses for charms or cures, and the activities of so-called 
mallams (the term is reserved for popular ʿulamā’, see the next chapter) who performed divination 
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much in the same way as traditional religious specialists had done before them.148 According to 
Muḥammad Bello the situation was much worse in Bornu, where Muslims, he says, prostrated before 
their kings, sacrificed to rivers, stones and trees and consecrated the gates of their towns with blood.149 
The information is of course biased - this was after all the justification for the jihād against Bornu – 
but not in the sense that these things did not happen in Bornu, but rather that they also happened in the 
Sokoto sultanate. Authorities in Bornu saw the ‘mixing’ of Islam and non-Islamic habits as a problem 
in the rural hinterland especially. They sent mallams out to the villages to correct such behaviour, but 
to little avail.150 
 
Most of our information comes from the nineteenth century and later. What is important here, is that 
from this information and the fact that the vulgarisation of Islam was more recent in the seventeenth 
century, we can deduce that the religious practices and beliefs in Muslim communities in al-Wālī’s 
time were quite diverse. Conversion seldom involved (and nowadays seldom involves) complete 
abandonment of previously held beliefs. R. Bulliet distinguished two aspects of conversion to Islam, 
namely formal conversion (`a matter of eight words’: lā ilāh illa Allāh, wa Muḥammad rasūl Allāh) 
and social conversion, by which he meant the movement of people from one religiously defined 
community to another, thus entailing changes in the composition of the Muslim population and its 
position in relation to adherents of other religions, with or without the development of Muslim 
institutions.151 This social conversion in central Sudanic Africa (as in so many places) was a far from 
linear process. For F. Fuglestad, who looked at different types of political authority that were based 
either on traditional religions or on Islam, the competition between them is one of the processes that 
heavily mark the social history of central Sudanic Africa, especially from the sixteenth century to the 
nineteenth.152    
 
The question of what made this competition so tough, or conversion to Islam so difficult, is 
fascinating. As we saw, there were good reasons to join the Muslim community. What were the 
equally good reasons not to do so? Of course, as Van Beek and Blakely point out in their overview of 
approaches to religion in Africa, religious experience and expression are always deeply rooted in 
tradition and bound with other aspects of culture and society, including politics, economics, social 
processes, illness and healing, art, music, dance and speech.153 They are not easily discarded without 
ripping apart a whole system in which identities are rooted. But in order to understand more of the 
cultural context in which al-Wālī worked, it will be useful to try to say a bit more about the 
competitive strengths of traditional beliefs in Africa. Many authors have drawn attention to two 
themes that they consider as central in the religion of many people throughout Africa, namely the 
communal aspects and the reality and importance to them of spirits for human life.  
 
To start with the first, the relation between the subject or the individual and his community (which 
includes the spirits of deceased ancestors) is crucial, more so than the relation between subject and 
God, and religious action is therefore action closely linked to social interaction.154 Van Beek adds that 
notions of evil in these religions concur with characteristics of the social structure of the community of 
believers, and ways of coping with evil (the causes of disorder) reflect the stress of living with and at 
the same time without others.155 At the same time, it is widely believed that the social structure reflects 
                                                     
148 Hunwick 1970, 20; Paden 1973, 45. 
149 In many places in Infāq al-maysūr. 
150 Lovejoy 1980, 40. 
151 Bulliet 1979. 
152 F. Fuglestad, ‘A reconsideration of Hausa History before the jihād.’ In Journal of African History XIX, 3 
(1978), 319-399. See also Levtzion’s article about the integration of Islamic elements into African societies, 
Levtzion 1985. 
153 W.E.A. van Beek and T.D. Blakely 1994; 1. 
154 Van Beek and Blakely 1994, 18. 
155 W.E.A. van Beek, ‘The Innocent Sorcerer: Coping with Evil in Two African Societies (Kapsiki & Dogon).’ 
In Blakely, van Beek and Thomson 1994, 197-228.  
 42
order and disorder on a cosmological and moral level and that the members of a community must play 
their part in maintaining order on all levels. Religions and moral obligations are social obligations.156  
 
Secondly, one of the most important characteristics of religion in Africa ‘is the widespread belief in 
the existence of an invisible world populated by spirits of various sorts’ write S. Ellis and G. ter Haar, 
who include the ‘surviving remnants of those who have already passed through life’. 157 They are 
considered to be real and indeed more powerful than the living members of a community, because they 
are closer to God or the gods, and to have great influence on the welfare (health, success of crops and 
so on) of their descendants in this life, rewarding them for maintaining the religious and social order, 
and punishing them if they harm it. Correct relations among the living are not only a matter of social 
order, they are also a condition for the performance of many rituals—that is, for maintaining good 
relations with the spirits. One can not keep them up on one’s own. This means that on the one hand, 
those who are different, pose a threat to the community, as many authors on witchcraft for example 
have pointed out.158 On the other hand, the ultimate punishment for an individual is exclusion from the 
community here and now (which includes the phase of life as a spirit), and not in a hereafter as in 
Islam and Christianity present.   
 
Such exclusion was and often still is achieved by a method that is deeply rooted in moral systems 
around the world, and that has attracted much attention from anthropologists, psychologists and others 
in the past decades, notably ostracising, which is justified by linking impurity and disgust to normative 
ethics.159 Thus, the Kenga in Chad for instance, most of whom converted to Islam in the 1970s of the 
twentieth century, maintain that people who do not contribute to society because they are lazy or 
thieves or possess witchcraft which they do not control, must be completely excluded from communal 
life so that they have no other option than to leave the village. They believe that a thief will be 
punished with leprosy, blindness or a bad harvest, depending on the value of what he or she has stolen. 
Someone who lies too often will be given away by the fact that his tongue will swell until he always 
slobbers and becomes so repulsive that people will turn their backs on him. Similar examples can be 
found among all non-Muslim populations in rural Chad and Nigeria, and we will recognise one also in 
al-Wālī’s direct environment. 
 
Finally, another example from al-Wālī’s own village today explains another way in which membership 
of an ethnic community that shares religious responsibilities offers practical security and protection. In 
January 2012 a Barma inhabitant of Abgar, a Muslim with non-Muslim ancestors, explained why the 
Barma of his generation were not scarified, contrary to the habits of many other ethnic groups in 
Baghirmi. It was not so much because Islam regarded scarification as a pagan custom, he said, but 
rather because scarifications were not needed anymore. `They were a mark of who you were, like a 
passport. Before, when people were kidnapped and brought to a strange place as slaves, other people 
there, members of their own ethnic group (nafar) perhaps, or a related one, might recognise them by 
their scars and decide to help them. When we became Muslims we could not be enslaved anymore, 
and there was no more need for scarification.’ 
 
This complex of ethnic identity, security and welfare that traditional religions offered, was what Islam 
asked people to give up, in return for three promises that were not always water-tight or were just very 
abstract: protection against slave-raiders, reward in the hereafter and the glory of a global religion. 
This explains, briefly, why conversion to Islam was often a long process of going back and forth. This 
meant that where groups of people had converted or even where Muslim government had been 
installed, the unity of these Muslim societies was often unstable. Even in the Sokoto caliphate, and a 
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fortiori in Bornu, Baghirmi and other regions in present-day Chad Muslims (and later Christians) 
would cherish the belief in the continuing involvement of ancestors in their life.  
 
In the context of this struggle between traditional religions and Islam, the relation between those who 
identified themselves as Muslims and others whom they considered as not Muslim enough was 
especially sensitive. One form it took was that preachers of a radical and exclusivist sort questioned 
people on their knowledge of religion or the oneness of God (tawḥīd) and accused them of unbelief if 
this knowledge was found to be insufficient. ‘Uthmān dan Fodio called them mutakallimūn, 
theologians but, although he disapproved of mixing pagan habits with the Muslim belief, he disliked 
these Pharisees even more. 160 A few years later his son Muḥammad Bello had lost all respect for them 
and described them as members of roaming ‘bands’ or ‘sects’ (ṭā’ifa).161 They were ‘focussed on 
philosophical argumentation (kalām) and warned against ignorance and imitation’ in such an 
aggressive way, that people they questioned would ‘stutter and stammer’ with alarm, unable to 
produce the answers, even if they knew them. By the turn of the eighteenth century, this had gone to 
such extremes that, according to Bello, these fanatics accused anyone who could not read or write of 
unbelief. It all seriously troubled ‘Uthmān dan Fodio, who devoted an important part of his preaching 
and writings to opposing this type of mallams and their practices – without much success, because 
numerous manuscripts from the nineteenth and twentieth century testify to the continued practice of 
testing people’s knowledge of the Muslim faith.162   
 
Our concern here is that in Dan Fodio’s time there existed a need among Muslims to mark the 
boundaries between themselves and those who were not Muslim enough. The writings of al-Wālī and 
anonymous popular texts that will be considered in the following chapters will show that the attitude 
already existed in his days. One reason for this, I suggest, is that conversion was a communal affair 
and ‘Muslim’ was a collective label. As we saw in the previous section of this chapter, a population 
was Muslim when its rulers were Muslim, and an individual was considered Muslim if his whole 
community had a firm Muslim identity. Much was at stake here, because of the ‘simplistic equation’163 
described above, of non-Muslim and black and slave and inferior. Populations in central sudanic, 
especially those living near the centre of power in Bornu, therefore needed the image of Muslim 
communities, if they wanted to be left alone by slave-raiding neighbours. The Muslim identity of 
convinced converts was weakened, however, by those who were not unambiguously Muslim, and this 
signified the threat of enslavability to them. 
 
Among Muslims as well as the adherents of a traditional religion the worldview in al-Wālī’s time was 
mystical and reading the nineteenth century travelogues, one realises that this worldview was pervaded 
by awe before natural phenomena, but even more by fear, not only in the minds of the foreign 
travellers, but also in those of the people whose warnings and worries they recorded. The dusk, the 
dark and the world outside the towns and villages were dangerous places, inhabited by lions, tigers, 
witches, demons, robbers and enemies. 
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In the second half of the seventeenth century, the political and social turmoil, the drought and 
insecurity that had affected the populations of important parts of western sudanic Africa in the decades 
before, had reached Bornu too. S. Diagne, observing the reflections of this confusion in the historical 
works from Timbuktu, especially Ta’rīkh al fattash and Ta’rīkh al-sudān, remarks that there the 
philosophy of the time implied ‘that the inobservance of the laws of God inevitably leads to decline 
and chaos’.164 Pessimism and prophecies of doom. Hiskett still observes these in the religious 
sentiments of Hausa poets of the eighteenth century. This partly stemmed from an ancient ascetic 
tradition in Islam, he writes, but it also had to do with the experience of great changes in a world in 
which there were increasing challenges to till-then apparently valid assumption that the Muslims 
enjoyed God’s protection.165  
 
For educated Muslims, paganism became a symbol of decline and disarray.166 For the less educated, 
the imagined fundamental difference in the lifestyle of neighbouring unbelievers only encouraged their 
fears. This still comes through, for instance, in the work of Urvoy, when he writes about the struggle 
against ‘paiens farouches’ and ‘agressifs’.167 Before him, Barth had mentioned that north of the Benue 
lived ‘warlike pagan tribes’.168 Nachtigal heard that pagan peoples south of Bornu were cannibals, and 
met the leader of a Kanembu tribe who asked unquestioning support from his Arab allies ‘against 
everything with a dark skin’.169 More direct witness of such fears can be found in the manuscript 
collections, which are full of prayers and charms (fā’ida) to protect those who had to travel through 





The seventeenth century was a time of profound upheaval and great change in West Africa, from what 
is now Mauritania to Lake Chad. In the first half of the century, around the time when al-Wālī was 
born, Bornu had reached the zenith of its power. The scale of its trade was larger than ever. On the 
markets one could find goods and hear names and ideas that testified that the kingdom was part of a 
world that reached via Timbuktu and Tlemcen (in today´s Algeria) to al-Andalus and via Tripoli and 
Cairo to Istanbul, the centre of the Ottoman Empire.  
 
Along with the blossoming of the economy however, insecurity had increased as well. The political 
instability that had been caused by the collapse of the empire of Songhay, and which had initially 
benefitted trade along the eastern trans-Saharan route, now began to undermine the welfare of Bornu 
too. Groups of nomadic Berbers from the Southern Sahara were displaced and were forced to look for 
new routes for their cattle, while some farming populations to the south of Bornu recovered their 
strength. Throughout the seventeenth century, continuous attacks on Bornu by Tuareg from the north 
and from pagan Jukun from the south were a growing burden for peasants, merchants, ruling classes 
and scholars. When al-Wālī was growing up, the impact of the collapse of Songhay and of 
concomitant social changes were already clear.  
 
Among ʿulamā’ a need developed to change the attitude of compromise with the ruling elites that had 
been the habit of many, and to either withdraw to relatively isolated communities where they could 
practice what they saw as pure Islam, or to help organise governance and public life according to 
Muslim rules of governance. With the help of changes in the hierarchy of lineages and ethnic groups, 
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groups of ‘ulamā in the region succeeded in establishing Islam as the only source of legitimacy for 
dominant political formations. As a consequence, Islam also became more important for commoners 
who wished to have the best possible relation with those in power. These developments fostered what 
was perhaps the most profound and far-reaching change of this period: the adoption of Islam by 
important numbers of common people in the rural areas, and the movement of increasing numbers of 
ʿulamā’ there.  
 
As a result the social position of ʿulamā’ changed. On the one hand, their relation with the rulers was 
modified. In Bornu, ʿulamā’ had supported the political authority of the Sefuwa dynasty for centuries. 
Now members of this dynasty often felt threatened by ʿulamā’ who preached in rural areas, and 
sometimes they even persecuted them. The scholarly profession also faced changes from another side. 
Growing demand among rural populations for religious experts in Islam gave room to a variety of 
specialists who all claimed some status as ʿālim, but often did not have a scholarly education, as will 
be discussed in the next chapter. Moreover, the image of the scholarly and intellectual religious 
specialist may have come under some pressure from a third direction. While mysticism and 
scholarship had long been complementary aspects of the education and the role of ʿulamā’, the merit 
of intellectual knowledge was now sometimes put into perspective by ṣūfīs some of whom even prided 
themselves in religious knowledge and authority without the intermediary of any book-learning, 
suggesting that their divine inspiration was superior to it. 
 
Another consequence of the vulgarisation of Islam was a certain confusion of identities. Conversion 
was rarely a linear process, and very often the pull of traditional religions in which social organisation 
and morals were firmly bound together, remained strong. Individuals and groups who had adopted 
Islam, retained habits and loyalties to their old religions, so that the boundaries between Muslims and 
non-Muslims were blurred.  
 
Those who chose for Islam and the Muslim identity – still a minority in Baghirmi, Bornu and even in 
its capital Birni Gazargamo - had good reasons for their choice: not only did it offer them a new link to 
the dominant socio-political values, to trade networks and to a global culture, it also offered 
protection, in principle, against the threat of being captured as slave. Slavery was of great importance 
to the economy of Bornu, both for agriculture and as a commodity. Slaves were captured for and sold 
by Muslim merchants in conjunction with the Muslim ruling elites. The principle that only non-
Muslims could be enslaved was the reason why some communities saw an extra political and 
economic interest in defining themselves or others as Muslim or not, which rather obscured the matter. 
At the same time, more ambiguity added to the need to mark boundaries between the two. The 
question of how Muslims went about this, and how they construed their own identity, will be 
addressed in following chapters (5 and 6). Here we saw already that their emancipation and their 
consciousness of a new identity within a context of political decline, disarray and insecurity eventually 
led to the ‘othering’ of non-Muslims. ‘Pagans’ or unbelievers came to symbolise threats and chaos.  
  
This was the age in which al-Wālī worked. These were the outlines of the world to which he 












































































Historical facts about al-Wālī’s personal life are few and far between. This chapter will scrape them 
together, gradually moving from the most basic data regarding his origin and his works to a discussion 
of his reputation, and a first evaluation of how that might be interpreted. One element of his reputation 
is enveloped in a narrative about him that has survived in oral history until today, as an indication of 
his significance for the generations who have cherished his memory. In the twenty-first century al-
Wālī is regarded, in the village where he once lived, as a learned man with outstanding mystical 
qualities. I will argue, however, that this is more indicative of later and current images of great 
religious men than of al-Wālī’s own priorities.  
 
1 Facts of life  
 
Oral tradition, and its written reflection in the twentieth-century historical work Kitāb al-istidhkār171 
have it that al-Wālī lived and was buried in the village of Abgar, in Baghirmi. Today, this same village 
is some distance away from any main route in Chad, 135 kilometres southeast of the capital 
N’djamena. In al-Wālī’s time, it was at least as remote from what was then the seat of Baghirmi’s 
sultan, Massenya, and much more so from the more important political, cultural and commercial 
centre of Birni Gazargamu, the capital of Bornu, to which Baghirmi was tributary.  
 
Whether al-Wālī was in fact born in Abgar, and when he was born, are not certain. Al-Wālī’s father 
was a Fulani, member of an ethnic group with origins in West Africa, many of whom travelled 
eastward as scholars, propagating Islam. He came from Kebbi to Bornu and then left there, perhaps 
because of the social unrest and the rising costs of living, or also because of declining relations with 
the ruling elite, to finally settle in Baghirmi. 172 No work by him has been preserved, and no titles are 
known. There is some information that can help to give al-Wālī not a date but a decade of birth. One 
of his works, on grammar, is dated 1688 in at least one manuscript. In the Arabic scholarly culture, 
grammar was generally considered a thorny and prestigious topic, and not one that one would broach 
early in one’s career. If al-Wālī was about fifty when he wrote the text, he would have been born 
around 1640. That would mean that he was about twenty-six or younger when he first travelled as a 
pilgrim to Mecca, because he is reported to have stopped in Cairo and to have studied there with 
Muḥammad b. ‘Alā’ al-Dīn al-Bābilī, a man who died in 1666.173 Twenty-six is young, but not an 
impossible age to go on a pilgrimage, and it may be assumed that al-Wālī was born between 1635 and 
1645. This guess would tally with the age of a man who seems to have been his son, Sulaymān b. 
Muḥammad al-Wālī al-Abqarī, who wrote a versified work on grammar in 1730.174  
 
In manuscripts Muḥammad al-Wālī is most often referred to as Muḥammad al-Wālī ibn Sulaymān al-
Fulānī (or al-Fallātī). Many other nisbas (names referring to one’s geographical or ethnic background 
or affiliation), linking him to different places in central sudanic Africa, occur once or twice. In Arabic 
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literature and society, it was not unusual for people to be identified, depending on the context, by 
different nisbas. More than one nisba could also be used at the same time. As a rule, such 
identification was attributed to authors by students who copied a work of their master and gave his 
name, together with the customary praise, at the beginning. The most extensive identification for al-
Wālī is found in the copy of his treatise against tobacco, which was produced in 1755, most probably 
in Egypt. It informs us that the author came from Bornu and from Baghirmi, that he followed the 
Ash‘arī doctrine and the Mālikī madhhab. The last two specifications occur more often, and always 
together. Bornu is not mentioned in other manuscripts of al-Wālī’s text, but in Egypt it was no doubt a 
more meaningful reference than Baghirmi. A copy of Mu‘īn al-ṭālib (Kaduna 62, P/AR2) bears a note 
added in a different hand, which links the author to Baghirmi and to Kebbi. But that al-Wālī had a son 
in Abgar (note the nisba was al-Abqarī) is an additional indication of his connection – perhaps 
attachment is not too strong a word-, in spite of his travels to more cosmopolitan places, to this village, 
where he is also believed to be buried.  
The name al-Wālī is most often written as shown here, with ā (alif).175 It is curious that precisely in the 
manuscripts Or. 8362 and Hunwick 178, the ones most intensively studied for this dissertation, the 
name is written as al-Walī, with a short a. The difference is not without significance, since al-Walī 
would refer to a man who is close to God, a ‘saint’, although the name was sometimes given to a child 
to remember and honour a grandfather or other relative who had deserved the name. In these pages the 
spelling al-Wālī is used, following the majority of manuscripts, the information from Bobboyi’s 
fieldwork, and the choice made in ALA. 
 
2. Oeuvre 
An author’s reputation lies in the responses to his or her work and in the image his audience (or 
readers) maintains of him. But of course the reputation is built on his or her oeuvre, so let us start 
there. A first indication of al-Wālī’s importance is that his works reached readers far from his own 
region and copies can still be found in libraries in Niger, Ghana, Timbuktu and Algiers.176 Al-Wālī is 
known to have written ten or eleven texts. This is more than most of his contemporaries are known to 
have produced, and some of his works are also longer than what was usual at the time.177 As a whole, 
the oeuvre covers the fundamental fields of Muslim learning - theology, the Arabic language and 
jurisprudence - with an emphasis on theology (tawḥīd). That was clearly most important to al-Wālī. 
We know that he wished to be seen as a professional theologian, because he once referred to himself 
as al-mutakallim, the ‘theologian’ who follows the method of kalām, that is of speculative or 
philosophical theology, the theology which seeks to defend the Muslim faith with ´proof´ from logical 
reasoning.178  
Two texts form the basis of this study. The first is al-Wālī’s most copied work, a prose piece on God’s  
attributes entitled Al-manhaj al-farīd fi ma‘rifat ‘ilm al-tawḥīd, that is The peerless method to 
understand the science of theology. It is a commentary on al-Sanūsī’s (d. ca 1490) famous Al-‘aqīda 
al-ṣughra (The small creed), which is also known as Umm al-barāḥīn (The mother of proof). At least 
thirty-two copies of The peerless method are extant in public and private collections, mostly in or from 
Nigeria. The methods of composing it will be analysed in chapters 4 and 6. As I mentioned above, one 
of al-Wālī’s most original, but least known works was his treatise in the field of jurisprudence (fiqh) 
against tobacco, in which he also refuted the opinion of a Mālikī authority in Cairo regarding smoking. 
It will be analysed in chapter 5. An edition of it and a translation appear in Annexes I and II.  
                                                     
175 E.g. in mss Ibadan 82 and 48 (The peerless method), Hunwick 174.2 (‘Awsikum), Paris Arabe 5650, Kaduna 
D/AR7/4 (grammar), Kaduna N/AR2/47, Kaduna 62P/AR2. 
176 For a list of extant copies of al-Wālī’s works, see ALA II, 34-37. 
177 Fourteen entries are listed in J.O. Hunwick, Arabic Literature of Africa, (ALA). Vol. II: The Writings of 
Central Sudanic Africa. Leiden: Brill, 1995. 34-37. However, one of these (no. 10, Qaṣīda rā’iya fī dhamm al-
munajjimīn in ALA) is not by al-Wālī, while I consider the two texts on tobacco as one work. Both these remarks 
will be explained below. The final entry in ALA is about six lines in another text, which are attributed to al-Wālī, 
and which I do not count as a full work.  
178 Valid Proofs, folio 2v. 
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Apart from these texts, al-Wālī wrote mostly versifications and explanations of existing texts, most of 
which I have also read for this study.179 In the category of theology, the first is Manhal mā’ ‘adhb li-
‘ilm asrār ṣifāt al-rabb, (Sweet water source of the inmost attributes of the Lord), a concise 
versification of Al-manhaj al-farīd. Of this text too, thirty copies were preserved, in Nigeria, Niger and 
Mali. The second is another versification on the attributes of God, of a text by al-Suyūṭī, but this is 
lost. The most difficult text in the category of theology is a versified ‘arrangement’ (naẓm) of a pre-
existing text about the creation of the world, called Urjūza fi ḥudūth al-‘ālam. It rephrases ideas that 
had been part of mainstream thinking about the topic since the ninth century.180 Then there is a poem 
on the fundamentals of faith (uṣūl al-dīn), of which I have not been able to obtain or see a copy. 
Finally in this category, six verses on the main differences between the theological views of the 
closely related Māturīdīya and Ash‘arī schools of theology are also attributed to al-Wālī.181 
Al-Wālī wrote two works on different aspects of grammar. One is called Tadrīb al-ṭullāb ‘alā ṣinā‘at 
al-i‘rāb, (Training for students in the practice of inflection). Most likely, considering the topic, it is 
derived from an existing text, but I have not been able to determine from which. Only one copy of the 
text has been preserved, in Kaduna. (The photocopy I have of it shows much water damage.) The other 
is called Mu‘īn al-ṭālib wa-mufīd al-rāghib (Instrument for the student and instruction for the 
amateur) and is an explanation of Ibn al-Wardī’s (d. 1290) text on ‘the problems of inflection’, Al-
tuḥfa al-Wardīya fī mushkilāt al-i‘rāb182. It also refers to another famous text on the subject by al-
Ᾱjurrūmiyya (d. 1223), whose work was distributed widely in West Africa.183 This text is dated 1099 
Hijra, that is 1688 Common Era. It seems to have been a bit more popular than the former: seven 
copies have been preserved and it served as a text book for the linguistic studies of ‘Uthmān dan Fodio 
and his brother ‘Abdallāh.184 The photocopies of manuscripts of both texts that I have received are 
                                                     
179 The following manuscripts were studied: 
• Al-manhaj al-farīd fi ma‘rifat ‘ilm al-tawḥīd: Hunwick 178, Ibadan 82/48, Paris 5650, Paris 5541. 
• Al-adilla al-ḥisān fī bayān tahrīm shurb al-dukhān: Leiden Or. 8362.  
• ‘Awṣikum yā ma‘shar al-ikhwān: Falke 1687, Falke 862, Falke 1850, Hunwick 174.2. 
• Manhal mā’ ‘adhb li-‘ilm asrār ṣifāt al-rabb: Hunwick 196. 
• Mu‘īn al-ṭālib wa-mufīd al-rāghib: Kaduna D/AR7/4, Kaduna P/AR2/62.   
• Tadrīb al-ṭullāb ‘alā ṣinā‘at al-i‘rāb: Kaduna (NA) N/AR2/27. 
• Urjūza fi ḥudūth al-‘ālam: Falke 2414. 
180 See H.A. Davidson, Proofs for Eternity, Creation and the Existence of God in Medieval Islamic and Jewish 
Philosophy. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1987. Some verses of al-Wālī’s poem were translated by Hiskett: 
1975, 15-16. 
181 The lines are added to a copy of the Muḥaṣṣil by al-Zakrī (d. 1494), ms Arewa House (Kaduna) 1/25/130. I 
am grateful to dr. Salisu Bala for sending me copy. In these lines seven main differences are mentioned between 
Ash‘arism and Māturīdiyya. They concern istithnā (the ‘formula of exception’, i.e. the question whether it is 
allowed to add the words ‘God willing’ after one has said ‘I am a believer’), happiness and misery (?), kasb 
(man’s participation in what is predestined), knowing God, creation as one of God’s attributes of act, divine 
justice, and blessing for the unbeliever:  
 
 ھذا االیات نظمھا شخنا محمد الوالى بن الشیخ سلیمن الفالنى رضى
 هللا عنھما وارضاھما ونعمنا بركاتھما وبركات علومھما امین
)*...(فى السبع قد خالفت االشعارى الماتریدیة   
مان لالشعرى ال لذاك الثانتثنا في اإلاالولى االس  
عند االشعرى المتقى السعید لیس شقى والشقى بالعكسثم   
 والكسب قد اثبت عند االشعرى والعلم باU بشرع قادرى
للماتریدى العدل ع ثم الحدوث لصفات الفعل وقد  
ادر ھذا واحذرقاالشعرى بجواز االصغرى لالنبیاء و  
الخیر فادر الماخد ولیس للكافر نعمة فذا خلفھم  
*unreadable 
182 GAL II 140. 
183 GAL II, 237/238. See also Hall & Stewart 2011, 121. 
184 Hiskett 1957, 565, 571. 
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dark and difficult to read. For that reason, and because both works seem to keep closely to their 
subject, I have not yet studied them in detail, except for their introductions.  
Apart from these scholarly works al-Wālī composed a short and simple poem urging young believers 
not to waste their time in idleness. Opening with ‘Awṣikum yā ma‘shar al-ikhwān (I urge you, O 
brethren), it became quite popular and was still being published in Kano in 1965. A translation is 
given in the next chapter, a version of the Arabic text can be found in Annex III.  
 
ALA also attributes to al-Wālī another title, Kitāb al-naṣā’iḥ, apparently an exhortation to a certain 
sultan Sūt or Sūta of Yauri (south of Bornu). The addressee of this advice has not been identified.  
Unfortunately, the text itself has also not been found and the only reference to it comes from 
Muḥammad Bello, who writes that ‘master’ (ustādh) Muḥammad al-Wālī wrote it. It is possible that 
this ustādh Muḥammad al-Wālī is not the same as the scholar to whom Bello had until then 
consequently referred as shaykh Muḥammad al-Wālī.  
Before we consider how al-Wālī was seen by his contemporaries and later readers, we must look at an 
important issue: whether al-Wālī was, as is stated in ALA, the author of a poem condemning astrology, 
‘ilm al-awfāq and ‘ilm al-ḥurūf or was, on the contrary, interested in these sciences and even taught 
them himself. The poem in question is quoted in Bello’s Infāq al-maysūr in a way that has led to its 
attribution to al-Wālī.185 There is reason however, to say that the attribution is incorrect. The question 
whether al-Wālī really is the author is of particular interest, because it regards a central theme in this 
book—that is, his attitude towards knowledge, learning and scholarship.  
Astrology, ‘ilm al-awfāq and ‘ilm al-ḥurūf can be described as esoteric sciences, sciences which relate 
to knowledge that is conceived of as organised in a hierarchical system of which the highest levels are 
made available to a few specialists only and remain secret to all others.186 ‘Ilm al-awfāq, literally the 
science of correspondences, is based on the belief in the conformity between God and elements of His 
creation. These conformities are represented in combinations of letters, numbers or words in grids of – 
usually - three by three. In the right combination they are believed to be able to mobilise the spiritual 
energy vested in the elements of creation, and this is why they function as talismans or amulets, which 
can protect, ensure good health, and so on.187 
‘Ilm al-ḥurūf is a special branch of ‘ilm al-awfāq. It is the science of letters, of their numerical value 
and of their correspondence with other elements of creation. It can be used merely as an instrument to 
study the hidden meanings in creation and ultimately to come nearer to knowing God himself. But it 
can also serve to make talismans to ward off harm or evil. The interest in these sciences is strongly 
associated with Sufism and the notion of waḥdat al-wujūd, the unity of existence or creation. 
Theologians of a more literalist and traditionalist inspiration have usually rejected these sciences, in 
the first place because they often conceal the idea that God’s intentions can be influenced. In Dan 
Fodio’s Sokoto ‘ilm al-awfāq, ‘ilm al-ḥurūf and astrology were popular among large groups of 
believers, but fiercely condemned by others such as ‘Uthmān dan Fodio himself, as activities of ‘venal 
‘ulamā’’ who cheated people with their tricks, and only for their own material interest. 
L. Brenner referred to al-Wālī’s attitude towards esoteric sciences in an article in which he argued that 
in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries these were studied within the most sophisticated circles of 
scholarship of the region. This is in itself an important point to make, but there is not enough evidence 
to demonstrate a particular interest on al-Wālī’s part in esoteric sciences. Brenner wished to illustrate 
his argument with the example of three scholars, Muḥammad b. Muḥammad al-Kashnāwī (from 
Katsina) a certain Muḥammad Bindū and al-Wālī. Al-Kashnāwī went to Cairo where he came to teach 
astrology, ‘ilm al-ḥurūf, ‘ilm al-awfāq and divination at al-Azhar. He befriended al-Jabartī, the father 
of the famous historian and died in his house in 1741. ‘Abd al-Raḥmān b. Ḥasan al-Jabartī, the son, 
                                                     
185 In ALA (II, 36) it is called Qaṣīda rā’īya fī dhamm al-munajjimīn and also attributed to al-Wālī. The poem is 
quoted in Bello’s Infāq al-Maysūr, Or. 14063, 3v. Apparently, M. Last found a manuscript of the poem which 
also bears a note attributing it to al-Wālī. See Brenner 1985a, 112, n. 44. 
186 I am here paraphrasing a description by L. Brenner, Controlling Knowledge. London: Hurst & Company, 
2000. 18. 
187 Dorpmüller 2005, 25 ff gives a good explanation of such beliefs. 
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reported al-Kashnāwī’s death in his Ajā’ib al-athār fī l-tarājim wa l-akhbār, together with a 
biographical note, in which Muḥammad Bindū and Muḥammad b. Sulaymān b. Muḥammad al-Wālī 
al-Barnāwī al-Bagirmāwī are mentioned as teachers of his.188 All the subjects that al-Kashnāwī read 
with Bindū are listed and they include the esoteric sciences. Al-Wālī, however, is named as one of the 
emigrant’s teachers without a mention of the subjects he taught. In a document in which he listed the 
isnād of teachers who instructed him in the esoteric sciences, al-Kashnāwī himself did not say 
Muḥammad al-Wālī was one of them. He wrote that he was taught by Muḥammad Bindū, who was 
taught by Sulaymān b. Muḥammad al-Fulānī, the father of ‘our shaykh Muḥammad b. Sulaymān, 
known as al-Wālī, whose achievements cannot be mentioned enough.’189 Al-Wālī is mentioned for no 
other reason than that he was more famous than his father, and not because he taught al-Kashnāwī ‘ilm 
al-awfāq. Indeed, it is rather striking in this context that he is not mentioned as a specialist of such 
knowledge at all.  
That al-Wālī too was interested in esoteric sciences, is suggested, wrote Brenner, by circumstantial 
evidence, ‘for example, references to them in his writings, and the fact that his father transmitted them 
to M. Bindū and that he himself taught al-Kashnāwī’.190  But this circumstantial evidence is mainly 
based, as in fact Brenner also noted, on sources that are not very clear. A major cause of the confusion 
is the poem that is quoted in Infāq al-maysūr, against astrology, ‘ilm al-awfāq and other secret 
knowledge, and that has been attributed to al-Wālī. Brenner wondered if the attribution could be a 
mistake, based on a misreading of the passage concerned in Infāq, or if the poem should be interpreted 
as condemning only the abuse of esoteric sciences and not the sciences themselves. I believe the 
former. Where Muḥammad Bello writes that ‘the shaykh’ wrote the poem he is about to quote, he was 
referring to his own father, ‘Uthmān dan Fodio, in the way he usually did, and not to al-Wālī, whom 
he had mentioned earlier in the text. Moreover, in the sentence preceding this reference to ‘the shaykh’ 
Bello had already clearly stated what the relation between al-Wālī and esoteric sciences was in his 
view. His intention in this paragraph was, I believe, to emphasize that al-Wālī and his father had been 
respectable scholars in an environment – that of Bornu, which Sokoto was trying to conquer at the 
time - that was otherwise ridden with bigotry. He wrote that the excellent Muḥammad al-Wālī 
produced works that indicate the abundance of his intelligence and knowledge of the sciences, notably 
in the field of theology, in prose and verse, and continues: 
وكان قرأ ھذه البالد وما قرب منھا معتنین بعلم االوفاق والحروف وعلم النجوم ومستغرقین في طلبھا حریصین على ذلك حتى ھجروا 
191سنة والشریعة اصال رغبة في الدنیا.علم الكتاب وال  
 
The crux is in the meaning of the first wa. Here it is not ‘and’, but ‘whereas’ and thus the translation 
reads: ‘... whereas the ‘reciters’ of these lands and surroundings were interested in ‘ilm al-awfāq and 
‘ilm al-ḥurūf and astrology and absorbed by their study to the point of abandoning the science of the 
Qur’ān, the sunna and the law, because of their desire for worldly things.’ Bello distinguishes these 
people from ‘ulamā’, learned people such as al-Wālī and his father, by using the word reciters for 
them. At least since the end of the fifteenth century, this term referred to people who read or recited 
the Qur’ān, but most often without understanding Arabic, and without much literate education. It was 
a pejorative term, suggesting the misuse of the holy texts. Al-Maghīlī had written to Muḥammad 
Askia that such reciters were no more than ‘venal ‘ulamā’ (‘ulamā’ al-sū’), who condoned the illegal 
behaviour of rulers and were harmful to the Muslims. Since then, the notion of ‘reciters’ and venal 
‘ulamā’ had turned into a strong tradition.192 It was their misunderstanding and misuse of Islam which 
                                                     
188 ‘A al-R. al-Jabartī,  Ajā’ib al-athār fī’l-tarājim w’al-akhbār. Cairo: Bulaq, 1880. I, 159. 
189 Al-Kashnāwī, Bahjat al-āfāq wa-īḍāḥ al-labs wa l-ighlāq fī ‘ilm al-ḥurūf wa l-awfāq. SOAS Library ms 
65496, f 11a. Cf Brenner 1985a, 112, appendix I. 
190 Brenner 1985a, 110. 
191 Whitting 1951, 5 and Or. 14.063, 3r, 3v. Where Or. 14.063 has ‘ilm al-kutub, Whitting has ‘ilm al-kitāb here, 
which seems to be the better term in this context.  
192 Hiskett 1962, 581. 
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had provided a major motivation for reform and one of the justifications for the Fulani jihād in the 
region.193 
What may have added to the misinterpretation of Bello’s statement is the English ‘paraphrase’ of the 
paragraph by Arnett, via a Hausa translation, as follows: ‘[Mohamadu Alwali] wrote a treatise on 
Toheid in verse, of unimpeachable orthodoxy. He wrote certain other verses which are read in 
Bagharmi, concerning divination, magic, and astrology. These subjects are much studied in these 
parts.’194 There is nothing like that in the original text. 
To summarise, al-Wālī did not write a poem against esoteric sciences or their abuse, but neither is 
there enough indication to associate him with this field of study. To the leaders of the Sokoto jihād, he 




Al-Wālī was a Fulani, and he also identified predecessors on whose work he built as Fulani. This 
name does not refer to a place, but to a group of people that is usually thought of as an ethnic group. 
Fulānī or Falātī is the Arabic spelling of the name that has been adopted in European languages as 
Fulani, Fellata, Fulbe, Peul, Peulh, Pulo and more, a variety that reflects the great mobility of the 
people designated. It is certain that groups of Fulani have played a central role in the Islamic history of 
west and central sudanic Africa, from the first propagation of the religion to the reforms and 
revolutions that succeeded each other from the seventeenth century to the early nineteenth.  
The Fulani are generally considered to have had their origins in West Africa, in the region of Futa 
Toro in present-day Senegal, from where they have migrated over the centuries along the plains of the 
Sahel, up to Bornu, Kanem and Wadai. Some of these groups or clans have always retained their 
nomadic lifestyle as well as their original religion, while others converted to Islam and combined the 
new religion with their traditions. There was however one particular group of Fulani who identified 
themselves primarily as students and educators of knowledge of Islam. The Kano Chronicle (the 
written account of the oral list of kings of the Hausa from the tenth century to the nineteenth)195 relates 
how learned Fulani arrived in Kano during the reign of Sarkin Yakubu, from 1452 to 1463. They came 
from Mali ‘bringing with them books on Divinity and Etymology. Formerly our doctors had, in 
addition to the Qur’ān, only the books of the Law and the Traditions.’ Then, after some time, ‘the 
Fulani passed by and went to Bornu, leaving a few men in Hausaland, together with some slaves and 
people who were tired of journeying.’196 A group of Fulani is believed to have arrived in Bornu in the 
sixteenth century.  
These Fulani who travelled as teachers and scholars of Islam are often called Torodbe (or Torodo). 
Based on an extensive comparison of sources, J.R. Willis came to the conclusion that the labels Fulani 
and Torodbe may not designate strictly ethnical categories, but that the people referred to were drawn 
from diverse strains of sudani society. Torodbe, he demonstrated, was the word for the métier of 
Muslim learning. It referred to a ‘clerisy evolved out of that mass of rootless peoples who perceived in 
Islam a source of cultural identity.’197 Many of them came from oppressed groups, or were individual 
runaway slaves or outcasts of different ethnic backgrounds, for whom the study of Islam with a 
Torodbe shaykh was a way to obtain a new social role. This role was associated, in practice and in 
                                                     
193 This reading of the paragraph concerned would also imply that Bello did not regard al-Wālī’s father, 
Sulaymān b. Muḥammad al-Fulānī as involved with esoteric sciences in a way that was offensive to the jihadists, 
although we know from al-Kashnāwī that he did pursue these sciences. However, the father lived a hundred and 
fifty years before Bello, was never as well-known as his son and no works by him have been preserved. 
194 E.J. Arnett, Rise of the Sokoto Fulani. Kano: n.d., 1922. 4.  
195 H.R. Palmer, Sudanese Memoirs: being mainly translations of a number of Arabic manuscripts relating to the 
western and central Sudan. London: Frank Cass, 1967 (2nd ed.). 
196 H.R. Palmer transl., ‘The Kano Chronicle’. In The Journal of the Royal Anthropological Institute of Great 
Britain and Ireland 38 (1908), 58-98; 76-77. 
197 Willis 1978, 196. 
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people’s minds, with that of beggars. Many of these shaykhs and their students lived of the charity of 
others, from whom they asked for food in a calabash. In time however, the Torodbe extricated 
themselves from a minority position, to emerge as the dominant ruling group in several societies of the 
western Sudan. Some Fulani came to teach in the most prestigious institutes in the Middle East. As we 
saw, al-Wālī’s pupil al-Kashnāwī, also a Fulani, taught at al-Azhar, while a certain Ṣāliḥ al-Fulānī 
(1752-1803) taught in Mecca and Medina.198  
As a scholar, al-Wālī seems to have belonged to the Torodbe section of the Fulani. The leaders of the 
Sokoto jihād were members of this group199 and one of them, Muḥammad Bello, wrote in the first 
decade of the 19th century that al-Wālī was ‘of our tribe’.200 Whether Bello had a professional or also 
an ethnic group in mind, would be difficult to establish.201 In any case, with or without a (presumed) 
common ancestor - the usual criterion for an ethnic group - all Fulani, including the Torodbe, did share 
a language, Fulfulde, and a culture, in which some of the values and social customs of the pastoral 
Fulani remained prominent. When they settled in a new region to make their living as specialists and 
teachers of Islam among the pagan inhabitants of rural areas, it was most often in camps and then 
villages separate from the autochthonous villages. They have not fully integrated into the host 
populations, even today. On the other hand, these ‘scholarly’ communities maintained contacts with 
Fulani cattle-herders, whose core values they shared and among whom they took their wives, even 
though they were usually non-Muslims. Not all of these specialists of Islam settled. Some kept moving 
from one village or nomad camp to the next, offering teaching, religious services and amulets to 
Muslims as well as non-Muslims.  
In the seventeenth century these ‘scholars among the people’ acquired a political role of increasing 
importance. The Torodbe who lived in rural areas and a growing number of religious men who shifted 
their attention away from the towns, assumed a role in articulating the grievances of peasants against 
heavy taxation by their rulers, lamentations they larded with their own expressions of longing for the 
peace and glory of the old empires. As mentioned in the previous chapter, between 1650 and 1800 this 
alliance of scholars and common people led to a series of revolutions, movements against oppression, 
that were all framed as religious reforms or jihāds. The most well-known are the revolutions led by 
Nāṣir al-Dīn, in the south western Sahara around 1675, and others in Bondu in 1690, in Futa Jallon 
about 1725, in Futa Toro about 1775, and the most successful of all in Sokoto from 1804 to 1806. All 
but the first were led by Torodbe.202  
The community of family-members and pupils around al-Wālī’s father was essentially a community of 
Muslim Fulani. Young Muḥammad, therefore, would have been raised with values that were not 
exclusive to Fulani culture, but which, according to many anthropologists, were explicitly defined 
among them in a code of conduct (often referred to as pulaaku) that emphasised reserve and self-
control – the control of any physical desire, but also of anger and other strong emotions – as well as 
patience, respect and the duty to ‘subdue sentiments by means of reason’.203 Another norm is the fear 
of shame, and the knowledge that shame and honour are never individual but are vested in the 
community. ‘For the proper manifestation of pulaaku, the whole society should be sane and proper to 
a maximum and this is only possible when every member conforms to conventional norms [...] in 
terms of authority, rights and obligations.’204 
Most likely Muḥammad’s mother-tongue was Fulfulde. He probably also spoke Kanuri, the lingua 
franca of the region. It is unlikely that he spoke the Arabic dialect, called Shuwa or Baggara Arabic, 
                                                     
198 For Ṣaliḥ al-Fulānī see Levtzion 2007, VII, 7. 
199 Last 1967, lxxiii. There the Torodbe are designated by the Hausa form of the name, Toronkawa.  
 .Or. 14063, 3r  من قبیلتنا  200
201 See also H.J. Fisher 1966, 346. 
202 Lapidus 1988, 508-523. 
203 A. Issa & R. Labatut, Sagesse de peuls nomades. Yaounde: Editions Clé, 1974, 208. Cf P. Riesman, Freedom 
in Fulani Social Life. An Introspective Ethnography. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1977. See also A. 
Breedveld and M. de Bruijn, ‘L’Image de Fulbe. Analyse critique de la construction du concept de pulaaku’ in 
Cahiers d’Études Africaines 144, xxxvi-4 (1996) 791-821. 
204A. Abu Manga, ‘BaaJankaro. A Fulani Epic from Sudan.’ In Series Africana, Marburgensia 9 (1985), 22. 
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which is spoken in the region today by people of many different ethnic backgrounds, but was not 
introduced there before the early seventeenth century, when it was still exclusively the language of the 
Baggara Arabs. Traces of this dialect can sometimes be found in manuscripts from the region from the 
nineteenth and perhaps the eighteenth centuries, but I have not found any in the writings of al-Wālī. 
The language of religious education was fuṣḥā’ Arabic. Children (mostly, but not exclusively, boys) 
started to learn it around the age of seven, when they learned to memorise and recite the Qur’ān. Many 
authors have written about the organisation of Islamic studies in West Africa.205 Of course, their 
descriptions show variation over time and space, but some of the main characteristics are constant: a 
first phase or cycle was devoted to learning to recite the Qur’ān (according to the Warsh tradition) and 
to the ḥadīths. Then followed the writing of Qur’ānic texts, then learning the basics of jurisprudence 
according to the Mālikī doctrine, as well as – only then - basic Arabic grammar, to better understand 
the language of further instruction and exegesis (tafsīr) of the Qur’ān and ḥadīths.  
The method of instruction – that is of the transmission of written texts in particular - was similar at all 
levels and, in accordance with the tradition of teaching since early Islam, it combined writing, reciting 
and listening. The shaykh would read sentences or parts of the Arabic source to his students and then 
explain it in a local language, and sometimes, at higher levels, in Arabic. Students literally formed an 
audience, and memorised what they studied. At an advanced level, they would also write down what 
they had heard, producing their own copy of a book, which was then submitted to the teacher for his 
approval. However, to be learned meant in the first place to have memorised many books. The 
transmission of knowledge was also personal. Lessons or ‘assemblies’ (majālis) took place in (or in 
front of) the home of a shaykh, rather than in institutes, class-rooms or even mosques. In Islamic 
culture in general true knowledge was seen to derive from personal contact with learned masters, and 
those who attempted to rest their education only on the written word were seen as arrogant.206 For the 
teacher the transmission of knowledge was (and is) an act of piety and of worship. Both teaching and 
studying were activities that, like prayer, could only be undertaken effectively in a state of ritual purity 
- one of the reasons why the hours directly after sunrise were considered best for it. 
In al-Wālī’s case, his first teacher may have been his own father. After a few years, around the age of 
ten, pupils would be sent to another teacher, preferably in a place away from home, so that they would 
not be spoilt by the tender feelings of their closest family. They would pay for a good part of their own 
tuition by working on the teacher’s land. (Teachers also received presents from the pupils’ parents.) At 
some point, as a boy or a young man, Muḥammad went to Birni Gazargamu, where his father had 
lived and where Islamic learning was much more advanced than in Baghirmi. It was more than seven 
hundred kilometres away from home. Contemporary oral tradition in Bornu has it that he studied there 
with the Fulani Booro Bindi and with Buba Njibima (of Kanembu background), two renowned shayks 
in the capital.207 He is said to have been one of the ‘twelve stars’ of the latter, although the information 
is not too reliable, as Bobboyi explained. There are not many facts about Buba Njibima and he is 
reported to have had students who would in fact have been too far apart in age to have known him all. 
Collective memory seems to have appointed them as his students as an expression of their excellence. 
Among the twelve stars who are remembered by name were also al-Wālī’s father and Muḥammad b. 
al-Hajj ‘Abd al-Raḥmān al-Barnāwi (better known as al-Hajrami), who wrote an important treatise on 
jurisprudence, shurb al-zulāl, and whom we will meet again.208 If the data seem confused, the 
important thing to keep in mind is that the second half of the seventeenth century in Bornu knew so 
many scholars who deserved to be remembered as stars. It was an age when scholarship was 
particularly important in social life. 
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Booro (‘repository of knowledge’ in Fulfulde) Bindi is interesting, because one wonders whether he is 
the same person as Muḥammad Bindū, who was close to al-Wālī in more than one way. He seems to 
have married al-Wālī’s mother after his father had died,209 and he was one of the teachers of al-
Kashnāwī, who also studied with al-Wālī. In other ways however, Bindū’s path diverged from the one 
al-Wālī took. As we saw, according to the information al-Kashnāwī gave al-Jabartī, Bindū’s special 
interest concerned various ‘ulūm al-asrār or esoteric sciences.210 He also taught the work of Ibn Zakrī 
(d. 1494), who was a contemporary fellow townsman but a staunch opponent in the field of theology 
of Yūsuf al-Sanūsī, whose work was most important to al-Wālī (see chapter 5). Could it be that the 
relation between Bindū and al-Wālī mirrored that between Ibn Zakrī and al-Sanūsī? It is tempting to 
let one’s mind wander in the direction of a domestic rivalry between al-Wālī and his mother’s new 
husband, but the reader would have to do so on his or her own. 
According to Bello’s Infāq al-Maysūr, al-Wālī also studied with an unidentified shaykh al-Bakrī, 
perhaps the al-Bakrī who lived in Yandoto, near Katsina.211 It is possible that al-Wālī lived in Katsina 
for some time too, as many scholars from Bornu did.212 And perhaps he went there especially to study 
with a ṣūfī shaykh, because his father had studied in Katsina with Abū ‘Abdallāh al-Tadhilī, a student 
of the Maghrebian (Mālikī) scholar of fiqh and Sufism Muḥammad b. Muḥammad b. Aḥmad b. Naṣr 
al-Dar‘ī (1603-1674), who was in turn associated with the Shādhilī (ṣūfī) centre of Wadi Dar‘a.213 The 
spiritual father of this centre, Abū al-Ḥassan al-Shādhilī (d.1258), is mentioned in the preface of Al-
manhaj al-farīd as one of four people who were blessed with three karamāt, who were sharīf, walī and 
‘ālim (of the family of the prophet Muḥammad, close to God and learned) at the same time. (The 
others were Muḥammad b. Yūsuf (al-Sanūsī), Abū Bakr al-Bāqillānī and Abū Isḥāq al-Isfarā’īnī.214 
What do we know about al-Wālī’s later journeys? Travel has always been highly commended in Islam, 
for the pilgrimage but also in search of knowledge. ‘Those who go out in search of knowledge will be 
in the path of God until they return’ said the founder of the Mālikī school, Anas b. Mālik (d. 712). And 
al-Wālī’s student al-Kashnāwī said to his host in Cairo: ‘If not to elevate my aim and the sincerity of 
my purpose in pursuing the religious sciences, then why should I have abandoned my family, my 
people and my country and forsaken the comforts of home... for a life of travelling abroad and 
loneliness and anxiety?’215 A further reason for scholars to go out into the world, was that they were 
expected to contribute to the establishment of an Islamic order, and therefore had to have experience 
of the affairs of the Muslim community. It is reported that al-Wālī made the journey to Mecca, 
apparently even twice, and on his way there also spent some time in Cairo to study, as did many 
learned pilgrims from sudanic Africa.216 Here and in the two holy cities al-Wālī also met with students 
and scholars from other schools than the Mālikī school to which he adhered by convention. Among 
them was the jurist and scholar of ḥadīth Muḥammad b. ‘Alā al-Dīn al-Bābilī (d. 1666), a Shāfi‘ī who 
had also studied jurisprudence with the Mālikī scholars al-Sanhūrī (d. 1606) and Ibrāhīm al-Laqānī (d. 
1631).217 The latter would become one of al-Wālī’s heroes. (See chapter six.)  
Various authors have drawn attention to the considerable mobility that existed by the seventeenth 
century among scholars between the southern Sahara, Bornu and Hausaland and also between these 
regions and Timbuktu and Fez in the west, Tlemcen, Tripoli and Cairo in the north.218 It is conceivable 
– though there is no written record to support this - that al-Wālī travelled west to cities such as 
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Agades, Timbuktu, Gao and Djenné. He did mention and quote from works of which no copies have 
been found in the libraries of Bornu and Hausaland, but which were available in Timbuktu and farther 
west, such as the ḥadīth collections of al-Naysabūrī, al-Ṭabarānī and al-Bayhaqī, work by al-Tirmidhī 
(fl. ninth century), the thirteenth-century jurist Shihāb al-Dīn al-Qarāfī and ‘Abdallāh al-Manūfi (fl. 
fourteenth century). But all of these were of course also available in places such as Cairo and Mecca. 
In any case, al-Wālī travelled enough to observe and experience the culture of Islam in cosmopolitan 
places like Cairo and Mecca and to set his opinions alongside those of scholars in the heartlands of 
Islam.  
 
4.  Reputation 
At first blush, there is not much to go on if we wish to judge the reception of al-Wālī’s work. No 
contemporary discussions of or references to his work are known. In his Kitāb al-istidhkār, a 
biographical dictionary of the shaykhs of Bornu and Kanem, Ibrāhīm Ṣāliḥ mentions that a certain 
Khātib b. Adam Jaber Muḥammad al-Barnāwī wrote a commentary on al-Wālī’s Ḥudūth al ‘ālam, but 
I have not been able to find this commentary, or more information about its author.219 A biography of 
al-Wālī by his pupil al-Kashnāwī, which could no doubt reveal in what terms and context his near-
contemporaries spoke of him, has likewise not been found.220 And apart from the short entries in 
twentieth-century overviews nothing is known to have been written about al-Wālī’s work by other 
scholars. However, the same is true of most other sudanese authors. It may be claimed that compared 
to them al-Wālī enjoyed a very positive reputation in his own time and later. In the Arabic literary 
tradition scholars and shaykhs used to be introduced in text by adjectives referring to their qualities, 
like epitheta. The more adjectives that were used, by a copyist or by the student who wrote down the 
text his master taught, the more attention a scholar was considered to deserve.221  
The Middle Eastern copyist of the treatise against tobacco praises al-Wālī for his moral qualities: he 
calls him truthful, magnanimous and generous. The copyists of The Peerless Method state – or perhaps 
repeat what al-Wali himself wrote - that the author is humble and in need of God’s mercy.222  
Praise for al-Wālī’s qualities as a scholar and a theologian comes from the copyist of a version of 
Mu‘īn al-ṭālib (Kaduna D/AR7/4) who called him the most learned, a renewer of faith (mujaddid), and 
a knight of sciences and judgement. He supported these choices by mentioning the year in which the 
text was written: 1099 (hijra). It was not at all customary for authors or copyists to give dates in 
literary works, but that al-Wālī was active on the threshold of a new century increased the likeliness 
that he was a renewer of faith, sent by God, and perhaps therefore the copyist considered it worth 
mentioning the year.  
The most remarkable reference to his scholarly reputation is the one by Muḥammad Bello, who lived 
more than a century after him and moreover in a sultanate that was at that time in conflict with Bornu. 
Wishing to describe the state of Islam and its shortcomings in Bornu, he started with information 
about its scholars. Al-Wālī and his father are the first he mentioned. Bello called Al-Wālī ‘the 
excellent (al-najīb) Muḥammad al-Wālī whose works indicate the abundance of his knowledge and 
intelligence and skill in the sciences’.223 
For later western scholars in the field al-Wālī has been less important, perhaps because he was not a 
direct precursor of the Sokoto jihād and did not write about social injustice or examples of ‘mixed 
Islam’. Brenner is one of the few of this generation who has been more attracted to the author, also 
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because of his interest in a specific method of teaching Islam, which he traced back to al-Wālī’s 
comment on al-Sanūsī’s creed.224 In Nigeria, al-Wālī’s name is kept alive among a few specialists of 
Islamic history. There, the memory is clearly influenced by the history of Sufism and the importance it 
gained in West Africa in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. In an oral interview, Ibrahīm Ṣāliḥ 
remembered al-Wālī primarily as a great ṣūfī.225 The same is true of today’s inhabitants of his own 
village, as I discovered during a visit to Abgar in 2012. And they also regard al-Wālī as one of the 
founders of the village:  
The name Abgar, the villagers explained, is derived from ‘Abū Gara’ because this was once the home 
of ‘him of the calabash’, gòòraa meaning calabash in Hausa. The description refers to an ‘ālim, since 
learned men and their students would ask the people among whom they lived and for whom they 
performed religious services to give them food in a calabash they carried with them. Based on the 
great reputation of this mythical figure, descendants in the village still boast of an exceptionally good 
Islamic pedigree and see themselves as muhajirīn226, a word they understand as ‘emigrants for the sake 
of Muslim knowledge’.  
Abgar, or Abgar Alim Wali in full, is now a village of about sixty houses and one small mosque. Its 
chief, Saleh Ahmat, one of the few here who can read, is also an out-reach health-worker, but because 
his motor broke down, today he has time for a story. Surrounded by half a dozen men who share his 
mat under a large neem-tree, he confirms that in the old days Ahmat Silé Fullata al-Wali and his son 
Silé and many other fuqara (literally ‘poor’, the word for religious men in Chad) lived here. The name 
Ahmat or Aḥmad is an alternative form of Muḥammed, derived from the same Arabic root ḥ-m-d. Silé 
is short for Sulayman. Ahmat Silé Fullata al-Wali is Muḥammad b. Sulaymān al-Fulātī al-Wālī. Tea 
arrives and a few small glasses, to be used in turn. While the older men nod at Saleh Ahmats words, 
more and more boys silently join the group, and the chief narrates:  
 There were two friends, two shaykhs. One was an Arab called Ahmat Badawi, the other was Ahmat 
Silé Fullata. Together they set off on a journey to Egypt. When they arrived there, they alighted at a 
mosque where they found an inscription on stone or earthenware saying alif mishilak, ‘there are a 
thousand like you’. They broke it and kept the shards. But some people had seen them doing it and 
they warned the Sultan of Egypt, that there were travellers with their muhajirin who had shattered 
that text. The two friends understood that they were in danger and they threw the shards into the 
river. But these did not sink, they floated, and the Egyptians who saw it said: ‘these people have 
hidden powers’. Now the Sultan wanted to know who they were and how strong their powers and 
their knowledge were. So he sent for them and asked them: ‘Who are you? Tell me who your 
ancestors are up to twelve generations back.’ The Arab and the Fulani both did so, but the Sultan 
himself could not name more than four of his ancestors. Then the Sultan decided to organise a test. 
He ordered a white cow and a white calf to be put in a house that was entirely closed and then 
asked shaykh Badawi: Shaykh Badawi, you know much. Tell us the colour of the cow and the calf 
that in that house.’ And Badawi answered: ‘the cow is white and the calf is white.’ The Sultan 
asked Ahmat Fullata the same question, and he answered: ‘the cow is grey and the calf is grey.’ 
Then the house was opened and the cow and the calf were grey. The Sultan understood that both 
shaykhs were right, because the cow and the calf had indeed been white when they were enclosed, 
but now they were grey. He became frightened, for the knowledge of these shaykhs was powerful 
and they might be a threat to him. He decided they must leave, and told them that his soldiers 
would accompany them on their journey back. But he instructed the soldiers to kill them and their 
muhajirin on the way. They all set off and after a while the soldiers tried to grab the shaykhs. But 
they escaped and when the soldiers came after them, they never succeeded in catching up with 
them. Finally the soldiers gave up and returned to Egypt. 
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What stands out in Ahmat Saleh’s story is the image of the Fulani Shaykh Ahmat Silé and his Arab 
friend as men whose knowledge astonished even the learned men of Egypt. Part of it is knowledge of a 
ṣūfī character: they could see things that were hidden from the eye. However, for people in Abgar 
today, there is not really an alternative: most of them are illiterate in Arabic or French, and cannot read 
the wooden slates with Quranic verses that lean against the neem-tree. They are there as relics of the 
community’s unique Islamic past, but its members have not inherited the scholarly tradition in which 
al-Wālī stood out. Their idea of an outstanding Muslim is that of an outstanding ṣūfī, and necessarily 
their historical ancestor is to them a great seer.  
There is a second part to Saleh Ahmat’s story, that explains why there are today (as in Gustav 
Nachtigal’s time, see Volume III, Chapter 2, section 1) two villages, now named Abgar and Abgar 
Alim Wali.227 It pictures the shaykh as one of the founders of Abgar.  
After a long stay in Sennar (in today’s Sudan), where the two shaykhs found the legitimate 
heir to the kingdom of Baghirmi, they all returned together, the shaykhs, the heir and a group 
of followers that increased in every place along the route where they stopped. When they 
arrived in Baghirmi, the heir to the kingdom, the new sultan, proceeded to Massenya and 
established a dynasty. Ahmat Silé wished to settle in another place, where he had seen animals 
with one horn.228 Sometime afterwards the two friends, the Fulani and the Arab shaykh, 
wished to return to Mecca. They told their students to live together in one community, during 
their absence. The students however soon had a conflict and split up. Far away from them, 
Badawi understood, as soon as he saw that his horse wanted to take a different route, that 
something must be wrong at home. But he said to Ahmat Silé Fullata: ‘even if our students do 
not get along and are in conflict, we will continue together and fortune will always be with us’. 
And indeed Abgar has always been prosperous and was even spared by the terrible army of 
Rabah [the slave-raider from Sudan at the end of the nineteenth century].’ 
  
If the figure of the Fulani shaykh who helped to install the first legitimate (Muslim) ruler on the throne 
of Massenya was one of the Fulani who supported Sultan ‘Abdallāh (r. 1568-1608) according to 
Nachtigal’s data, he may represent al-Wālī’s father. In Saleh Ahmat’s version the founding father and 
his more famous son Ahmat Silé have merged into one person – another indication of the mythical 
rather than the historical character of the stories about the latter. 
 
 
5. Concluding remarks 
 
Muḥammad al-Wālī was a worthy representative of the Fulani (Torodbe) tradition of teaching Islam 
on the frontiers of the religion. In one of his texts, he refers to himself as a mutakallim, a scholar in the 
field of rational or philosophical theology. The famous Muḥammad Bello remembered him as one 
who was most learned in the religious sciences, distinguishing him and his father from other scholars 
who practiced astrology, ‘ilm al-ḥurūf and the like. Al-Wālī’s oeuvre as a whole treats all the classical 
subjects of Ash‘arī scholarship and handbooks: the creation of the world, God’s attributes from the 
kalām point of view, grammar and syntax and fiqh. It all yielded him an enormous reputation, at least 
in central sudanic Africa. One copyist of Muʿīn al-ṭālib, the work on grammar that was written in the 
Hijra year 1099, even called al-Wālī a mujaddid, a renewer of the faith, a learned man such as God 
would send at the beginning of every century.229  
 
In Chad and Nigeria today, most common believers have forgotten al-Wālī. The inhabitants of his 
village Abgar, however, do remember him, as one of the founders of their village and as a man of 
great learning who travelled to Cairo, where his knowledge was superior to that of the authorities in 
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place. In popular memory, and also in that of the twentieth-century Nigerian historian Ibrahīm Ṣāliḥ, 
this was knowledge of a magical or mystical character. This reminiscence, however, seems to have 
been determined by the importance that Sufism acquired in the region in the nineteenth and twentieth 
centuries. In the following chapters I will show that al-Wālī’s own works provide no basis for 
assuming that he claimed to be an expert in what are often called the esoteric sciences. In fact, he did 












































































































To ask how al-Wālī fashioned himself as a scholar is to ask how he positioned himself with respect to 
his environment—that is, with respect on the one hand to what other scholars in his social and 
intellectual environment were doing or had done, and on the other to the various prevailing models of 
what it took to be a learned Muslim. This chapter is about the cultural, social, and intellectual 
influences that are likely to have played a role in al-Wālī’s choice of a particular scholarly persona. 
Over the past decade or so, the concept of the scholarly persona has been developed to analyse when 
and why, and under what circumstances particular models of the scholar—of the ‘scientist’ as opposed 
to the ‘natural philosopher’, or of the ‘experimentalist’ as opposed to the savant—have developed in 
one and another culture.230 Although I will not attempt here to follow the development through time of 
models of scholarship in central sudanic Africa, the concept of the scholarly persona helps us realise 
that an individual scholar may opt for the role of a particular persona, even as he is shaped by it. The 
model the scholar chooses determines what virtues and skills he is to have, as well as what attitudes 
and disposition he is to have towards moral goods (such as righteousness or goodness) and epistemic 
goods (knowledge, understanding), for instance.  
 
This chapter will first look briefly at models of Muslim scholarship in al-Wālī’s environment. It will 
present outlines both of the scholarly genres that were most frequently practiced and of some 
theological themes that were widely debated, such as the attributes of God, the relation between God’s 
power and man’s will, and between faith and ‘imitation’ or taqlīd. This presentation will help us 
determine, in the final chapters, the ways in which al-Wālī did and did not fit in with mainstream 
ideas. 
 
1. Scholarship and religious leadership 
  
The ‘ālim, the ‘knower’ has always had an essential place in Islam: while there are no priests in Islam 
who might have a more direct relationship with God than others, or a claim to have the right answers 
to religious questions by virtue of a sacrament they have received, some Muslims do have better 
knowledge than others. As Rosenthal notes in his study of the concept of knowledge in medieval 
Islam, Knowledge Triumphant, various verses in the Qur’ān imply that those who believe are those 
who have a certain knowledge and that those who ‘know’ are the best believers. What it means to 
‘know’ and by what means one knows, were (and are) contested. There could be an emphasis on 
cognitive knowledge (‘ilm) of the manifest and ‘knowable’, or on intuitive knowledge (irfān) about 
God that is less easily shared with others. Regarding the former, there is a basic agreement that ‘ilm is 
closely linked to faith (īmān) and the word of God. Therefore it is conceived of as ‘the most precious 
treasure’ of the community,231 as having an importance that has been ‘unparalleled in other 
civilisations’.232 Scholarship—in the sense of producing and transmitting culturally valued, specialised 
knowledge—has been valued concomitantly.  
The knowledge that the ‘ulamā’ transmit is knowledge they have inherited from the Prophet. It is 
religious, and lies primarily in the field of theology and law, both of which are based on knowledge of 
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the Qur’ān and the ḥadīths. Moreover, the ‘ulamā’ have an understanding of how religious knowledge 
is obtained—with much emphasis on the transmission by reliable sources of knowledge ultimately 
originating from the Prophet—and of how it relates to God´s own truth. Because of this, they can also 
find answers to new questions that are not answered in the holy sources, questions that arise for the 
first time in the moral and social life of their own time. It gives them both the right and the duty to 
guide others, as spiritual as well as political leaders, in the role of an ‘ālim who avoids worldliness and 
the corruption of power or who issues authoritative opinions (fatwas) on matters of daily life, or in 
some role combining aspects of these two. 
A number of quite stable norms, values and attitudes applied to those who claimed a role in the 
production and transmission of Islamic knowledge, regardless of local forms of Islam. Humility and 
piety, virtues that were attributed to al-Wālī (possibly by the author himself) in the introductory lines 
of at least some copies of The peerless method, were important. However, a norm almost diametrically 
opposed was also in force—one that certainly influenced al-Wālī, as we shall see: that of correcting 
other believers, ordinary as well as scholars, who were considered to be erring from the straight path. 
In theory, the duty of commanding good and forbidding wrong was (and is) incumbent on all legally 
competent Muslims. In practice, it falls especially on the shoulders of the ‘ulamā’. Instructions for 
carrying out this obligation were discussed at some length. A division of tasks that was ordinarily 
agreed upon held that, while political authorities could forbid wrong ‘with the hand’, and anyone 
could do so ‘with or in the heart’, it was up to scholars to forbid wrong ‘with the tongue’—that is, with 
language.233 Al-Ghazālī was one of the theologians who thought about ways of addressing those who 
have violated religious law that would be just as well as effective. An unwitting lawbreaker, he 
explained, must be gently informed and corrected. Those who realise that they do wrong need 
exhortation, and those who understand their offense and have already reacted with obduracy and 
contempt to earlier advice, deserve harsh language.234  
Another idea underpins the duty to correct other scholars when necessary: the idea that the knowledge 
of the ‘ulamā’ is ultimately collective. Every single scholar is fallible, but collectively they unite all 
the guidance that God bestows on the community of believers. This is why consensus (ijmā‘) among 
‘ulamā’ is important. When the ‘ulamā’ agree and reach ijmā‘, that is a sign that they have arrived at a 
true judgment or interpretation. But there are no formal procedures that can be followed to reach ijmā‘. 
Shared norms regarding the professionalism of those involved in the process are therefore all the more 
important. Key to all other values is the moral imperative of the scholars’ commitment to the ‘truth’. 
The prime concern of classical scholars was not to be original but to transmit faithfully, to authenticate 
their material, and to contribute both to the collective body of knowledge and ultimately to better 
judgement on the part of the Muslim community. Accuracy in writing, copying and quoting was 
central to trustworthy transmission, and all the extensive quoting was not done for the sake of names-
dropping, but to demonstrate a scholar’s painstaking care in taking into account the relevant sources in 
the correct manner.235 True scholarship also implied excellent mastery of the Arabic language, without 
which all the sciences would give one trouble and one would run a serious risk of misinterpreting the  
Qur’ān and other sources.236 The norm corresponded with the idea that the highest authority in Islam 
was in the Arabic-speaking Middle East.  
On the other hand, as was mentioned in the previous chapter, it was not considered correct to found 
one’s knowledge exclusively on written sources. The best way to learn was to seek out an expert in the 
field one wished to study, and study the relevant books with him personally. It implied that travelling 
in search of knowledge was an ideal in itself. It was greatly facilitated by the fact that these values also 
formed the basis of solidarity among members of the profession in all corners of the Muslim world.  
In at least one of his texts, al-Wālī called himself a mutakallim. This means that he saw himself as a 
specialist of kalām, which is usually translated as ‘philosophical theology’ or ‘speculative theology’ 
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because its topic is often abstract. For medieval Muslim scholars, the word referred to the defence of 
the religion by means of reason, argumentation and disputation.237 Kalām was used in both tawḥīd and 
jurisprudence. A preferred method, in both fields, was to refute a (supposed) opponent through logic, 
notably dialectic (jadal) and syllogism (qiyās). The style of disputation was ideally marked by an 
equanimity of tone, but in practice the language could be pugnacious.238 Kalām was founded by the 
Mu‘tazilis and also had a central place in Ash‘arism. But in the latter case it was also seen as 
dangerous, especially when applied to dogmatic theology, because reasoning independently from the 
holy sources could easily lead anyone astray and certainly harm the faith of simple souls.239 It was 
better restricted to those who knew their way in its labyrinths and would not get lost in the 
abstractions. And even then, one had to take great care when swimming in ‘the ocean of speculation’, 
as Ibn Khaldūn calls it.240 The Maghribi school of Malikism, in contrast to Malikism in the Mashriq, 
was pre-eminently suspicious of kalām and syllogism. We will, however, see that al-Wali was 
conversant with kalām, in both theology and jurisprudence.  
In the foregoing paragraphs we have looked at values and expectations that were formulated in some 
of the most classical texts of Islam, and that ‘ulamā’ throughout the Muslim world took account of. 
These values received a further interpretation at the local level. For instance, solidarity among 
members of the scholarly profession, no matter where they came from, was a recurring trope in the 
Islamic literature that we also find in Muḥammad Bello’s Infāq al-maysūr. Bello reminds his readers 
of a certain learned man who would ask people he met which country they came from. Wherever that 
was, he would reply: ‘I am from among you, from the people of learning and piety.’241 Among the 
Fulani and also the Berbers of the southern Sahara, the scholars’ social distinction from others was 
even more pronounced. Their scholarly communities in the early modern period have often been 
described as caste-like, because clerical status tended to be restricted to hereditary lineages 
specializing in the arts of reading, writing and teaching, while they also had their own system of 
initiation, marriage patterns, ritual observances, prohibitions, and obligations.242  
However, the ideal of social coherence and solidarity among ‘ulamā’ was increasingly put into 
perspective, on the one hand by stories of jealousy among them, and, on the other, by the variety of 
religious specialists who presented themselves as ‘ulamā’.243 Indeed, not all Muslim specialists were 
learned or even literate. In the late fifteenth century the North African theologian al-Maghīlī had 
already complained of ‘ulamā’ or ‘reciters’ whose schooling was insufficient. When Islam gained 
influence in rural areas, the demand for experts of the religion increased. New converts turned to 
Muslim clerics simply to know how they should behave as Muslims, but also with a need for ritual and 
intercession between them and God. It offered opportunities to increasing numbers of people who 
were interested in that role, but lacked much literate education. By the nineteenth century, when 
European travellers recorded the local words in use for Muslim clerics, there was a wide range of them 
who were called ‘ālim, shaykh, goni (Kanuri for a learned person) walī, mallam (derived from 
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mu‘allam and mostly associated with clerics of lesser academic learning)244, imām or faqīr, with book-
oriented theologians on one end of the spectrum and magico-religious practitioners on the other.  
The book-oriented theologians distinguished themselves in the first place by their insistence on writing 
excellent literary Arabic. Their role—and the source of their income—was to provide teaching and 
advice to communities of ordinary believers as well as to rulers. They also settled disputes, in local 
courts organised more or less according to the Muslim model, or in a role that combined Islam with 
elements and rituals from traditional beliefs—a practice that’s still common today. They would also 
give authoritative opinions on questions that were put to them.  
On the other end of the spectrum were the popular religious practitioners who often assumed the role 
of priests of traditional religions. They provided all sorts of supernatural services of a more or less 
Islamic character, offering healing and protection to Muslims as well as non-Muslims.245 The idea of 
the Muslim ‘holy man’ (faqīr) included healers, diviners, writers of charms, and other specialists 
besides scholars. The variety of their expertise is matched by the number of modern authors who have 
written about them. One of the first was Dixon Denham, who remarked about some village clerics he 
met in Bornu: ‘In these untraversed climes, a very little learning indeed is sufficient to raise a man’s 
fame and fortune to the highest pitch. Persons who have been to Mecca, of the meanest capacities, 
who amuse them with tales of the countries and people they have seen on the road, are treated with the 
greatest respect, and are always provided for.’246  
These mallams and ‘holy men’ played an important role in the propagation of Islam, because they 
appealed to so many people, irrespective of their religion. However, by the eighteenth century the 
popular mallams had also acquired a reputation among ordinary believers that was just the opposite of 
the respectable image presented to Denham. In some folktales they were presented as crooks.247 
Moreover, the activities of Muslim leaders with a minimum of learning or a maximum of tolerance 
towards non-Muslim habits were grist to the mill for puritans. Reformers such as ‘Uthmān dan Fodio 
and Sīdi Mukhtār al-Kuntī in Timbuktu saw them as the fundamental cause of the laxity of Muslims in 
their time. It will be remembered, however, that Dan Fodio also objected to people whom he described 
as mutakallimūn, who had sectarian tendencies of which he deeply disapproved (see chapter 2.4). The 
term al-Wālī had proudly applied to himself more than a century before had by then taken on negative 
connotations. Although al-Wālī was associated with Bornu, while Dan Fodio lived in Sokoto, places 
with slightly different Muslim histories, this point illustrates that in the intervening period, models of 
what was to count as ‘the learned Muslim’ were changing.   
 
 
2. The influence of social surroundings 
 
Al-Wālī’s position on the spectrum from least to most learned was without doubt somewhere near the 
latter end. His ambitions on this front will be discussed in chapter 7. However, he did not live in an 
ivory tower, but was in various ways involved with the concerns of unlettered people in his direct 
social environment, as a teacher, a religious leader and simply as a father. His main income probably 
came from the labour of his students on his fields, and from payment for his teaching and his books.  
It should be noted that al-Walī seems to have been relatively unconcerned about the political elite, and 
could work fairly independently from them. As a scholar of repute, there were surely moments when 
he interacted with the political authorities in Massenya and Birnu Gazargamu. Moreover, both al-Wālī 
and his father may have held a function at the legal court of Massenya, with the title of ngol.248 But, 
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living far from the courts, he did not operate among the political elite. Moreover, those of his writings 
that have survived indicate little interest on his part in political matters or governance. 
 
However, his involvement with the quality of the religious life both of his pupils and of ordinary 
believers appears in several of his works and in the fact that he versified some texts to make them 
more easily available (by memorisation) to a wider audience. Most clearly it comes across in the 
following short poem he wrote, and which has continued to appeal to believers for many generations. 
It was printed in Nigeria in the twentieth century.249 (See annex III for the original text.)   
I urge you, oh brothers, to heed the Merciful. 
And I warn you: if you don’t mind your time, you will one day regret the waste.  
The wealth of mankind is his youth; his loss lies in neglecting 
the benefits to the young of complying. Brothers, seek piety towards God! 
Spend your time being obedient and prepared, every moment and hour, 
for he who fritters away an hour of his life must face the loss in his grave. 
He who says, ‘I am young. Just wait—I’ll grow up and fear God’, 
Iblīs will mislead him and so will his cheated and prejudiced heart. 
There’s no good in him who is reckless and does not repent when young. 
So turn to your Lord, o people, before time is up. 
Choose for companion who’s on the straight path, for a fellow will follow in the steps of his 
friends.   
The company of the excellent is medicine to man, and strengthens with vigour and power. 
The company of the idle is sickness and blindness, and increases vile illness in the heart. 
Pursue the path of the Prophet and avoid associating with hoodlums. 
Oh, you who are oblivious and distracted from your Lord, consider the deeds you will show 
Him. 
Don’t you know that death arrives in a hurry, while man has nothing [to speak for him] but the 
things he has done? 
And after death he has only the works done before.  
He who wastes his life in idleness—oh, what has he done?  
But the bliss for him who invests it in works that please his Lord! 
Oh, fooled one, what is this? Till when will this recklessness and dawdling go on? 
Why must I see that the lessons don’t help you? That rather, your heart is harder than stone? 
If only people would come to grips with the limits on their time, with how [futile] it is in all of 
eternity, out of their control. 
Oh, the poor man, who puts his hopes off, wastes his time and does little good. 
His days he spends in idleness, his nights in sleep. What misery. 
The blessing of God, the glorified Lord, on the chosen prophet Muḥammad 
and his family and companions for all eternity. They are the guiding stars forever. 
 
The exhortation may serve as a first indication of al-Wālī’s sensitivity (chapter 6 will give another 
example) to the feelings and reasoning of his students. Presumably he was also sensitive to the various 
images they held of clerics. The increasing influence of barely literate village preachers and magico-
religious practitioners, as well as the growing trend to view such specialists as crooks, must have 
affected the position of ‘ulamā’ such as himself, whose authority and income depended on their 
classical scholarly training. This was the first of three threats to the position of ‘ulamā’.  
Their position was also affected, I would suggest, by two other developments. One was the growing 
popularity of Sufism, which may have been embraced at times as a form of counterknowledge by 
those who did not have access to books, as we saw in chapter 2. The other was the result of the success 
of the ‘ulamā’’s own teaching, in a process to which K. Hirschler, writing about the heartlands of 
Islam, recently drew attention. With the expansion of Islam from urban to rural environments, 
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increasing numbers of ordinary people became familiar—some through their own reading, and many 
more through oral transmission—with forms of narratives, laws and other written knowledge, which 
had for centuries been the monopoly of the ‘ulamā’ and the core of their expertise. Reading became 
more popular, and scholars were no longer the only ones who owned written texts. Between the 
twelfth and the sixteenth centuries, when more and more people became familiar with some of the 
important writings of the religion, there arose a feeling among ‘ulamā’ in Syria and Egypt, which 
feature in Hirschler’s case studies, that they were being challenged. Hirschler remarks that ‘it would be 
surprising if a similar transformation had not occurred in other regions of the Mediterranean during the 
Middle Period, such as al-Andalus and North Africa, and also farther to the east in those regions that 
came under Mongol rule.’250 And the same goes, I would argue, for farther south in central sudanic 
Africa in the seventeenth century.  
 
3. Intellectual environment: the canon 
 
The first cataloguing by western scholars of Arabic literature that was studied and produced in central 
sudanic Africa was done by Hiskett. His point of departure was ‘Abdallāh dan Fodio’s Ida’ al-nusūkh 
man akhadhtu ‘anhu min al-shuyūkh, a list of what the erudite brother of ‘Uthmān dan Fodio had 
learned from his teachers (including ‘Uthmān), and thus of what was taught in the region.251 Hiskett 
and A.D.H. Bivar then published a ‘provisional account’ of the Arabic literature of Nigeria based on 
other works of the Dan Fodio clan and on Aḥmad Bābā’s Nayl al-ijtihāj bi taṭrīz al-dībāj. Shortly 
before the ALA volume on central sudanic Africa was published, one of the contributors, Bobboyi, also 
devoted a chapter of his dissertation to a detailed description of the organisation of learning and the 
curriculum of studies in the region.252 Most recently, B. Hall and C. Stewart organised and analysed 
the West African Arabic Manuscript Database. From its 21,000 manuscript titles they distilled what 
they call the core curriculum of learning in all of west and central sudanic Africa between the 
beginning of the seventeenth and the end of the eighteenth centuries: a list of books of which they 
found at least four copies dispersed across three libraries in sudanic Africa.  
All of these authors agree that the literature they reviewed demonstrates a predominant interest in texts 
from outside the region—especially by authors based in North Africa and Egypt—and from what they 
call the classical period: from the beginning of Islam until about 1500. The majority of books in 
African libraries, and all the titles in the ‘core curriculum’, are related to religion. Even in Timbuktu, 
the number of books about empirical sciences such as geography or mathematics was relatively small.  
Tafsīr (explaining Qur’ān and ḥadīths) and ḥadīth were popular genres. A canonical work such as the 
Tafsīr al-Jalālayn by Jalāl al-Maḥallī (d. 1459) and Jalāl al-Suyūtī (d. 1505) was much quoted, as was 
al-Bukhārī’s (d. 870) Jāmi‘at al-Saḥīḥ, in the field of ḥadīth. More widespread were copies of the 
anthology of ḥadīths by al-Nawāwī (d. 1277), Arba‘ūn ḥadīthan. In theology the ‘creeds’ (‘aqā’id, sg. 
‘aqīda) by Muḥammad b. Yūsuf al-Sanūsī dominated the field. His smaller (not the smallest) creed, 
Al-‘aqīda al-ṣughra or Umm al-barāhīn, was available in all the libraries in Hall and Stewart’s study. 
In the West African libraries, legalistic works had pride of place. Among the books on religious 
observance, inheritance, marriage, governance and so on that were studied and quoted over 
generations, were the Kitāb al-Shifā’ by the Almoravid qāḍī  Iyāḍ (d. 1149), a number of basic works 
of Mālikī law, such as Mālik b. Anas’ Muwaṭṭa, the Mudawwana by Saḥnūn (d. 854), al-Juwaynī’s (d. 
1085) Waraqāt and the Mukhtaṣar by Khalīl b. Isḥāq (d. 1374), along with commentaries on them, and 
works by al-Qarāfī (d. 1285) and al-Qurtūbī (d. 1172).  
Corresponding with a relatively negative attitude in Maghribī Malikism towards kalām, logic and 
personal reflection (ra’y), one category is poorly represented in the collections: logic (manṭiq). Only 
libraries in Boutilimit and some other towns in today’s Mauritania include some texts on logic, but 
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none are classified as such in other libraries in the West African Arabic Manuscript Database.253 No 
copies of the books on logic by Ibn Sīnā (d. 1037), Al-Fārābī (d. 950), Ibn Rushd or Najm al-Dīn al-
Kātibī (d. 1276), some of the great Arabic philosophers who elaborated on Aristotelian thought, were 
found in any of these collections. 254   
 
Few of the aforementioned books were widely available. Several researchers have remarked that, 
especially in the eastern parts of the region, certainly in Bornu, many of even these classical works 
were known only via commentaries on them. This is true, for instance, of the Muwaṭṭa and of al-
Tirmidhī’s ḥadīths, al-Juwaynī’s Waraqāt and al-Razī’s Al-maḥṣūl fī uṣūl al-fiqh.255 An incident that 
Heinrich Barth once witnessed illustrates the status of books as veritable treasures to the scholars who 
owned them. On one of his journeys, Barth came to a place on the river Benue where he wished to 
cross. On its bank he met a pilgrim who was returning from Mecca, with the books he had acquired in 
the illustrious cities across the desert. They boarded a pirogue together, and the boatman stowed the 
pilgrim’s luggage on the bottom, in the back of the boat, where some water was standing. When the 
traveller realised this, it was already too late. The books were spoiled and the man shed bitter tears.256  
 
Up until the sixteenth century the scale of book production in West Africa as a whole was modest, but 
it increased at the beginning of that century. The writings of a number historians from Timbuktu stand 
out as examples.257 For central sudanic Africa, the names of only a handful of scholars (some of them 
born in the Maghrib) who worked there before the sixteenth century survive, it was not until the end of 
the century that scholarship there picked up. From then on a lot of attention was devoted to 
educational texts (versifications, explanations and exhortations). Many fields of learning were touched 
upon, but here, too, fiqh and texts on worship predominated, thus filling a felt need on the part of new 
believers to know how to behave as Muslims. Numerous and voluminous commentaries were written 
on Khalīl’s Mukhtaṣar, as well as countless smaller texts on family law, marriage and inheritance, on 
the things the Qur’ān forbids or allow, and on the application of hudūd, the punishments that are 
established in the Qur’ān for capital sins. Jurisprudence was predominantly from the Māliki school—
that is, of the Maghribi and sudanic versions of it. As mentioned, these differed from Malikism in the 
Middle East, in that it was rather averse to reason and personal reflection as sources of knowledge, 
very strict regarding the exclusive observance of the regulations and traditions of its own authorities, 
and much more austere than the Mashriqi version in matters of religious observance and social life.258  
The West African Mālikī literature showed an increasing attention to Islamic rules of administration 
against the abuse of power and illegal taxation, for example. In time, the scholars’ awareness of a gap 
between ‘real’ Islamic rules as they thought it should be and that of kings or sultans who took from the 
religion what suited them, became a leading theme. The best known example of works on this subject 
is perhaps ‘Uthmān dan Fodio’s Kitāb al-farq, one of the central texts in the social and political reform 
of the Fulani, which criticises practices of ‘pagan’ governments in the Hausa kingdoms and sets out 
the principles of Muslim governance and public expenditure.259 An earlier example is Shurb al-zulāl 
(‘a drink of sweet water’—that is, the water in heaven), a didactic fiqh poem from about a century 
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earlier, in 1707, by Muḥammad b. al-Ḥajj ‘Abd al-Raḥmān al-Barnāwī (d. 1755), who was better 
known as al-Ḥajramī or shaykh Hajrami.260 It first sets out the rules of Muslim life, with much 
emphasis on the dietary laws, and then criticises, mildly but in detail, all sorts of illegal appropriation, 
especially by authorities and traders, who were typically Muslims. Shurb al-zulāl was a much-copied 
text, which Hiskett regarded as one of the forerunners of the reformist movement of the nineteenth 
century.261  
Searching for the motivations of the Sokoto jihād, not in social history, but in theological literature, 
Hiskett identified five themes that played a role in the writings (and sermons, no doubt) of reformers 
in the region, ever since the Almoravid movement of the eleventh century: the ‘disobedience’ (al-
mu‘āsī) of Muslims who continued practices stemming from traditional religions or the mixing of 
pagan beliefs with Islam; the ‘venal ‘ulamā’’ who accommodated mixed Islam and supported the 
illegitimate conduct of ‘Muslim’ rulers; the differentiation between true and false Muslims; the belief 
in the necessity of holy war against false Muslims; illegal taxation by Muslim rulers, and the belief 
that renewal (tajdīd ) of religion is necessary. 262 These themes also occur in the correspondence of al-
Suyūṭī and al-Maghīlī with the rulers of Songhay and Kano (see chapter 2). Al-Maghīlī’s letters were 
copied and over and over in Timbuktu and elsewhere, and still served as guidance to the leaders of the 
Sokoto revolution of 1800, which took place in what is now northern Nigeria.263 By that time, many 
reformers had become quite outspoken in their condemnation of non-Islamic habits among Muslims 
and in their assertion of the need for stricter compliance with Muslim rules. 
 
But perhaps the tradition was not as strong in Bornu as in more-westerly regions. Hall and Stewart 
remark that, because of the scarcity of books in central sudanic regions, there is a ‘distinct possibility 
that Islamic learning in the Central Sudan followed a slightly different (more original?) trajectory’ and 
they left it up to future research to shed more light on that trajectory.264 I hope to show below that one 
of these themes is strongly present in al-Wālī’s work—that of distinguishing true from false Muslims. 
At the same time, the practices of mixed Islam and the compromising ‘ulamā’ seem to be present in 
the background to his work, but he does not address these issues explicitly; neither does he speak 




4. Intellectual environment: themes 
 
Al-Wālī lived in a time that western scholarship has long regarded as one of cultural stagnation and 
apathy among Arab-Muslim civilisations, after a period of decline that was supposed to have 
definitively set in in the thirteenth century (with the Mongolian invasion of the Abbasid empire) if not 
earlier. It has been seen as a time when men of letters composed anthologies, scholars wrote 
commentaries and compilations, and scarcely an original idea flowed from their pens. Even from a 
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wider perspective, al-Wālī’s age was part of what is usually called the ‘early modern’ or ‘pre-modern’ 
period, which historians have mostly described as a period that lay in wait for the radical changes that 
were to culminate in modern society, with its worldwide exchange of goods, dependence on fossil 
fuels, and a worldview in which ‘religion is a lifestyle choice, not an inescapable and uniform 
discipline’.265 A growing number of researchers in the field of Muslim culture now take a different 
view, arguing that intellectual debate was not suppressed or at a standstill and that commentaries or 
anthologies were not signs of a moribund culture but products of creativity with different building 
blocks from those we are now used to seeing.266  
One of the views that has been adapted has to do with the debate among Muslim theologians on taqlīd 
versus ijtihād—that is, on the ‘blind acceptance’ of religious truths or of the authority of the great 
interpreters of divine law from the past versus the exertion of maximum mental effort in search of a 
legal opinion independent of centuries of exegesis and possible human error. It was argued in the first 
half of the twentieth century that in the thirteenth or fourteenth century ‘the doors of ijtihād’ were 
‘officially’ closed by religious authorities, and that this was generally accepted. Recent studies, 
however, have demonstrated that this was never the case, and that the traditions of both ijtihād and 
taqlīd have continued throughout Muslim history, not as exclusive modes, but rather as competing 
hegemonies.267   
It is possible that our understanding of both taqlīd and ijtihād has been warped by the representations 
of theologians in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, such as ‘Abd al-Wahhāb, who renewed the 
call for ijtihād. They emphasised reason as the means to get closer to the religious truth, and therefore 
their views are often supposed to be ‘rationalist’ or ‘modernist’, even though they tended to go hand in 
hand with a radically scripturalist and anti-scholastic stance. To sustain their call for ijtihād, they 
represented the theologians of the period before them as unthinking imitators, and perhaps it is true 
that their view, which saw stagnancy in the intellectual climate preceding their time, has been too 
uncritically adopted by modern scholars.268 In reality, however, while in Europe rationalism reigned 
supreme and formed the basis for its Scientific Revolution, in the Muslim world, too, rational sciences 
such as logic and grammar, and the trend of verification through detailed logical analysis of received 
scholarly opinions were becoming increasingly popular. 
For al-Wali too, reason was an important theme, and he often invoked the ‘reasoning’ person as the 
yard-stick for any argument. What did ‘reason’ mean in pre-modern Islam? Obviously, it was unlike 
the Enlightenment idea of substituting individual thought for inherited religious authority, but as a 
principle reason and rationality in the service of a non-rational revealed code, the Sharī’a, was central 
to Islamic intellectual life, argues J. Walbridge, who traces the use and understanding of reason in the 
main currents of pre-modern Islamic thought. As a working definition, he characterises reason as ‘the 
systematic and controlling use of beliefs, arguments, or actions based on well-grounded premises and 
valid arguments such that another person who has access to the same information and can understand 
the argument correctly ought to agree that the premises are well-grounded, that the logic is sound, and 
that the resultant beliefs, arguments, or actions are correct.’269 As in European scholasticism, then, 
reason was applied to expound revelation as the ultimate source of authority, sometimes in the service 
of theology, sometimes equal to it. For some philosophers and theologians (Ibn Sīna is one of the most 
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outspoken examples), God was the ultimate intellect and therefore also must be knowable by reason. 
In all periods and currents, reason was strongly present especially in the sciences of uṣūl al-fiqh, 
grammar and kalām. However, as in European philosophy, kalām or scholasticism was in time being 
pushed too far, in the eyes of opponents, who felt that it decayed when the means of casuistic logical 
reasoning came to obscure the end.  Reactions to it were framed as revivalism—that is, as a call to 
return to the scriptures.  
The themes of reason, mysticism and revelation as mutually complementary but distinct sources of 
knowledge, and of verification and ijtihād as opposed to taqlīd—coincide with major elements of al-
Wālī’s thought. Before we turn to his work, I will introduce them below, emphasising the perspective 
of Ash‘arism and, more specifically, views from al-Sanūsī, who was one of the pillars of this school in 
West and central sudanic Africa. 
 
 
Source of knowledge 
 
An issue that has pervaded Muslim theology since Greek philosophy was introduced into it in the 
ninth century, was that of the sources of knowledge. The debate on the question pitted traditionalists 
against rationalists—that is, those who relied primarily on the transmission (naql) of divine revelation 
against those who relied primarily on reason (‘aql).270 For traditionalists, the principal source of 
knowledge of God’s truth, apart from the Qur’ān, lies in the ‘traditions’ or ḥadīths that record the 
words and deeds (the sunna) of the prophet Muḥammad and his earliest followers, and in the 
consensus of the community of early scholars. They are the ahl al-sunna wa l-jamā‘a. For rationalists, 
reason was never the sole authority in the attainment of religious truth, but they did regard it as 
indispensable (notably in matters on which the Qur’ān and the sunna are silent) and ultimately as 
superior to tradition. Some argued that the Qur’ān and the sunna often seem to contradict each other, 
so that reliance on them as the leading principle in the religious sciences gave rise too easily to 
conflict. A more fundamental argument was that God cannot be known intuitively or by the senses, but 
that only speculative reason can lead to knowledge of Him, and that it is therefore the first duty of the 
believer.  
 
Speculative theology, kalām, was the stronghold of the rationalists. Its stock in trade was to provide 
logical proof for what was believed as a matter of faith, in the first place that God is One. Its 
practitioners, the mutakallimūn, found most freedom in thinking about issues that were not touched 
upon by revelation or sunna, such as God’s essence and his attributes. The tools and terminology of 
their thoughts on the subject were to a large extent derived from the source that has directed 
generations of thinkers around the Mediterranean—that is, the philosophy of Aristotle, notably his 
metaphysics and his logic. From this tradition, which was perpetuated by philosophers such as Ibn 
Sīnā and al-Ghazālī (d. 1111), we have such ideas as the distinction between substance (that is, what 
can be or what can exist in different forms; dhāt in Arabic) as the basis of changing matter, and the 
contingent, the ‘accidental’ or changing matter itself (‘araḍ). The Arabic philosophers also adopted 
and elaborated on the distinction between, on the one hand, perception, which is not independent of an 
object—that is, of external matter—and, on the other, the perception of the soul or intellect, which can 
reach the pure form of things without the help of an image or some other phenomenon based in 
materiality. And they wholeheartedly adopted Aristotle’s concepts and technical terms of logic, such 
as the syllogism and its conclusion, negation and affirmation, and the three logical options of 
necessity, impossibility and contingency.271 Examples of this influence will be recognised in the work 
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of al-Sanūsī, which we will look at in the next chapter. The theological school that relied most 
exclusively on reason was that of the Mu‘tazilis, but a good measure of rationalism was also 
characteristic of the Ash‘aris and the Māturīdis.272 The Māturīdis were never as influential as the 
former, but they are mentioned here because, as we saw in the previous chapter, al-Wālī is thought to 
have considered the main differences between their school and his.  
 
The Mu‘tazilis and the Māturīdis shared the view that, ultimately, we must believe in God because 
reason forces us to—that one cannot have faith without the use of reason. In order to acquire 
knowledge about God, man was considered capable of rational speculation, based on reason and 
evidence, and independently of revelations or prophets. This stance was criticised by traditionalist as 
well as Ashʿarī theologians, both of whom said that we must believe in God, not because reason forces 
us to, but because it is written.  
 
Related to the preference for ‘aql or naql is the question of where knowledge is situated or produced. 
An interpretation that was commonly accepted in Ash‘arism was first formulated by the Mālikī Abū 
Bakr al-Bāqillānī (d. 1013). He saw knowledge as existing in two forms: the uncreated knowledge of 
God and the created knowledge of man. The knowledge of man is again divided in two sorts, in 
necessary or intuitive (darūrī) knowledge and speculative or reflective (nazarī) knowledge. The 
former is knowledge that we cannot doubt, such as the fact that a body is impenetrable, to give an 
example that al-Wālī also uses (see next chapter). Speculative knowledge is, for instance, the 
knowledge that God is eternal. It depends on the understanding of logical proof.  
The discussion among philosophical theologians was about the relation between this speculative 
knowledge and the object speculated about, or the truth. Does reflection or speculation enable us to 
grasp knowledge or truth that already exists, or does it generate knowledge? Here Ash‘aris and 
Mu‘tazilis had different opinions. Many among the former maintained that all knowledge was created 
by God in the world and in men, even if He created some of it only after man has engaged in 
speculation, in the way He creates a child after a coition.273 In the Ash‘arī epistemology, reflection 
leads to knowledge—sound or unsound, depending on the soundness of the reflection itself—but it 
does not generate it. The Mu‘tazila (and the Māturīdīya) view was that rational speculation generates 
knowledge.274  
A preference for either ‘aql or naql also led to different points of view on issues such as God’s essence 
and His attributes, or free will versus predestination, or God’s omnipotence and natural laws. And long 
after Ash‘arism had become the dominant creed in Sunni Islam, the need its adherents felt to counter 
Mu‘tazila opinions on these matters barely subsided, if at all. Some of al-Wālī’s heroes, such as Yūsuf 
al-Sanūsī (d. 1490) and Ibrahīm al-Laqānī (d. 1631), rarely missed an opportunity to explain why 
Mu‘tazilism was wrong. And remarkably, al-Wālī never repeated their criticism. 
Heading the list of issues of contention between the two schools was the ontological status of God’s 
essence or self (dhāt) and of his attributes (ṣifāt)—that is, the question of how God existed, and how, 
being One, He related to his multiple attributes.275 In the Qur’ān, God is described as powerful, 
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knowing, willing and so on, as well as sitting on a throne, for instance. These can be considered as 
some of His attributes. For pure traditionalists, observance of the revelation meant that such Quranical 
assertions must be accepted without searching for ‘hidden’ meanings (ta’wīl), because God had 
nowhere called for such a search. Mu‘tazilis, on the other hand, argued that God does not ‘sit’ or 
possess any other of these attributes in the way a human being can possess them, and that it is almost 
heretic to believe otherwise, because it implies tashbīh (resemblance)—that is, an anthropomorphic 
conception of God. To avoid that, their doctrine held that His sitting is a metaphor and that He is 
knowing ‘by a knowledge that is He’, powerful ‘by a power that is He’, and so on. But here, they soon 
realised, there lurked another problem. If God’s existence lies in these various aspects, that opens the 
door to perceiving Him as multiple, instead of One. Therefore, as early as the ninth century the idea 
was reformulated and now stated that God is knowing because of His essence. The same was true of 
His living, His existence and His power—the attributes of essence (ṣifāt al-dhāt), which were 
distinguished from attributes of act (ṣifāt al-fi‘l, hearing, seeing, and so on). Eventually they denied 
that God has knowledge and power as substantive attributes at all. 
For leading Ash‘aris, this view strayed too far from what is written about God in the Qur’ān. As 
always seeking the middle ground between extreme rationalism and obscurantist traditionalism, they 
held onto all the attributes (He has power and is powerful, is knowing and has knowledge, and so on) 
and maintained that God’s essence is one, but that His attributes are multiple, even unlimited. They 
saw no contradiction between God’s oneness and His multiple attributes, because attributes in general 
were characteristics that are within the being it qualifies. They defined eight of the divine attributes: 
power, knowledge, life, will, hearing, sight, speech and everlastingness—all substantives that exist 
within God’s essence. 276 
Ibn Sīna found another way out of the struggle with an essence that is one and multiple at the same 
time: he introduced the further distinction between (God’s) essence and existence, between necessary 
and possible existence, and between ‘the necessity of existence in itself’ and the ‘necessity of 
existence through another’. These distinctions were all eagerly taken up by thinkers such as al-
Juwaynī, al-Ghazālī and Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī (d. 1209).277 Al-Juwaynī and al-Ghazālī elaborated a 
subdivision of real or substantive attributes (ṣifāt al-ma‘ānī or ṣifāt nafsiya) and ideal attributes (ṣifāt 
al-ma‘nawiya). God has power (a real attribute) and can also be characterised by words meaning that 
He is powerful, knowing, living, willing, hearing, seeking and eternal (ideal attributes). These are not 
essential to God but have significance only in relation to an object. For instance, God has knowledge, 
but He is knowing only where there is an object to know of. This classification of essential and 
qualitative attributes was taken up by Ash‘arism.278 It was a central part of the doctrine in West Africa 
of God’s attributes, which had spread there through the creeds in which al-Sanūsī had formulated it.279 
One of the objections of the traditionalists against this type of kalām and against ta’wīl and the 
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preference of reason over revelation in general was that it easily leads to anathematising ordinary 
people (takfīr al-‘awāmm), who, without specialist theological training, would hardly understand the 




An important matter that Ash‘aris, including al-Sanūsī, kept debating with the Mu‘tazilis in particular 
was the extent of—or, rather, the limits to—man’s own will in view of God’s omnipotence. Does man 
have a free will, and is there any causality invested in him that is outside God? No, said the most 
orthodox traditionalists and determinists (called Jabriyya by their opponents): there is no other power 
or cause than God himself. God is the ultimate cause of everything, and all of creation depends on His 
will to produce any effect. This is, indeed, the proof of His existence, for God’s will depends on His 
knowing the effect of it, and both His will and his knowledge depend on His Living. Therefore God 
lives.  
 
Yes, said the Mu‘tazilis and other believers in man’s free will (so-called Qadaris, derived from qadar, 
free will): man does make certain choices of his own, through a power that God has created in him. 
How else could he be held responsible for his sins? Not everything is predetermined by God. If 
someone were predetermined to be an unbeliever, how could God punish him for that? It would mean 
either that God was unjust in relation to the absolute ethical principles of good and bad, which the 
Mu‘tazilis believed existed, or that He would act arbitrarily. And in the end, God’s justice (‘adl) 
mattered more to the Mu‘tazilis than His omnipotence did—something the Ash‘aris deeply resented. 
That God was not the sole cause of everything could also be observed in nature, where natural laws 
rule processes of cause and effect, such as fire and burning. These processes are apparently, said the 
Mu‘tazilis, caused by forces outside God.  
Ash‘aris, who disagreed with the extreme fatalism they called Jabriyya, also opposed this view of the 
Mu‘tazilis, who, they argued, made a logical mistake, because what they observed or experienced in 
nature were not natural causes and effects, but the incidental co-occurrence of two events ‘willed’ by 
God each time. They came up with a solution in between determinism and free will, between God as 
the only cause and man’s responsibility for his sins. This lay in the concept of kasb or acquisition, 
which states that the moment a human being does something that God has pre-ordained, he 
appropriates (kasaba) the value of that act and assumes responsibility for it.  
The discussion about causality as experienced in the natural world was carried on for centuries and 
often revolved around the example of the ‘fiery furnace’. It would be too much of a distraction to go 
into it in detail here—after all, al-Wālī’s The peerless method does not accord nearly as much 
importance to causality as al-Sanūsī did—were it not for the fact that the example resonates with an 
anecdote in the preface to The peerless method. An explanation is therefore in place. The story of the 
‘fiery furnace’ clarified the central issue—the amount of agency accorded variously to God, man and 
nature—by asking whether it is possible that a prophet, if he were thrown into a fiery furnace, would 
not burn. ‘Philosophers’, as al-Ghazālī calls the pure rationalists in his discussion of the question, 
maintained that this is never possible. Ash‘aris were certain that it is possible, because the effect of fire 
that we usually observe to coincide with it is not necessary, but depends on God’s will.280 Al-Sanūsī 
used a simple example to explain the idea. He said that the relation between putting food on a fire and 
its getting cooked is coincidental every time—that is, that it is willed by God.281 The link to an 
anecdote about al-Sanūsī, which was told in his hometown and which comes up again in the preface to 
The peerless method, cannot be missed.282 It is about a man who had just bought some meat in the 
market, which he wanted to eat the same evening. On his way home, he heard the call to prayer and 
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stopped to enter the mosque from which it came, where al-Sanūsī happened to be the imam. When he 
came home, he put his meat on the fire, but it did not cook, even after hours. Puzzled, the man went to 
al-Sanūsī the next day, and asked him if there was an explanation. Perhaps, said the saint, this meat 
was present where I prayed? For all who pray behind me are protected from fire (nār, also the word 
for hell), and it will not affect them.283 It is a beautiful translation of a philosophical point of view into 
a popular tale. 
 
Faith and taqlīd 
 
Throughout the history of Islam, theologians have debated what faith (īmān) consists of. A 
fundamental view they have shared was that faith is not a matter of ‘believing’ in the sense of thinking 
(zanna) without knowing for sure, but of totally accepting (taṣdīq) the truth of God and revelation. In 
this view, the intellectual challenge is to determine exactly how man related to that truth, and what the 
character of his knowledge of it was.284 Widely shared among theological schools, too, was the notion 
that faith consists of three parts: internal conviction (i‘tiqād), verbal expression (iqrār bi’l-lisān or bī l-
qawl of the shahāda in the first place), and prescribed works or deeds (‘amal), with different schools 
emphasising different parts. 
 
Conviction was understood in turn as knowing, based on understanding, about religious principles; the 
extent to which God Himself can be known was another discussion). The positions regarding the 
acquisition of knowledge oscillated between two extremes: on the one hand, traditionalists believed 
that religious knowledge comes only from revelation. For rationalists, the only knowledge that 
counted as the basis for taṣdīq was knowledge obtained through the rational consideration (naẓar) of 
evidence (adilla or barāhīn) by means of arguments offered by the ‘ulamā’.285 Just parroting the 
religious tenets and theological terms was not enough—that was considered to be taqlīd: imitation or 
‘blind acceptance’ as it is often translated. The risk of taqlīd was that it implied a lack of conviction 
and could make faith unstable. 
In the early history of Islam, the fiercest opposition to taqlīd in the matter of faith—taqlīd al-īmān—
came from the Mu‘tazilis, who accused the muqallid of sinning (fasaqa)—although not of unbelief. 286 
In a reaction to this verdict, al-Ash‘arī had been one of the most influential advocates of moderation 
regarding the weakness of imitation. His view, that rational consideration was one of the sources of 
religious knowledge but not the only one, was adopted by the school that developed in his name. 
Later, al-Juwaynī and his pupil al-Ghazālī agreed that the fundamental issue was the stability of faith. 
A deep understanding of the principles of faith was certainly conducive to true and stable faith, they 
argued, but they also believed that this could be reached by means of taqlīd. Al-Ghazālī went so far as 
to say that the faith of most Muslims, even that of most ‘ulamā’, was in fact based on taqlīd. Only very 
few understood all the theological knowledge and could be said to have real knowledge, independently 
of the great scholars from Islam’s formative period. The imperfect understanding of most scholars was 
basically ignorance as well, although at a different level from the simple ignorance of ordinary people. 
At the same time, common people and muqallidūn were almost synonymous in his discourse. Al-
Ghazālī paid much attention to the social circumstances in which people came to the Muslim faith, and 
to the influence on the stability of a believer’s faith of people whom he admires, trusts or distrusts.287 
If the social environment did not inspire doubt in the ordinary believer, his faith could be as stable as 
anyone’s. On the other hand, going along with others could be positive if the others were good 
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believers. In the eyes of al-Ghazālī, accusing common believers of a defective faith just because they 
‘accepted’ certain tenets, could lead to takfīr al-‘awāmm, unjust anathemising of ordinary believers. 
He accused a certain class of theologians of making this mistake, who ‘make paradise depend on the 
custody of the mutakallimūn’.288 Of course al-Ghazālī is well known for his moderation. But if we take 
the opinion of someone of a reputedly stern inclination, such as Ibn Taymiyya, we see that it was the 
same on this issue. Many people were simply incapable of understanding the details of theological 
principles, he wrote, and that this did not make them unbelievers.289   
Taqlīd al-īmān is sometimes explicitly distinguished from taqlīd fī l-madhhab or taqlīd fī l-fiqh, which 
was in general understood as ‘accepting an opinion concerning a legal rule without knowledge of its 
bases’.290 This form of acceptance had long been the preferred or even the prescribed attitude for 
laymen as well as scholars. It was, for the famous jurist al-Qarāfī, for instance, what held a legal 
school together.291 The discussion in this case was, on the one hand, about whether one could follow 
an imām in matters that fall outside his jurisdiction as well as outside the perimeters of the madhhab, 
and whether one could in such cases follow one’s own judgment in the effort to derive opinions 
concerning a legal rule from the fundamentals of the law. On the other hand, theologians attempted to 
define what conditions a mujtahid had to fulfil in order to make independent decisions about legal 
principles. After centuries of discussion, the interpretation of the notion of taqlīd changed. In the 
sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, fundamentalist views gained ground, and it was argued that even 
the opinions of the founders of the legal schools, humans like anyone else, were liable to error. 
Therefore believers had to go back directly to the Qur’ān and the Sunna as their sources, and exert 
ijtihād, using their intellect, to understand the rules they found there.  
 
5. Conclusion  
 
In al-Wālī’s time, various models were in force and still developing, to which the specialist of Muslim 
learning could choose to conform, and which in turn would shape his functioning and his values. They 
varied from the ‘ālim to the storyteller, from the mutakallim to the faqīr, from those most oriented 
towards the scholarly standards of sunni Islam as formulated in the historic heartlands of Islam, to the 
popular religious practitioners, who combined with Islam elements from the roles of traditional priests 
or diviners. Al-Wālī operated on the most learned end of this spectrum. However, partly as a result of 
the expansion of Islam to rural areas, these models of scholarship were adrift. Learned scholars tended 
to regard popular mallams as ‘bad’, West African Malikism was wary of mutakallimūn who indulged 
too much in logic, and some ṣūfīs claimed that they could do without intellectual learning or 
scholarship anyway. This leads to the hypothesis that, in this period, the authority of ‘ulamā’ as men of 
undoubted moral standing who possessed unique religious knowledge, was challenged, and that this in 
turn forced those of a scholarly, ‘book-learning’ orientation to renegotiate their role and their 
authority.  
A further hypothesis following on from this is that al-Wālī’s prestige was partly built on his having an 
answer to the question of how to go about it. Apparently, he struck the right chord in negotiating 
between changing demands from believers, on the one hand, and, on the other, views on religious 
learning and authority. In the following chapters I will investigate how he did this. 
As mentioned, kalām was not popular in the Mālikī tradition that had developed in West Africa. This 
tradition was more concerned with the social aspects of Islamic law, and its scholars were growing 
particularly attentive to the gap between the ideal of Islamic governance and the practice of Muslim 
rulers—an attentiveness that would lead to the politico-religious reforms of the eighteenth and early 
                                                     
288 Rasā’il al-Ghazāli 140/3, www.alhadeeth.com.  
289 I thank dr. U. Ryad for pointing this out to me, and referring to Th. ‘A. al-Hallāq, ‘Ḍawābiṭ al-takfīr fī l-fikr 
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290 Peters 1980, 135. 
291 S.A. Jackson. Islamic Law and the State: the constitutional jurisprudence of Shihāb al-Dīn al-Qarāfī. Leiden: 
Brill, 1996. 139. 
 76
nineteenth centuries. Al-Wālī, however, did regard himself as a mutakallim, and indeed had somewhat 
different interests. The last part of this chapter has focussed on some of the matters that were discussed 
in theology, notably among Ash‘aris in North Africa and the Middle East. The themes of knowledge, 
causality and taqlīd were selected to form the background of al-Wālī’s own views, which will appear 


























































At this point we can take up the question to be answered in the next three chapters, namely, how al-
Wālī fashioned himself as a scholar and made his work significant for his environment. As a first step, 
this chapter will present an analysis of the most important pillar of his reputation, The peerless method 
for understanding the science of theology (Al-manhaj al-farīd fi ma‘rifat ‘ilm al-tawḥīd). This text has 
been highly regarded in more quarters than any of the other texts that bear his name, both in his own 
time and later. Thirty-two copies of it are still extant. Most of them are kept in libraries in Nigeria, 
while some are in Niger, Ghana, and Mali. A number of copies that were collected in Segou are now 
in Paris.292 The fact that The peerless method (and al-Wālī’s own versified abridgement, Sweet water 
source of the inmost attributes of the Lord)  has been passed on and preserved so often demonstrates 
that it has answered the needs of audiences that have discussed, appraised, and cited it.  
 
The origin of the text—of which al-Wālī was not the sole author—is complex, and this makes it a rich 
source of information. In the first place, it is a text that is situated in the heart of the field of Ash‘arī 
theology, or more specifically tawḥīd, the science of God’s oneness.   
 
Secondly, The peerless method is a commentary on a canonical text, the ‘Aqīda al-ṣughra or ‘small 
creed’, (hereinafter ‘the Ṣughra’), by the North African theologian al-Sanūsī. Composing a 
commentary is a specific way of translating and passing on selected knowledge from one environment 
to another. In general, commenting concerns knowledge with authority, which is deemed important as 
a point of reference in the social or intellectual life of the commentator. It is about the explanation and 
interpretation of canonical texts (or music or painting) in terms of the specific culture of a different 
time, place, ethnic background or class; about linking canon to cultural identity. As such, 
commentaries say as much about the culture of the interpreters as about the interpreted text. In an 
exceptional essay on the genre of commentary writing, A. Hughes argues that, while negotiating 
between two worlds, interpretations of canonical religious texts present an authoritative view of the 
basic values of the community for which they are written; they are intended to be normative for a new 
community which they provide with their own code and legitimacy. In the relation between canonical 
text and commentary, the former facilitates the latter. ‘Commentary may think with the text it 
interprets; it is almost never about it.’293 The aim, then, of this chapter is to uncover what The peerless 
method really is about, and how it links canon to the cultural and political environment of central 
sudanic Africa in the seventeenth century. It will allow us, in chapter 7, to discuss al-Wālī’s relation as 
an author to this message of The peerless method.  
 
Thirdly, this commentary stems from a Fulfulde oral tradition of teaching Islam, which was based on 
al-Sanūsī’s Ṣughra and had existed since the sixteenth century, and which al-Wālī claims to have only 
translated. In the nineteenth century this tradition was known as the kabbe, a name which, for 
convenience, will also be used here, although it is certain neither whether the term was used in the 
seventeenth century, nor to what extent today’s kabbe versions correspond with the earliest forms. 
The composers of predecessors of The peerless method are anonymous, but the reader must be warned 
that I will often speak in the plural of the authors of The peerless method.  
 
The method in this chapter is twofold. First it will analyse the relation between The peerless method 
and the traditions on which it is based. It will then explore the meaning and intention of the resulting 
                                                     
292ALA II, 35, 36. 
293 A. Hughes, `Presenting the Past: the Genre of Commentary in Theoretical Perspective’, in Method and 
Theory in the Study of Religion 15 (2003), 164-165. 
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text. A close comparison of The peerless method with the Ṣughra on the one hand and with what we 
know of the kabbe tradition on the other, will reveal the choices that were made, and the ideas that 
were either adopted or left out. The adaptations will uncover motivations that were relevant to the 
cultural, social and historical environment of seventeenth-century central sudanic Africa. 
 
For the present study, I used copies of four manuscripts. I closely studied manuscript Hunwick 178 
(kept at NU) and another that is kept in the library at the University of Ibadan in Nigeria, catalogue 
number 48.294 I later compared these with two manuscripts from the Segou collection in Paris, 
numbers 5650 and 5541. Mistakes that were made in copying both Hunwick 178 and the Ibadan 
manuscript suggest a direct relation between these two. In both versions the number of mistakes (not 
always the same ones) increases towards the end. Both copyists seemed to become less and less 
captivated by the text as it became  more  repetitive. Although Hunwick 178 has more mistakes than 
Ibadan 48, my references are to the former, because this copy is more easily available, and its 
handwriting is in general clear. The manuscript is not an original but a photocopy. References are to 
numbers I gave the photocopied pages, starting with 1 where the text starts with the basmallah, and 
ending with 57. 
 
 
1. Roots: al-Sanūsī’s Ṣughra 
 
In al-Wālī’s lifetime al-Sanūsī’s Al-‘aqīda al-ṣughra had been a canonical text in North and West 
Africa for quite a while: very soon after it was written, the West African Muḥammad b. ‘Abd al-
Raḥmān al-Ḥawḍī (d.1505) produced a versification, copies of which are now in libraries in 
Boutilimit, Segou and Timbuktu.295 A few decades later, one of the most respected scholars of 
Timbuktu, Muḥammad b. Aḥmad b. Aḥmad b. Abī Bakr b. Baghayogho al-Wangarī (1523—1594), 
made another versification,296 and dozens of copies of the Ṣughra itself were found in almost all of the 
West African collections. In the nineteenth century, commentaries and versifications were also made 
in other languages, such as Hausa, and numerous commentaries written in the Mashriq.297 
 
Abū ‘Abdallah Muḥammad b. Yūsuf al-Sanūsī was born in 1428 near Tlemcen, a town in the 
mountains in today´s Algeria, which had been one of the main cultural centres of the Maghrib since 
many centuries. He died there in 1486. He wrote about law, algebra and medicine, but was most 
famous, perhaps even during his own life-time and certainly soon afterwards, for his ‘creeds’, the 
‘Aqīda al-kubra (or ‘Aqīdat ahl al-tawḥīd wal-tasdīd  al-mukhrija min ẓulamāt al-jahl wa-raqbat al-
taqlīd), the ‘Aqīda al-wusta (also called Al-jumal or al-murshida), and the ‘Aqīda ahl al-tawḥīd al-
ṣughra, which is also called Al-ṣughra or Al-Sanūsiyya or Umm al-barāhīn (‘Source of proofs’). They 
are all similar in content, treating the same theme of the Ash‘ari doctrine on the attributes of God and 
of the prophets. The Ṣughra, as it is referred to in The peerless method, is elementary, while the longer 
texts, including a separate ‘introduction’ and commentary by al-Sanūsī (al-muqaddima), discuss more 
topics more extensively and polemically, criticising Christian, Mu‘tazili, and other points of view. All 
these texts have played an essential role in teaching theology in North and West Africa (as well as in 
Egypt and Asia) up to the twentieth century, but the Ṣughra was and is by far the most popular and the 
                                                     
294 My copy bears two numbers: 82 and 48. 
295Wāsiṭat al-sulūk. Hall & Stewart 2011, 170; GAL S II, 355.  
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with the Ṣughra. I found two short poems (in Arabic) that resemble the Ṣughra or The peerless method in Chad, 
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most highly respected.298 In The peerless method it is presented as a text that al-Sanūsī found on the 
‘preserved tablet’ (al-lawḥ al-maḥfūz) that is believed to contain all books of the Revelation.299 
 
Al-Sanūsī’s theological work was that of a scholastic, a master of kalām. It deals with God’s ontology 
from an axiomatic point of view, from where His attributes are deduced. From there the logical 
implications for the relation between God and man are deduced. Al-Sanūsī’s thought is permeated 
with the terms and concepts of Aristotelian logic, usually designated by the Arabic term manṭiq. His 
‘proofs’ are indeed barāhīn (sg burhān): they follow from a methodical argument within the logical 
framework. The word is to be distinguished from another type of ‘proof’ (adilla, sg dalīl), which is the 
unmistakable sign of something else, the way smoke is the sign of a fire.300 The Ṣughra’s nickname 
Umm al-barāhīn was deserved.  
 
By contrast with the abstract character of this work, as a person al-Sanūsī was remembered as an 
ascetic, as a pious and humble man, and as a good teacher with special sympathy for the poor and 
those who lacked formal education, but also as someone who shied away from social interactions, 
especially whenever the authorities were involved.301 His lifestyle helped to win him the reputation of 
a ‘walī’, a ‘friend of God’. Al-Sanūsī was often held to know things that could not be known by 
reason, to see truths the eye cannot perceive, and to be blessed with the ability to perform miracles.302 
Moreover, he was said to be descended from al-Ḥassan, the son of ‘Alī ibn Abī Ṭālib and grandson of 
the prophet Muḥammad. The peerless method presents him as one of four men in history who 
possessed three exceptional blessings, being sharīf, walī and ‘ālim (descending from the Prophet, 
‘holy’ and learned).303 After his death, people would appeal for his intervention in heaven, for instance 
to ask God for rain.304 
 
Even a short while after his death, al-Sanūsī’s writings were already held in high regard. There once 
was a man who upon his death appeared before God with al-Sanusi’s Ṣughra in his hand. Because of 
that book God saved him from hell, so a friend of this man was told, when the dead man appeared to 
him in a dream.305 The flip side of the coin was that, according to the author’s biographer, a man who 
admitted to the angels Nakir and Munkar that he had never read any of al-Sanūsī’s creeds, was 
immediately beaten by them with iron rods.306 
                                                     
298 E.I.; Hall and Stewart, in Krätli & Lydon 2011, 137. Today in northern Nigeria the text is best know as Umm 
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299 Hunwick 178, 9.  
300 See J. van Ess, ‘The logical structure of Islamic theology’ in I.R. Netton (ed.) Islamic Philosophy and 
Theology,  II.  London: Routledge, 2007, 35-38. 
301In 1519 Sīdī Aḥmad al-Abbadī sent information about al-Sanūsī to a colleague in Fez. The text was found and 
translated by C. Brosselard: ‘Les Inscriptions Arabes de Tlemcen.’ In Revue Africaine 3, 16, (1859), 241-248.  
And ‘Les Inscriptions Arabes de Tlemcen. Retour à Sidi Senouci. Inscriptions de ses deux Mosquées.’ In Revue 
Africaine 5, 28 (1861), 241-260. Other biographical information comes from a biography by his pupil 
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Sundusiyya fi-l-faḍā’il al-Sanūsiyya. Bibliothèque Générale et Archives, Rabat, D984. Now Bibliothèque 
Nationale du Royaume du Maroc) and from Ibn Maryam (d. 1602) who devoted a long paragraph to al-Sanūsī in  
Al-bustān fīdhikr al-awliyā’ wa-l-‘ulamā’ bi-tilimsān. Algiers, 1908.  
302Ibn Maryam 1908, 244, 245. Ibn Maryam says that there are many anecdotes about al-Sanūsī’s miracles and 
relates two of them. The first is the miracle of the meat that would not cook, which is also told in The peerless 
method and was mentioned in the previous chapter. The second is about a woman who had lost the key to her 
house. She desperately tried to enter the house, but did not succeed, until she laid her hand on the lock, crying 
‘by the glory of my lord Muḥammad b. Yūsuf al-Sanūsī!’ Then, when she pulled, ‘the house gave way’. The 
image of unlocking doors and knowledge again emphasises al-Sanūsī’s educational gift.  
303 Hunwick 178, p. 13. The other three are Abū Bakr al-Bāqillānī, Abū Ishāq al-Isfarā’īnī  and Abū al-Ḥassan 
al-Shādhilī. 
304 Brosselard 1861, p 247. 
305 Brosselard 1861, p 247.  
306 Berbrugger 1861, 264. 
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Al-‘aqīda al-ṣughra is an excerpt of a work on tawḥīd. It presents the quite abstract main issues of this 
field of learning without much explanation. The lack of clarification, however, is perhaps compensated 
for by al-Sanūsī’s concluding remark that this entire theology is contained in the shahāda, the 
testimony that there is no other god than God and that Muḥammad is His prophet. Each of the two 
parts of the shahāda, he wrote, embodies knowledge of the attributes of God and the prophets, which 
can and should be internalised by repeating the words often, ‘until they mingle with one’s flesh and 
blood’. One wonders whether the phrase is one of the reasons for the Ṣughra’s great popularity in 
many parts of Africa and Asia, because it may have been read as a ‘free’ offer of all this philosophical 
knowledge to each Muslim: even if a believer could not reproduce the logical arguments, this 
paragraph seems to suggest, still, as long as he remembers the shahāda, he or she is always a vessel 
and a custodian of such knowledge, and thus a respectable member of the community of Muslims. 
 
Another reason for the Ṣughra’s popularity was undoubtedly its brevity. All over the Islamic world, 
short texts were more often commented on than longer ones.307 The entire text of the Ṣughra takes up 
no more than eight or ten pages in modern print, but it is useful to give an even shorter paraphrase of 
it, and I do this below. The excerpt is actually based on three editions: J.D. Luciani´s edition, with a 
translation and a selection from comments by al-Sanūsī himself and by al-Dasūqī (d. 1815) and al-
Bajurī (d. 1861)308; an edition of al-Sanūsī’s own Sharḥ Umm al-barāhīn;309and an edition and 
translation by M. Wolff with primarily grammatical and philological notes and a translation by M. 
Wolff.310 Other sources that help to understand the text are Luciani’s introduction and notes to al-
Sanūsī’s Muqaddima and to al-Laqānī’s Jawharā. 311  
 
After the basmallah, al-Sanūsī immediately comes to the point: 
 
Know that judgement concerns three categories: the necessary, the impossible and the possible. 
The necessary is that of which non-existence cannot be thought; the impossible is that of which 
existence is incompatible with reason; the possible is that of which existence as well as non-
existence can be thought of. Every adult is held by Law to know what is necessary, impossible and 
possible concerning God and the prophets. 
 
God has twenty attributes that are necessary to Him, starting with the following six: existence; 
existence without beginning; eternity (existence without end); being unlike temporal things; 
existence by itself without the need for anything to define that existence (without mukhaṣṣis); 
oneness—that is, not being composed of elements and having no equal. The first of these 
attributes is essential (nafsīya), while the other five are negative (they define what He is not). 
 
God has seven necessary attributes that are ‘substantive’ or ‘real’ (ma‘ānī)312: power and will 
(which have as object everything that is possiblet), knowing (which has as object everything that 
is necessary, possible and impossible), life (which has no object), hearing and vision (which have 
all that exists as their object) and speech (without word or voice and having the same object as 
                                                     
307 Wisnowsky 2004, 159. 
308 J.-D. Luciani (translation and annotation), Petit traité de théologie musulmane par Abou Abdallah 
Mohammed ben Mohammed ben Youssef Senoussi. Algers: Imprimerie Orientale Pierre Fontana, 1896.  
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knowing). God has seven necessary attributes that are ideal (ma‘anawiya), related to the first 
seven: he is powerful, willing, knowing, living, ‘hearing’, seeing’ and ‘speaking’. 
 
God has twenty impossible attributes, the opposites of the first twenty: non-being; having been 
created; being finite; being like temporal things and taking up space, being limited in space and 
time or having interests; depending on something else to define Him; not being one; having no 
power to create, and an attribute such that it is impossible that anything exists that was created 
without his willing or knowing it. It is impossible that he should act as a natural force, causing 
things involuntarily (bi l-ta‘līl) or with the force of a law of nature (bi l-ṭabā‘). It is impossible for 
God to be unknowing or defective in any way concerning anything that can be known. It is 
impossible that He dies, or is deaf or blind or without speech.313 
 
It is possible for God to do or not do anything possible. 
 
The proof of God’s existence without beginning is the creation of the world. If the world had 
come into existence by itself, from a situation where being and non-being were equal, there would 
have been a moment where being had gained precedence over non-being, without the interference 
of an external cause. The proof of the necessity of His eternity (without end) is that if He could be 
non-existent in future, then His existence without beginning would have to be denied too, because 
His being would then be only possible, not necessary. The proof of God’s being different from 
temporal things, is that if He were similar to them, He would have to exist in time, which is 
unthinkable. The proof that He exists by himself, is that if He depended on something to make him 
appear, He would be an attribute, and an attribute cannot have other attributes. And if He needed a 
creator, He would have had a beginning. The proof of His oneness is that if He were not one, 
nothing would exist, because He would be powerless. The proof that God necessarily has power, 
will, knowledge and life is that, if He lacked one of them, none of the created things would exist. 
The proof that He necessarily has hearing, vision and speech is in the Book, in the sunna, and in 
the unanimity of the first Muslims (ṣahaba). Also, if He did not have them, He would have 
imperfections, whereas it is impossible that God has imperfections. 
 
The proof that it is possible for God to do or not do what is possible, is that if one could imagine 
that realising or abandoning something possible were necessary or that it is impossible for God, 
the possible would become necessary or impossible. 
 
God’s prophets have the following necessary attributes: truthfulness (ṣadaq), faithfulness (imāna), 
and being transmitters of what they have been commissioned to transmit. The contrary is 
impossible: they cannot lie or betray their mission by doing something forbidden or disapproved 
of by religious law, or hide anything they have been commissioned to transmit. What is possible 
for the prophets is all events that can befall people, such as illness and other accidents, as long as 
they do not harm their dignity.  
 
The proof that the prophets are necessarily truthful is that, if they were not, God would have lied 
when he confirmed by miracles (mu‘jiza) the truthfulness of His messengers. The proof that they 
are necessarily faithful is that, if they did something forbidden or disapproved of, those things 
would be acts of obedience, for God has ordered us to imitate the prophets, and He does not order 
what is forbidden or disapproved. The proof that human events can befall them is that it has been 
observed to be so. This may happen either to assure them of greater rewards in the hereafter, or to 
establish an example for others, or to inspire people to accept their fate or to show that worldly 
things are contemptible in God’s eyes, and that He does not mean that this world should be the 
place where prophets and saints receive their reward. 
 
                                                     
313 Thirteen impossible attributes are listed. The last seven are the opposite of the seven necessary real attributes. 
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All this is included in the words ‘There is no god but God, and Muḥammad is His prophet’, 
because they mean: there is no creature that is in need of nothing outside him, or is needed for 
everything outside him, except God. ‘There is no god but God’ encompasses the necessary, the 
impossible and the possible, which every adult must know. ‘Muḥammad is His prophet’ 
encompasses belief in the other prophets and angels and books of revelation and the Day of 
Resurrection, because Muḥammad has brought belief in all these. Although they have only a few 
letters, the two expressions of the shahāda encompass all the knowledge that a Muslim adult must 
have. The adult who is of sound mind (al-‘āqil) must repeat the shahāda often, so that its meaning 
mingles with his flesh and blood. Then, God willing, he will behold many secrets and wonders.  
 
The second, and main, part of The peerless method comments on the Ṣughra by explaining and 
illustrating each statement in the original, as I will discuss below. In a few instances, the explanations 
are drawn directly from al-Sanūsī’s own commentary (Sharḥ) and introduction (Muqaddima), which 
were apparently known to the author(s) of The peerless method or of its precursor.314 
 
For instance, the Ṣughra distinguishes between the cognitive categories of the necessary and the 
impossible, of ‘that which the mind cannot think of as absent’ and ‘that which the mind cannot 
conceive to exist’, but it does not elucidate this. In The peerless method (PM), however, the point was 
considered important enough to be worth expanding on. The necessary is divided in two, it states, and 
paraphrasing al-Sanūsī’s Muqaddima, it explains 
 
that which is self-evidently necessary (ḍarūrī) and that which is necessary after rational 
consideration (naẓarī). What is self-evidently necessary is, for instance, the impenetrability of 
a body. What is necessary after consideration is, for instance, the prior existence of God. You 
don’t perceive this necessity until you consider what would follow from the negation. The 
impossible is what the mind cannot conceive of as existing. [PM adds:] The impossible is 
divided in two: [PM quotes from Muqaddima:] that which is self-evident and that which is 
impossible after rational consideration. It is self-evidently impossible, for instance, for a body 
to be free from movement and immobility at the same time. What is impossible upon rational 
consideration is, for instance, the existence of an idol next to our Lord, the majestic and 
powerful. [PM adds again:] You do not perceive the necessity until you consider what would 
follow from the negation.315 
 
This passage is all the more significant in that it gives a first glimpse of The peerless method’s views 
on knowledge. In his longer text, which is addressed to other scholars of theology, al-Sanūsī had given 
a place to this typically kalām distinction between self-evident knowledge and insights that can be 
reached only after a thought process, but apparently he did not consider it essential in the context of 
the shorter, more popular creed.316 For the author(s) of The peerless method, by contrast, the 
distinction was important to the message they wished to transmit. The examples of naẓarī knowledge 
                                                     
314Passages that are quoted from al-Sanūsī’s Muqaddima occur in Hunwick 178 notably on p 14 (‘judgement is 
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Cf. J.D. Luciani 1908. 38, 39. 
315 Hunwick 178, 15, 16. Cf. Luciani 1908, 48-51. 
316 See Van Ess 2007, 42,43. 
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that are given make one realise that the topic of the Ṣughra and The peerless method falls entirely 
within this category of things that are essential to the religion and need to be turned over and over in 
the mind. 
 
Given the awareness of al-Sanūsī’s other theological work on the part of the author(s) of the 
commentary, it is interesting that some of the themes and explanations that al-Sanūsī discussed there at 
length were not incorporated into The peerless method, such as the relation between legal judgement 
and divine law, and the concepts of ‘appropriation’ (kasb) and unbelief (kufr). Al-Sanūsī’s views on 
these last two are closely related, and they are particularly relevant for this study: as I will argue 
below, The peerless method rejects them on purpose. Let us look more closely, then, at al-Sanūsī’s 
understanding of kasb and unbelief.  
 
Regarding kasb al-Sanūsī expressed the prevailing Ash‘arī view. He rejected both the determinist view 
of the Jabrīya, that all human acts are like trembling, over which man has no influence at all, and the 
opposite view, of the Mu‘tazila and the Qadarīya, which held that a human being has his own 
independent will in all acts in which he feels no constraint—voluntary movements for instance—and 
can produce certain effects himself through a force he has received from God. This would imply, said 
al-Sanūsī, that God produced only what we cannot produce ourselves, such as colours or trembling. 
The correct, Sunni doctrine was, he argued, that all acts come from God, whereas ‘voluntary’ acts 
coincide with a human being’s incidental force, which does not produce these acts nor has any effect 
in and of itself. The human being is free in the sense that he generally does not feel compelled either to 
act or not to act. He has ‘a share’ in his acts, consisting of the relationship between his incidental force 
and the act produced in him. Through that relationship he appropriates (yaksabu) the effect of the acts 
within himself, but not their effects outside of him. The effects outside of him are concomitant with 
God’s will, the effects within himself are the basis of his responsibility for the law.317 
 
A belief that human beings are free to produce certain acts and their effects themselves, so that there 
exists causality outside of God, amounts to associating something else with God, and is therefore a 
form of polytheism (shirk).318Al-Sanūsī lists six forms of shirk319: 
1. Believing that there exist two independant Gods (as do the magians) 
2. Believing that God is composed of more than one deity, as Christians do 
3. Adoring others than God with the aim of coming closer to Him, as the pagans of the first jahaliyya 
period did (shirk al-taqrīb) 
4. Adoring others than God, in imitation of others, as the pagans of the last jahiliyya period did (shirk 
al-taqlīd) 
5. Believing that causes that we experience have effects of their own, as philosophers do 
6. Doing anything for reasons other than God 
 
He continues with a list of seven sources from which innovation (bid‘a) and unbelief can develop320:  
1. The belief in an ‘essential necessity’ that makes God act through a logical causality or a 
natural force, and not by divine will 
2. The belief, held by the Mu‘tazila, that God’s acts depend logically on interests or motivations 
(al-aghāḍ) to realise what is good and prevent what is bad 
3. Imitation by clinging (to one’s madhhab; ta‘assab) without searching for the truth 
4. Experimental induction, i.e. the belief, based on experience, in inevitable relations between 
certain things 
5. Complex ignorance, that is, not knowing the truth and ignoring the fact that one does not 
know it 
6. Attaching supreme importance to what the Qur’ān and the ḥadīth seem to mean, without a 
distinction between what is possible and what is impossible 
                                                     
317 Luciani 1908, 58-72. 
318 Luciani 1908, 237. 
319 Luciani 1908, 96-108. 
320 Luciani 1908, 112. 
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7. Not knowing the rules of reasoning that allow one to know what is necessary, possible, and 
impossible, as well as not knowing the Arabic language, including lexicology (‘ilm al-lugha), 
inflection (i‘rāb) or rhetoric (bayān). 
 
It is especially important that a good part of al-Sanūsī’s views on possible sources of unbelief revolves 
around the relationship between God’s omnipotence and free will or causality. The Fulani 
commentary, on the contrary, does not (except in one instance321) refer to this matter because, as we 
will see, the view on unbelief expressed there is linked, not to an understanding of causality, but to 
social issues. 
 
Al-Sanūsī’s dialectic mostly uses the Mu‘tazila as the party to whose views he opposes his own. Apart 
from their ‘false doctrine’ regarding causality and man’s free will in certain cases, as well as God’s 
obligation according to logic to consider the well-being of people, al-Sanūsī also discusses, in his 
Muqaddima and his Ṣharḥ, the Mu‘tazilis erroneous belief that it is impossible that God would punish 
someone who has not transgressed any of His laws; the idea (based on a grammatically wrong 
interpretation of a phrase in the Qur’ān) that there are things that God has not created; the notion that 
God has no real (ma‘ānī) attributes, and a few other Mu‘tazila errors.  
 
It is also noteworthy that The peerless method refers to the Mu‘tazilis only once, where the first of 
God’s necessary ideal (ma‘anawiya) attributes, His being powerful, is explained: ‘It is related to the 
first of the substantive attributes, power. This is different from the point of view of the Mu‘tazila, who 
say that it is [directly] related to [God’s] essence. But if it were linked to the essence, as they claim, 
the essence would be substantive, and his uniqueness would be denied.’322 Otherwise, al-Wālī leaves 
the Mu‘tazilis in peace.  
 
 
2. The Kabbe tradition 
 
In the first lines of The peerless method, Al-Wālī wrote that he translated commentaries in Fulfulde 
that several learned Fulani before him had made on al-Sanūsī’s ‘Aqīda al-ṣughra. These commentaries 
existed most probably only as oral texts,323 but if they were anything like The peerless method, they 
must have been the beginning of a long tradition of religious teaching. In its form, The peerless 
method strongly resembles texts from a Fulani tradition of teaching tawḥīd that is still alive, in a 
region stretching from today’s Senegal to Mali, Burkina Faso, Nigeria and Niger. At least since the 
nineteenth century, this teaching has been called the kabbe in Fulfulde, a word that is derived from a 
root that means ‘to tie’, just like ‘aqīda in Arabic.324 The translation of the Arabic word into Fulfulde 
covers the cultural translation of al-Sanūsī’s text to the context of the Fulani’s ‘missionary’ work. In 
the kabbe, the idea of the purpose of the Ṣughra was transmitted, and concepts were explained in a 
way that was appealing to a new audience, and were organised and presented in ways that joined in 
with the discursive culture of the Fulani. 
 
The roots of the kabbe must lie early in the sixteenth century, when al-Sanūsī’s Ṣughra was already 
circulating in its original form and in versified versions in the most western part of West Africa, as 
manuscripts show, from where Fulani brought it eastward. What the content of the kabbe was in al-
Wālī’s time can only be guessed at, because its oral transmission has always been an important 
                                                     
321 See Hunwick 178, 49, where an explanation is offered of the words in the Ṣughra ‘This must be the case if 
you presume that one of the existing things has an effect through its own nature. If you presume that [something] 
has a self-working [causal] effect through a force that God has made in it, as many of the ‘ignorant’ claim...’ 
Here al-Sanūsī’s sentence is broken off, in order to give three different categories of ‘ignorant philosophers’ and 
their ideas of cause outside God. The passage is abruptly ended by the remark that this (cause outside of God) ‘is 
also impossible’. 
322 Hunwick 178, 23. 
323As far as we know, Fulfulde prose was hardly ever written down, until the 19th century. Brenner and Last 
1985, 434. 
324Brenner 1984, 79. 
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characteristic, and up until the twentieth century it was indeed the only way in which the text was 
preserved.325 And even of the recent expressions of the kabbe not much has been committed to paper. 
But there are some sources that describe the tradition. To begin with, a short description by Paul Marty 
from 1921 tells us that in some of the most western regions of Africa the kabbe is a form of teaching 
tawḥīd, based on al-Sanūsī’s Umm al-barāhīn and preceded by an introduction which includes 
information about the Qur’ān as the first of four holy books, before Pentateuch, Psalms and Gospel.326 
These three elements -Umm al-barāhīn as the core of the text, its didactic character (for instance 
introducing new topics with the phrase ‘what is the meaning of...?’ and the use of metaphor and 
repetition), and an added introduction about more general aspects of the Muslim faith - are also found 
in other kabbe versions, as well as in The peerless method. A few other versions have been discussed 
in detail by L. Brenner, both in his book about the Malian ṣūfī shaykh Tierno Bokar (d. 1940), who 
was the author of the ‘catechism’ called Mā al-dīn (‘What is religion?’), and in an article about one of 
the latter’s pupils, the Malian historian and world-famous author Amadou Hampāté Bā (d. 1991), who 
collected several versions of the kabbe and also made a new version of it himself in Fulfulde.327 
Brenner also found references to the kabbe in the archives of two French colonial officers from 
Senegal and Niger.328 And, together with a Fulani colleague, he wrote down a version of the kabbe that 
had been recorded on tape in the 1960’s by Boubou Hama in southern Niger. They translated part of 
the Fulfulde text into English.329 
 
The traces and descriptions of kabbe versions from the seventeenth to the twentieth centuries confirm 
much continuity especially in their educational aspects. As oral texts they were aimed at an illiterate 
audience: non-Muslims who were candidates for conversion, as well as members of the broader 
Muslim community who wished to expand their understanding of their religion. In stories about its 
origin the kabbe is often presented as a recent discovery by a specialist of religion who wishes to make 
difficult information available to people without (much) formal education. More than once the stories 
also mention the instruction to and by women, who were often excluded from formal education.  
 
The kabbe’s teaching methodology is very well adapted to the purpose of including as many common 
believers as possible. Like religious poetry in Fulfulde, the kabbe was clearly marked by techniques to 
facilitate memorisation, like repetition and the use of pairs or phrases.330 Most remarkable is the 
version developed by Tierno Bokar, who supported the teaching of his Mā al-dīn to illiterate people by 
means of a pattern of lines and dots, each of which represented an item in the catechism. The kabbe 
versions also share a devotion to the clarification of abstract theological concepts, through metaphor 
and analogies with elements of daily life. 
 
Another characteristic of the recent versions is the association with Sufism. Especially in the teachings 
of Tierno Bokar and Amadou Hampāté Bā, the mystic element is strong. The older, oral Nigerien 
version says that the kabbe concerns one branch of the study of tawḥīd, of which ‘there are two 
branches,[that of the study of] the manifest and the hidden’ The manifest has to do with the knowledge 
of jurisprudence and other Islamic sciences and of what is permitted and forbidden. ‘What is hidden 
                                                     
325 As far as I know they are still transmitted only orally, in some quranic schools in various West African 
countries where there is a strong Fulani influence. 
 
326P. Marty, L‘Islam en Guinée. Paris: Ernest Leroux, 1921, 351-355. 
327Brenner 1984. L. Brenner, ‘A Living Library: Amadou Hampāté Bā and the Oral Transmission of Islamic 
Religious Knowledge.’ In Islamic Africa 1, 2 (2010), 45-93.  
328 The first report is entitled ‘Islam dans la Résidence de Dori’, 31 july 1899. Archives Nationales du Sénégal, 
AOF Série G, 15-G-186. Professor Brenner has generously given me a copy of his own handwritten copy of part 
of this report. The second report is quoted at some length in his West African Sufi, 83. 
329 Brenner did this work together with Almamy Malik Yattara. Unfortunately the translation could not be 
finished and was never published, but I am much indebted to professor Brenner for kindly allowing me to 
photocopy his drafts. 
330 Cf. Seydou 1966 op. cit. in Haafkens, J., Chants Musulmans en Peul. Textes de l’héritage religieux de la 
communauté musulmane de Maroua, Cameroun. E.J. Brill, Leiden 1983, 27. 
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concerns purification... it is ṣūfī knowledge and it is called the knowledge of truth.’331 That may not 
prove that, in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, Sufism was as important in the kabbe tradition 
as it later became. It may be that it has gained importance in these texts since the nineteenth century, 
when the influence of Sufism in the region as a whole increased.332 On the other hand, since many 
elements of the kabbe tradition are quite constant, there is no reason to doubt that from the beginning 
it accommodated—in its text or context—an approach to religious knowledge through mysticism.  
 
The status of the kabbe has not always been the same across times and places. Marty, for instance, 
described it in Futa Djallon in the beginning of the twentieth century, as part, not of popular Islam but 
of formal Islamic education, in which it was taught only in the superior cycles, which only a minority 
of students followed. In other regions, mastering the text came to function as a rite of passage that 
must have been widespread among Fulani: Marty and French-colonial reports, as well as Boubou 
Hama, mention that in certain communities from Senegal to Niger, a Fulani man could marry, or 
slaughter an animal, after he had finished his study of the kabbe. In the nineteenth and twentieth 
centuries at least, it was this study that made him a full Muslim and an adult member of his 
community.333 It is plausible that, as Brenner suggests, such practices had already developed into a 
sectarian cult by the end of the eighteenth century and that the advocates of the kabbe, the 
kabbenkoobe, were the mutakallimūn against whom ‘Uthmān dan Fodio raised serious objections, 
because they excluded faithful believers for no valid reasons, and spread confusion and dissension 
among Muslims.334 Though he was admired by Dan Fodio’s son, al-Wālī seems to have had a hand in 
turning an inclusive educational tradition into a tool of partition. 
 
 
3. The peerless method builds on both 
 
And then: some Fulāta have commented on the Ṣughra by shaykh al-Sanūsī in their own 
language. I have wished to put that in Arabic in order to study the lessons from it. I have 
named this The peerless method to knowledge of the science of theology. 
 
This is how al-Wālī starts his work, which, at first sight, indeed seems to be nothing but an Arabic 
translation of a model example of the kabbe tradition. Like the modern examples, The peerless method 
is divided into two parts, a preface about other issues than the Ṣughra, and the actual commentary on 
al-Sanūsī’s text on God’s attributes. The preface takes up slightly more than a quarter of the entire 
                                                     
331The passage in Brenner’s notebook is: ‘The religion which the Prophet brought us is divided in two parts, the 
fundamentals and the commands. Fundamental religion consists of faith, and the knowledge [of/and] upright 
behaviour. It is the knowledge of tawḥīd. It is called the kabbe. It is called the knowledge of essence, it is called 
the knowledge of attributes. One who [understands] the attributes will come near to what he seeks. There are two 
branches [to this study]: the manifested and the hidden. The manifested is Islam and the knowledge of doing 
what is right in Islam. It is the knowledge of fiqh, and is called the knowledge of the branches, or knowledge of 
the permitted and knowledge of the prohibited. And it is called the knowledge of practice.’ 
332Even so, the versions recorded in the twentieth century have given rise to different interpretations of this 
aspect. Marty and Brenner for instance have opposite views of the meaning of  ‘ilm al-ḥurūf in the kabbe. Marty 
writes that, using knowledge that is transmitted through the kabbe (for instance that the shahada is contained in 
the name Allah, and that the letters of this name correspond with the number 66, which is therefore sacred) many 
cultured Fulani are devoted to combining words, letters and numbers, but that there is nothing mystical about 
such activities; that they are au fond not different from the ‘intellectual recreation’ favoured by European 
scholars in the Middle Ages or offered on the last pages of our own journals and magazines. (Marty 1921, 352) 
Disagreeing with Marty, Brenner explains that the manipulation of numbers and letters is more than recreation, 
that it reflects an elaborate religious understanding of creation and of the relation between the visible and the 
invisible world. (Brenner 1984, 91) While both interpretations seem right for different groups of people, their 
different understandings must also be seen against the background of their work. Marty was partly responding to 
French colonial officers and travellers who saw students of the kabbe as members of a secretive sect and the 
kabbe itself as an obscure sort of ‘Kabbala’, an image he wished to correct. One of Brenner’s intentions is to 
correct an image of African Sufism as being devoid of the spiritual dimension. 
333 Brenner 1985, 83-86. 
334 Brenner 1987, 47. 
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text. The second part comments on—al-Wālī uses the verb sharaḥa—or rather explains Al-‘aqīda al-
ṣughra in the peculiar way in which commentaries were often composed: al-Sanūsī’s entire creed is 
wrapped up in it. It is followed word for word, and the comments are added in a way that sometimes 
even disturbs the syntax and the logic of the original sentences.335 
 
Below I will first discuss textual characteristics that seem to be part of the oral kabbe tradition: the 
introduction, the organisation of the text in order to facilitate memorisation, and the translations of 
abstract concepts to the life-world of an audience that had no education in theology. As a written text, 
The peerless method still shows clear traces of this oral tradition, and it was intended to be not only 
read, but also to be heard, as is vividly evoked at the end of the preface: ‘Know! That is, be aware of 
your foolishness, wake up from your sleep, rouse your brain and understand what I say, so that the 
beginning of the speech does not escape you, for he who lets the beginning slip and [then] listens to 
the middle or another part, will not understand a thing.’336 
 
In the past decades, increasing attention has been given to the ways in which oral and written practices 
have complemented each other in the transmission of knowledge in different fields of literature and 
scholarship in Islamic culture. Within that field of interest, S. Ali has focussed on the influence of 
orally transmitted traditions on written texts.337 His work—like that of J. Vansina and W. Ong before 
him in the wider field of intellectual history and literary studies—shows that two main principles 
underlie oral traditions in cultures of primary orality, that is among people who had no writing at all: 
performance and memory, whereby performance is related to the adaptability of traditions, and 
memory to continuity. In orality, narratives must be organised in a way that makes it easy to remember 
them and pass them on—for instance, through repetition and the use of parallel terms and phrases, 
antithetical phrases, epithets and formulas; and they must be composed in a way that allows the 
narrator to hold the attention of his audience, for instance by assimilating the alien, objective world to 
the more immediate, familiar interaction of human beings; through narration as opposed to more 
abstract ideas in written texts; through the use of an agonistic tone, celebrating physical behaviour, 
featuring both violence and praise, in a highly polarised world of ‘good and evil, vice and virtue, 
villains and heroes’.338 All of these figures of style will be recognised in the formal analysis of The 
peerless method below.  
 
Later, in the section ‘Tradition with a twist’, we will turn our attention to a specific element in the 
content of the text: the point where The peerless method diverges from both the Ṣughra and the kabbe. 
 
 
An introduction for new Muslims 
 
The preface to The peerless method shares many similarities with other expressions of the kabbe 
tradition. It reads like an introduction, not so much to the topic of God’s ontology, but to the culture 
and society of Islam at large. It is not directly related to the text of the Ṣughra, but it is in a way true to 
the character of al-Sanūsī’s creed, in that it presents Islam to a wide audience. Thus, The peerless 
method opens with remarks about the conventions of Islamic text, such as starting by invoking the 
name of God. It asserts God’s power over Muslims and non-Muslims, Arabs and non-Arabs (as is 
done in the Nigerien kabbe version in Brenner’s notebook). Then it places Islam in the context of other 
religions of the Book and tells us that the basmallah contains all the knowledge God has revealed to 
the various prophets, both in a way that is almost identical to what Marty described in writing of the 
                                                     
335 This suggests that the first written version was noted as two texts: al- Sanūsī’s as the main text, with the 
comment added between the lines. 
336 Hunwick 178, 14. 
337G. Schoeler, 2006; K. Hirschler, The Written Word in the Medieval Arabic Lands. A Social and Cultural 
History of Reading Practices. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2012; S. Ali, Arabic Literary Salons in 
the Islamic Middle Ages. Poetry, Public Performance and the Presentation of the Past. Notre Dame, Indiana: 
Notre Dame University Press, 2010. 
338J. Vansina, Oral Tradition as History. London : James Currey, 1985; J.W. Ong, Orality and Literacy. The 
Technologizing of the Word. London: Methuen, 1982, chapter 3. Quote: Ong 1982, 44. 
 88
kabbe versions he knew.339 There then follows a brief distinction between believers and unbelievers: 
all have God’s compassion and mercy in this world, but believers can also count on these in the 
hereafter, a notion which is thereby casually introduced. This again resembles a paragraph in the 
Nigerien version. The same is true for the discussion of the meaning of ‘companionship’ of the 
prophet Muḥammad, with special reference to the conversion and companionship of the Negus of 
Ethiopia. Whatever the direction of influence between different versions has been, it shows that The 
peerless method is part of the wide kabbe tradition.  
 
There are a few topics in the introduction to The peerless method for which I have not found parallels 
in the other kabbe versions, but these may well have existed. This is true, for example, of a paragraph 
on blessing (ni‘ma) and notably the blessing of the shahāda, which can protect against murder, 
abduction, theft and even hell.340 Other examples are details about the prophet Muḥammad’s status 
among people, and the concept of sharīf. Much later in the text—not in the preface, but also rather 
separate from the abstract discussion of God’s attributes—there are explanations of the essence of 
angels and jinns (they are made of ethereal substance, finer than wind; less ethereal than wind is water, 
and after that comes earth and the substance of human beings), as well as a presentation of the 
archangels and their various realms of authority.341 And throughout the text various other concepts and 
social roles belonging to a Muslim culture are introduced, such as ahl al-bayt, saḥaba, shurafā’, 
different types of shaykhs, the faqīh and other leaders, and the ‘saint who knows God’, al-walī al-‘ārif 
bi Allāh. The importance of praise, prayer and worship is emphasised. All together, the text touches on 
everything one needs to know to act as a good Muslim. The peerless method—especially the 
introduction—is a shop-window full of samples of law, ḥadīths, Sufism, terminology, mythology, 
classical poetry, folklore and more.  
 
The preface ends with sixteen tales about miracles that al-Sanūsī is said to have performed or 
witnessed, thus bearing witness to the special blessing he received from God, and therefore to the 
value of his Ṣughra. These were evidently part of the original text that al-Wālī had translated, because 
he noted twice (indicating the addition with the phrase ‘here ends what I added’) that he had come 
across a similar story elsewhere, where it was told about someone else. Such narratives do not seem to 
be part of the more recent versions of the kabbe, but they are rooted in the ṣūfī lore about ‘holy men’ 
in the Maghrib. Some of the miracles have other people as beneficiaries: through mediation by al-
Sanūsī they find gold (symbolic of course for God’s truth), or peace, either in the hereafter or in this 
world. According to other anecdotes,  hidden knowledge was unveiled to the shaykh and God 
favoured him in other ways, for instance by lifting him up into the sky one day, when pupils asked 
whether holy men could fly.  
 
Two of these anecdotes deal specifically with causality. Apart from the story about the meat that 
would not cook (see chapter 3), there is one about a jinn who came, in the form of a snake, to where 
al-Sanūsī was sitting with some pupils, and wrote the words: ‘Nothing in all of creation has any 
effect.’342 In other words: the only cause of anything there is, is the uncreated God. To West African 
                                                     
339 Hunwick 178, 1,2: (About the reason why the ortography of the bā in the opening word of religious texts, 
bismallāh, is usually long) ‘Some say that it is long to substitute the alif that is suppressed, and some say it is 
long because it contains all the knowledge (jamī‘ al-‘ulūm) that God has sent down. It constitutes a hundred and 
four books. He sent ten down to the prophet Adam and fifty to the prophet Seth (peace be with him), ten to the 
prophet Idrīss (peace be with him), ten to the prophet Ibrāhīm (peace be with him), the Psalms to the prophet 
Dāwūd (peace be with him), the Torah to the prophet Mūsā, the Gospel to the prophet ‘Isā (peace be with him), 
the Furqān to the prophet Muḥammad, God bless him and grant him peace and honour and nobility. A hundred 
books are contained in three books and three books are contained in the Furqān, and all of the Furqān is 
contained in sūrat al-baqara and sūrat al-baqara is contained in the fātiḥa, the fātiha is contained in the basmallah 
and the basmallah in its opening and its meaning (ma‘nāhā) ‘in Me was what was, and in Me will be what will 
be’. Therefore it is called the connecting bā’: it connects all knowledge. Cf Marty 1921, 352. 
340 In Ash‘arī theology man is not predestined for heaven or hell. It is one of the differences al-Wālī mentions 
between Ash‘arism and Matūridiyya.   
341 Hunwick 178, 51, 52..  
342 Hunwick 178, 10: فكتب اال تاثیر لشىء من الكاىنات    
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Muslims, these two little stories were signs of the powers God invested in the ‘saint’. We may also 
recognise them as translations of an abstract scholarly theme for an audience without philosophical 
training. As we saw, the subject of causality played an important role in al-Sanūsī’s theology and in 
his discussions with other theological schools. One of the anecdotes that translates his stance on 
causality into a narrative, and translates the metaphor he used—of the prophet untouched by fire—into 
a meal that remains raw over the fire, originates from the region where he lived, as do many of these 
stories. It can be assumed that the same is true of the story of the snake. Apparently, when the kabbe 
originated, the stories were considered to be part of a fixed corpus of tales about al-Sanūsī, designed to 
demonstrate his closeness to God (wilāya) and to explain a theme that was important in his theology, 
the theme of causality. However, in the course of time, causality faded into the background in the 
kabbe, and for al-Wālī the theme was not a priority, as will be argued later in this chapter. That said, 
the presence of these anecdotes in al-Wālī’s version is an example of how elements that had lost their 
original meaning and function nevertheless survived for quite some time and even after the text had 
travelled quite some distance, because the text as a whole had a special significance of its own. The 
same may be true of other elements in the text that we will come across below. 
 
 
Organisation of the text 
 
After the preface to The peerless method, the Ṣughra is followed sentence by sentence. Despite this 
tight framework, the commentary manages to introduce some independent ideas and push others to the 
background, by not giving them much, or any, attention. Many of the choices that were made are 
related to the organisation of the text and determined by the oral context, not only of the kabbe 
tradition, but also of The peerless method itself. As mentioned in chapter 2, in central sudanic Africa 
the transmission of the culture of Islam has in the first place been oral. Even written, scholarly texts 
were produced to be recited from memory or read aloud to students and to be memorised by them.  
 
Memorisation was important, not only because many people were illiterate or had limited access to 
written sources, but also because memorisation and reciting from memory were highly respected, not 
only in Islam. In the Middle Ages and the pre-modern period, even when writing was in principle 
available, memorisation was regarded, not as a passive method of learning but, on the contrary, as an 
art that was also essential for the creation of new knowledge. Ideas about this art and its methods 
influenced the organisation of long texts.  
 
These ideas were based on the understanding of the working of the brain by Aristotle and some of his 
commentators in the Muslim as well as the Christian world, such as Ibn Sīna, Ibn Rushd, Galen, and 
Thomas Aquinas. In their view, the brain receives impressions from the senses. These are brought 
together by the image-forming ability into an ‘image’ that has a likeness to the observed things, and 
into an instinctive ‘feeling’ that colours the images. Then thinking makes these images available to the 
mind, so that it can use them to form thoughts and ideas. Since thoughts are made of mental images, 
which are stored and recalled in memory ‘locations’, memory is the basis of the inventive powers of 
the mind. Memory storage was to be undertaken in such a way that images were readily and 
immediately accessible. This meant they had to be organised. The basic principles for that 
arrangement were division and composition. A sophisticated technique was to divide text into verses 
and paragraphs that could be linked to particular markers and that could also serve as markers for more 
text such as glosses. The markers were composed into numbered sequences or linked to the alphabet 
or to a picture of a house with rooms, a hand with fingers that had joints, an angel with wings that had 
feathers, and so on.343 
 
In The peerless method, division and composition were applied con gusto. For example, where the 
actual commentary on the Ṣughra starts, and includes a quote to the effect that rational judgement 
                                                     
343M. Carruthers, ‘Mechanisms for the Transmission of Culture: The Role of  ‘Place’ in the Arts of Memory.’ In 
Translatio or the Transmission of Culture in the Middle Ages and the Renaissance. L.H. Hollengreen ed. 
Turnhout: Brepols, 2008. 1-27. 
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comprises three categories, it adds that ‘altogether there are twelve fundamental principles: five of 
sharī‘a, four of experience,344 three of reason.345 The five principles of the sharī‘a are given in an 
oppositional pair: ‘Wājib (obligatory) and its ‘next in line’ mandūb (recommended), and ḥarām 
(forbidden) and its ‘next-in-line’ makrūh (disapproved of), and in the middle mubāh’ (allowed or 
neutral).346 
 
The peerless method then arranges into seven chapters all that a Muslim adult should know: that God’s 
essence does not lack anything; that it is different from other beings; and that He is described by 
attributes of which none is lacking; what His substantive, negative and ideal attributes are (three 
separate chapters), and what the consequences of the 20 attributes are.347 And when al-Sanūsī adds—
not in the Ṣughra, but in his Muqaddima—that the necessary refers to either what is evidently 
necessary or what appears to be necessary upon reflection, The peerless method, typically, spells out 
that the necessary refers to two things: what is evidently necessary and what appears to be necessary 
upon reflection.348 Sometimes it is as if the author (or authors) get carried away by the habit of 
dividing and numbering, to the point that the didactic benefits seem doubtful. Thus the impossibility of 
God’s lack of oneness is subdivided into six sorts; the impossibility of a lack of will on His part into 
four sorts.349 These divisions surpass al-Sanūsī’s discussion of God’s impossible attributes, and are 
also more detailed than the corresponding paragraphs in the Nigerien oral version of the kabbe.  
 
The most conspicuous way in The peerless method of ‘explaining’ or reorganising statements from the 
Ṣughra is to follow and note down every logical step in the argumentations behind them, even when 
only small variations occur. This technique is also applied in the kabbe version from Niger, but not as 
exhaustively as in The peerless method. The examples below also illustrate the way in which the 
explanations are inserted into the text of the Ṣughra. The phrases in italics are from al-Sanūsī’s base 
text. 
 
Impossible with regard to the truth of God are twenty attributes. They are the opposites of the 
first twenty necessary attributes: non-existence—non-existence is the first of the twenty 
attributes that are impossible regarding the truth of God the Exalted, and it is the opposite of 
the first of the twenty necessary attributes, which is existence. The necessity of existence 
negates non-existence of His being and attributes. Being created—being created is the second 
of the twenty attributes that are impossible regarding the truth of God the Exalted. It is the 
opposite of the second of the twenty necessary attributes….350 
 
And so on until the twentieth attribute. The fourth impossible attribute, resemblance to temporal 
things (al-mumāthala li l-ḥawādith), touches on an issue that was central to the Ash‘ari doctrine—
namely, the reconciliation between God’s incomparability to anything created and Quranic 
expressions about God’s hands, vision, throne, and so on that do leave room for some sort of 
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Ḥukm al-‘ādiya refers to judgement based on observation or experience notably when causality is explored. 
The four principles in this category concern that which relates the existence of something to the existence or the 
non-existence of something else, and that which relates the non-existence of something to the existence or non-
existence of something else. For instance relating the absence of hunger to the presence of food, etc. J-D. Luciani 
translates ‘ādiya with expérimental.  
345The judgement of what is necessary, impossible and possible. 
346 Hunwick 178, 15. 
347The choice of the number seven is of course not unique to the kabbe tradition. The north African scholar and 
poet Aḥmad al-Maqqārī al-Tilimsānī (d. 1632), whom al-Wālī quotes a few times, had written that ‘the student’s 
efforts with the pursuit [of these matters] is not finished until he knows of seven issues he needs to know’. 
Hunwick 178, 33. 
348 Hunwick 178, 16. Cf. Luciani 1908, 48, 49. 
349 Hunwick 178, 30-31. 
350 Hunwick 178, 26. Compare e.g. with al-Laqānī, who says nothing more about the impossible attributes than: 
Les contraires de ces attributs sont impossibles à l´égard de Dieu. Il est impossible par exemple, qu’il occupe un 
coté d’un objet, c’est à dire qu’il soit dessus, dessous, devant, derrière, à droite ou à gauche. Luciani 1908, 14. 
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resemblance (tashbīh) between God and created beings. Al-Sanūsī gives some explanation for this 
attribute (see in italics below), and The peerless method also puts in an extra effort:  
 
A question was asked, ‘What is resemblance to temporal things?’ and the shaykh [al-Sanūsī] 
answered that He would be like a body. It was asked, ‘What is a body?’ and the shaykh 
answered, ‘[It would mean] that His exalted essence would take up a measure of the empty 
space. Being a body, however, is the first kind of the ten resemblances that are impossible 
regarding the reality of God, because of the necessity of His being different from temporal 
things. The necessity of His being different from temporal things negates that, 
or that He would be incidental, needing a body Being incidental and needing a body, however, 
are the second kind of the ten impossible resemblances regarding the reality of God,  
or He would be in the realm of bodies, and would be above a throne or below it, or to the right 
or the left of it. But being in the realm of bodies is the third kind of the ten impossible 
resemblances regarding the reality of God. The necessity of His being different from temporal 
things negates that, 
or He would have spatiality and the throne would be above that [spatiality] or under it or to the 
right or the left of it. But spatiality to Him is the fourth sort of the ten resemblances that are 
impossible regarding the reality of God, because of the necessity of His being different from 
temporal things, and the necessity of being different from temporal things negates that, 
or that He would be confined by place. It is said that He is in paradise or on a throne or a chair, 
or in the heavens or on earth, but confinement to a place is the fifth sort of the ten impossible 
resemblances regarding the reality of God….351 
 
Some methods of organising information have been associated especially with Sufism. For instance, 
The peerless method introduces a new classification of the twenty attributes, dividing them between 
God’s divinity (ulūhīya) and His lordship (rubūbīya). There are eleven attributes of divinity and nine 
of lordship. Why this partition into nine and eleven is appealing is not explained. But, while nine and 
eleven play no significant role in Sufism in other cultures, 352 both numbers are significant in the kabbe 
of the twentieth century. There, nine represents matter and materiality—the realm of God’s lordship or 
governance,353 while eleven, as Amadou Hampāté Ba explained, represents the spiritual world. It is the 
mystical light of God’s essence and the key to the name of Allāh, since eleven is the added numerical 
value of the letters that make up ‘huwa’. To know the secret of the number eleven ‘is to know how to 
make God smile’.354 
 
The authors of The peerless method were obviously familiar with ‘ilm al-ḥurūf, the science of letters 
(also called sīmīya), which is related to ‘ilm al-awfāq, the science of ‘correspondences’ between the 
laws that govern the manifest universe and those that govern the hidden reality. These branches of 
learning could be used for divination, a contested practice, but they were solidly based on the 
generally accepted understanding that the manifest and the hidden worlds are interconnected. The 
rules that govern the one are assumed to be similar to those that govern the other. Therefore, the study 
of rules in the manifest world of humans and animals, minerals, stars, numbers and letters can bring 
one closer to the hidden truths regarding God. God himself cannot be known, but His laws and His 
attributes can. Although ‘ilm al-ḥurūf and ‘ilm al-awfāq are sometimes described as magic, the 
techniques were studied in the framework of the regular Islamic sciences.355 
                                                     
351 Hunwick 178, 27-28. Cf. Cambon, J. et J.-D. Luciani. Petit Traité de Theologie Musulmane, par Abou 
Abdallah Mohammed Ben Mohammed Ben Youssef Senoussi. Alger: Imprimerie Orientale Pierre Fontana, 1896. 
7 and the page numbered 4 in Arabic. The question whether God’s throne should be understood as metaphor or 
fact continues to be an issue of popular discussion in Chad in the 20th century, see Seesemann 2003 and 
Brigaglia 2005. 
352A. Schimmel, Deciphering the Signs of God: a Phenomenological Approach to Islam. Albany: State 
University of New York Press, 1994. 
353 Brenner 1984, 96. 
354 Brenner 2010, 67, 71. Hā’ = five, wāw = six. 
355 See P. Marty 1921,85. L. Brenner 1985a, `Three Fulbe scholars in Bornu.’ In The Maghrib Review, Vol. X, 
4-6 (1985): 107-113; 107. S. Dorpmüller, Religiöse Magie im Buch der probaten Mittel. Analyse, kritische 
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The peerless method explains, for instance, that God has sent 313 or 314 or 315 messengers, numbers 
that corresponded with the numerical value of the name Muḥammad.356 The preface also presents a 
number of terms of which each radical is linked to an idea that explains it. The word al-shaykh, for 
example, receives the following treatment: Alif stands for being close (’alifa) as in the words of the 
prophet ‘those who will be near me on the Day of Resurrection are those of good deeds’. Lām is 
softness (līn) of the heart in obedience to God, shīn is thankfulness (shukr) for His blessings, yā is 
commending what is good and prohibiting what is bad (ya‘amar bi l-ma‘rūf wa yanhī ‘an al-munkar) 
and khā is fear (khawf) of sinning against divine law. The words Allāh, Muḥammad and al-faqīh are 
explained in a similar way. The interpretation of the orthography of the letter bā as the first word of a 
text (see note 339 above) is another example.  
 
Playing with the first letters of words fits into an old tradition, probably going back to pre-Islamic 
Indian cultures, that was especially popular among mystics and poets, to convey the deeper meaning 
of concepts to their readers. The meaning accorded to the letters that make up ‘Allāh’, for instance, is 
the same as that proposed by the school of the great mystic Ibn ‘Arabī.357 But the method was used 
more widely than that. It was also applied at a didactic level, where it was elaborated, for example, 
into the ‘golden alphabet’, a genre of poetry designed to make it easier to learn the alphabet.358 It is 
suggested here that, in The peerless method, too, the practical purpose of this playing with words and 
numbers was at least as important as the mystical one, and that it served here as a mnemonic aid rather 
than a method of esoteric science.359 That is the function of the method in this text, which places its 
primary emphasis on reason, as we will see below.  
 
 
Metaphor and closeness to the human lifeworld 
 
What is especially interesting here is the way in which some concepts from the scholarly culture 
within Islam were translated to the lifeworld of common people, through the use of metaphors and 
analogies with local practices. It is at this level that cultural translation is most explicitly at work, and 
again I suggest that The peerless method inherited this from its Fulfulde model. For example, one 
impossible attribute of God is (al-Sanūsī’s sentences in italics, PM in roman type.) 
 
that His exalted essence would be clad by incidental things, like hunger and repletion, or 
illness and health, or skinniness and fatness, or sadness and happiness. Attributing incidental 
things to His exalted essence [involves] the seventh sort of the ten impossible resemblances 
regarding the reality of God. Or that smallness like a speck of dust…or that greatness like an 
elephant could be attached to His exalted essence.360 
 
                                                                                                                                                                      
Edition und Übersetzung des Kitāb al-Muğarrabāt von Muḥammad  ibn Yūsuf as-Sanūsī (gest. um 895/1490). 
Wiesbaden: Harrasowitz Verlag, 2005, 25. 
356 The name has three mīms. Each word mīm, consisting of the letters mīm, ya, mīm, has a numerical value of 
90. The numerical value of one mīm is 40, the value of the yā´  is 10.Therefore three mīms make 270. The three 
letters of the name of the letter dāl add up to 35: Dāl is 4, lām is 30, alif is 1. The value of the ḥā’ is 8. 270 plus 
35 plus 8 makes 313. If the letter ḥā’ is counted as ḥ plus alif, 8 plus 1, the outcome is 314 and if the hamza is 
also counted, it makes 315. Hunwick 178, 39. The letters are discussed in this sequence, as in ancient Arabic 
dictionaries: the first, then the last, then the middle radical. 
357A. Schimmel, Mystical Dimensions of Islam. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1975. 422; L. 
Schaya, La doctrine soufique de l’Unité. Paris: Adrien Maisonneuve, 1962. 47, 83. 
358See Schimmel 1975, 421-423. 
359 Maribel Fierro makes a similar point in an article about the Andalusian sufist Ibn Masarra (d. 931). He was a 
philosopher who, she argues, was interested in showing the practical concordance between the Qur’ān and 
philosophy. ‘[His] kitāb al-ḥurūf, in which he deals with the letters found at the beginning of some Koranic 
verses, does not aim at magical interpretation or predicting the future, but intends to show that the Koran is 
nothing less than an explanation of creation.’ M. Fierro, ‘Opposition to Sufism in al-Andalus.’ In Islamic 
Mysticism Contested. F. de Jong ed. Leiden: Brill, 1999. 179. 
360 Hunwick 178, 26-29. 
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Aspects of the human and the bovine body, which the cattle-herding Fulani know so well, are used to 
clarify the very abstract notion that God’s oneness is incomparable to anything earthly.  
 
The oneness of His being negates three ‘defects’: the composition(tarkīb) of His being, 
manifoldness (ta‘addud), and the number of components and parts (kamīya ittiṣāl wa infiṣāl). 
Composition of being concerns six things: skin, blood, flesh, sweat, bone and marrow. 
Multiplicity of being concerns the multiplicity of members, from head to toe. ‘Number of 
components’ concerns the parts of substance. Every created body exists by the composition of 
substance in relation to its example. The oneness of being means that God’s being is not 
composed of two or more substances. And number of parts would imply that there is a[nother] 
being like God´s being, but the oneness of His being negates that. The oneness of His 
attributes negates three deficiencies as well: composition, manifoldness, and the number of 
His attributes.  
Composition, where attributes are concerned, regards, for instance, fat, skinny, long, short, 
beautiful and ugly. Manifoldness, where attributes are concerned, regards, for instance, white 
and the like. A single cow can be white-footed, or be white from breast to belly, or have a 
white tail, or a white back. The oneness of His being negates all that.361 
 
Other abstract concepts are translated into terms of social life in central sudanic Africa. This happens, 
for example, when the prophet Muḥammad’s status among people is considered. In more-mainstream 
theology, his status is also discussed, but there the discussion revolves around the issue of ‘iṣma, the 
eminence or infallibility of prophets—that is, the quality that God gives to certain souls so that at 
times they can rise to a spiritual level where they can hear divine speech. A question often discussed in 
that context is whether Muḥammad had been without sin all his life, or only after he took up his 
mission; and if he had sinned before that, to what extent? But this is not how his authority is discussed 
in The peerless method. Here, the question of the extent to which the Prophet is like other people is 
answered with the information that he was different in the sense that he could marry whomever he 
wished, without paying a bride-price, and that he did not even pay a bride-price if he wished to give a 
woman in marriage to someone else.362 The notion is not without a basis in the Qur’ān, which says, 
‘We have made lawful unto thee [the prophet Muḥammad] thy wives unto whom thou hast paid their 
dowries ... and a believing woman if she give herself unto the Prophet and the Prophet desire to ask 
her in marriage—a privilege for thee only, not for the (rest of the) believers’. (Q. 33:50) There is also a 
ḥadīth about the Prophet’s taking the ‘slave girl’ Safiyya after a battle, in order to marry her. When 
asked what he had paid her as dowry, he answered that her manumission served as her dowry.363 
Finally, there is the ḥadīth related by Aisha that the prophet did not die before God allowed him to 
marry whatever woman he wished.364 The sources are irrefutable, but the choice of this privilege to 
describe Muḥammad’s standing among men is nevertheless remarkable. In particular, the assertion in 
The peerless method that he could forfeit paying a dowry for a woman whom he wanted to give in 
marriage to someone else, seems to have been made with a view to local circumstances, and is in 
contrast with what the Qur’ān says.  
 
Most informative are the elucidations regarding the shahāda. As we saw, Al-Sanūsī had considered 
the confession of faith to comprise, in a symbolic way, all there is to know about God and the prophets 
(each part represents part of the doctrine of the attributes) and perhaps also in a mystical way: 
frequently repeating the shahāda could lead one to behold ‘boundless secrets and wonders’. More or 
less in line with this thought, in its comment on this statement The peerless method gives examples of 
the blessing the shahāda can bestow on the person uttering it, notably when used in dhikr—that is, 
‘remembrance’ or repeated utterance as practiced in Sufism but also by non-ṣūfī Muslims: one man 
who had performed dhikr with the shahāda had a son who was born with the parts of the shahāda 
written on his left and right shoulder. Another, who had done the same, proved to be blessed when he 
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was killed, and when his blood was shed it formed the words of the shahāda.365 (On the other hand, 
The peerless method warns that someone who repeats the words just because he believes they can 
guarantee him a place in paradise and rescue him from calamity in this world and the next, is an 
unbeliever.366) 
 
However, the preface also presents a remarkably practical view. First it states, in line with the 
conventional Ash‘arī view, that, as long as it is pronounced by someone who firmly believes in and 
complies with the sunna and acts as a Muslim should, the shahāda is the key to paradise. But the 
authors of The peerless method are aware that, for their audience, more than paradise is at stake, and 
that the idea of paradise (and hell) is part of the Muslim religion that does not resonate deeply with 
believers in the sudanic culture. Their audience of relatively new believers wishes to know what is in 
it, here on earth, for the person who pronounces the double creed. The answer to that question is that 
he who pronounces the shahāda, even if his faith is defective, will not be murdered, or enslaved (or 
abducted: lā yustaraqu367), and that others will not consume what is his. Murder, enslavement and 
theft were the real-life terrors in a society suffering from unrest. To be enslaved was a threat to 
everyone, but specifically to those who were considered non-Muslims. The passage shows clearly that 
the message of The peerless method was addressed to people who felt that threat, much more than the 
threat of suffering in hell. 
 
 
Mysticism and reason 
 
It is not easy to gauge the attitude of The peerless method towards mystical understanding. The word 
ma‘rifa , which appears in the title, is often translated by modern scholars as gnosis, and might be 
interpreted as an indication of a ṣūfī approach. However, in Arabic theology and philosophy the word 
was just as often synonymous with ‘ilm.368 In The peerless method, both approaches to knowledge—
the mystical and the rational—are represented. The text pays its respects, in the introduction, to the 
ṣūfī al-Shādhilī; there is the list of miracles associated with al-Sanūsī, which are characteristic of the 
ṣūfī tradition in the Maghrib. In the last pages, the stages on the path towards surrender to God are 
mentioned, and there is a reference to the existence of a sort of reality that is beyond ordinary 
perception, notably in the context of an elucidation of the character of the prophet Muḥammad. The 
Prophet has a perfection of beauty that is hidden from common people. It is so bright that they cannot 
see it, but God has created a stronger perception in us, through which some do behold it.369 
 
Bobboyi is of the opinion that The peerless method ‘strives to attain a synthesis between Tawḥīd and 
Taṣawwuf’.370 But the question is: could it not be the other way around? Could it be that al-Wālī, with 
the political climate of Bornu in mind, tried to undo the synthesis between tawḥīd and taṣawwuf  that 
we find in the original oral kabbe and that was developed further in its modern oral expressions, with 
the aim of privileging the rational study of God’s oneness? It is striking how, in The peerless method, 
the logical demonstrations of God’s oneness are all spelled out in detail, and how quotes from al-
Sanūsī’s Muqaddima are introduced to stress that an understanding of the truth about God’s eternity or 
uniqueness can only be had by rational consideration, while references to mysticism are more cursory. 
When, at the end of the text, the question is asked, ‘how it is that all knowledge just presented is 
contained in the words of the shahāda?’, the answer is a sort of excerpt of what preceded, but does not 
speak, for instance, of  a relation between words and divine truth. Neither is there an explanation of the 
doctrine of the unity of creation (waḥdat al-wujūd), which makes it possible to gain knowledge about 
divine truths by observing phenomena in the physical world. And in his versified ‘abridgement’ of The 
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peerless method, Sweet watersource of the inmost attributes of the Lord, al-Wālī does not mention any 
elements that are specifically related to Sufism.  
 
The best way to make the point, in the end, is not to highlight what is missing. However, before we 
move on to more positive indications of the separation of, rather than a synthesis between, two modes 
of religious exercise, one thing must be underlined. The peerless method does not deny that there is 
knowledge of an esoteric quality that can be acquired only through spiritual understanding. The 
existence of two types of truth—the one to be attained by spiritual, the other by intellectual effort—
was commonly accepted. As in other parts of the Muslim world, Sufism had been a part of religious 
experience and practice for many centuries. In West Africa, moreover, Sufism was beginning to be 
organised into brotherhoods and special communities in the seventeenth century, but was not yet as 
separate, culturally and socially, from other forms of Islam as it was later to become. The peerless 
method does not contest the mystical road to understanding—rather, it attributes to it only minor 
significance for the ordinary Muslim. That al-Wālī did not suppress the references to mysticism is 
understandable. The Fulfulde text he translated was too well known as it was, which was exactly why 
it served his purposes, as I will argue in chapter 7.  A canonical text cannot be altered too much 
without losing its authority. The primary indicate of al-Wālī’s ambivalence towards mysticism is the 
much greater emphasis in the rest of the text on rational cognitive learning. That is the subject of the 
next part of this chapter. 
 
 
4. Tradition with a twist 
 
There is one important issue on which The peerless method diverges significantly from the content of 
the Ṣughra and introduces its own views. This is where ignorance and imitation (taqlīd) are concerned, 
and the person who is ‘guilty’ of it, the muqallid. The theme does not occur in the modern kabbe 
versions, so we can concentrate on a comparison of the issue as it is discussed in The peerless method 
and by al-Sanūsī.  
 
As we have seen, the latter had said that every legally competent Muslim adult (the mukallaf) is held 
by divine law to know what is necessary, impossible and possible with regard to God. The Ṣughra 
presented this knowledge as essential to one’s faith or religion. It could be obtained by reading the 
Ṣughra and by reciting the shahada, which contained it all. The peerless method starts to unfold its 
own view of knowledge at the end of the preface: 
 
knowledge (‘ilm) is essential to the doctrine of faith. It relates to the truth, by means of proof 
(dalīl). Because, if people do not know, it does not matter whether this is from simple 
ignorance or complex ignorance, or whether they are doubting or mistrusting, or mislead or 
blindly accepting [imitating]. 
 
Farther on in the text, The peerless method comments on al-Sanūsī’s statement that it is possible for 
God to do whatever He wishes (‘As for that which is possible to the Exalted, it is doing or refraining 
from everything possible’) by remarking that God can judge in whatever way He wishes. Therefore a 
Muslim adult must know a number of things, and ‘it is no excuse [to say]: “I have worked hard, but I 
am not capable.” That is rather a sign of disqualification.’371 Apparently this remark about the duty to 
study was so important that it was squeezed into the commentary in a place where at first sight it does 
not seem to belong. For what do the earthly dweller’s intellectual efforts have to do with God’s 
capacity to judge? The remark makes sense only if the intention is to say that God will judge believers 
first and foremost for the intellectual knowledge they have acquired. 
 
What else did al-Wālī say about the relation between belief and knowledge or ignorance? As was the 
convention, he distinguished between simple and complex ignorance. Simple ignorance (al-jahal al-
basīṭ) was that of the person who, when asked about God’s being, says, ‘I do not know’, which means 
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that he is willing to learn. There was nothing wrong with that.372 Complex ignorance (al-jahal al-
murakkab) was the ignorance of people who do not recognise that they do not know the truth, and was 
a source from which unbelief could develop. The peerless method, however, expresses quite a different 
view. Here, ignorance in any form, simple or complex, is categorically condemned as unbelief. Four 
types of unbeliever are identified, two of which are ignorant, while for the other two their ignorance or 
understanding is unstable: first, there are those who neither have nor ask for knowledge, because their 
ignorance is ‘flat like the grass’; second, there are peoplewhose ignorance is complex—that is, who 
are ignorant without knowing it; third, there is the doubter (‘he who is equal to both sides shifting all 
the time and equally between truthfulness and lying. [Each time], whenever one side prevails, the 
other is mistrusted’); and fourth, there is the imitator. The short description of each category is 
concluded with the words, ‘there is agreement that he is an unbeliever’. The text does not further 
discuss the first three categories. Rather, all attention goes to the imitator.  
 
The imitator is he who pledges the twenty attributes without [their] proof (dalīl), and it is said 
that the imitator is he who accepts the words of the ‘ulamā’ without proof and [then] falls back 
to blind acceptance’.  
 
And again: ‘There is agreement that he is an unbeliever.’373 
 
Was there in fact such a consensus? It is useful here to stop and consider the question in some detail, 
before evaluating the assertions of The peerless method. First of all, al-Sanūsī himself had never 
suggested that the verdict regarding taqlīd was a matter that had been decided. It is true that he was 
convinced of the need to keep pondering the ontology of God, but his view on imitation seems to be 
more nuanced than is sometimes assumed.374 His ‘Aqīda al-ṣughra starts by stating that every believer 
has the duty to use reason to understand the proofs of God’s reality that are provided by the science of 
theology. In his own commentary (Sharḥ umm al-barāhīn) on the Ṣughra, al-Sanūsī says that, when he 
wrote that every mukallaf  must know what is necessary, impossible and possible with regard to God, 
he specifically said ‘know’ (innahu ya‘rifu) and not ‘settle for’ (innahu yajzamu). What one needed 
for faith, he said, was knowledge based on proof.   
 
‘Taqlīd is not sufficient. It is a resolution that corresponds with the principles of belief, but 
without the proof for it. [The word ‘know’] refers to the duty of knowing and the fact that 
taqlīd is not sufficient. That is the opinion of numerous experts such as shaykh Abū al-Ḥassan 
al-Ash‘arī and the qāḍī Abū Bakr al-Bāqillānī, Imām al-Ḥaramayn (al-Juwaynī), and Ibn al-
Qiṣār also relates this on account of Mālik. But there are various interpretations regarding the 
obligation of knowing. Some say that the imitator is a believer, although he is disobedient, 
because he leaves aside the knowledge which is produced by true understanding. Others say he 
is a believer and is not disobedient, except when he is capable of understanding the right 
meaning [and yet leaves it aside]. Others say: the imitator is fundamentally not a believer, but 
yet others criticise that.’375 
 
He then mentioned famous scholars—al-Qushayrī, qāḍī b. al-Wālid b. Rushd, Ibn al ‘Arabī, and Abū 
Ḥāmid al-Ghazālī and his followers—who believed that knowledge of God could also come from faith 
or inspiration and that one could be a good Muslim without independent intellectual reflection, by 
‘blindly accepting’ the knowledge of religious experts. In his Muqaddima, al-Sanūsī simply termed 
these people competent (muḥaqqiqūn) and left it at that.376 In the Sharḥ he added more critically, ‘but 
                                                     
372Luciani 1908, 112- 125. 
373 Hunwick 178, 14. 
374 K. el-Rouayheb e.g. in his inspiring article mentioned before (‘Opening the gate of verification’) regards al-
Sanūsī as someone who was unambiguous and outspoken in his condemnation of taqlīd. El-Rouayheb 2006, 269.  
375Sharḥ, 1932, 14, 15.  
376 Luciani 1908, 121. For al-Ghazālī’s point of view, see R.J. McCarthy, ‘Al-Ghazali, The clear criterion for 
distinguishing between Islam and Godlessness.’ In Deliverance from Error. Five key texts Including His 
Spiritual Autobiography, al-Munqidh min al-Dalal. Translated and annotated by R.J. McCarthy. Louisville: Fons 
Vitae, Louisville, 1980, 146. 
 97
this is in most cases (fī aghlabin) not true’377—that is, in most cases it is not true that firm belief can be 
reached or maintained without sustained reflection on God’s being.  
 
By the way, this may also be seen in the context of al-Sanūsī’s ongoing discussion with Aḥmad Ibn al-
Zakrī, his fellow townsman whom I referred to above and who defended the view that one could have 
faith without a perfect understanding of the theological arguments behind religious tenets. Indeed Ibn 
Zakrī argued along with al-Ghazālī) that the faith of ‘simple’ souls and old women was the most 
sincere and solid of all, and that honest worship was enough for those who lack the education or 
understanding that the learned possess.378 The discussion between the two men and their followers 
may have accentuated their differences and put more emphasis on al-Sanūsī’s insistence on reason and 
intellect. In any case, al-Sanūsī wrote that the risk one runs in trying to do without reflection is that 
one will lapse from faith into doubt and unbelief. He regarded taqlīd as a weakness that could 
eventually lead to unbelief, but not as a form of unbelief in its own right.  
 
In fact, in keeping with Ash‘arism, al-Sanūsī was rather careful when it came to defining what 
unbelief is at all.379 He mentioned only two unambiguous forms of kufr: consciously adoring other 
divinities than God, and denying that Christians and Jews are heathens. A substantial part of his 
Muqaddima is devoted to explaining that only he who adores an entity other than God is an 
unbeliever, and that it is very difficult to define any other categories of unbelievers. Even the greatest 
theologians—and he gives examples of qaḍī Iyāḍ, Malik and al-Bāqillānī—could not say anything 
definitive about it. The exclusion of anyone who professes Islam, he argued, must be avoided at all 
cost, for ‘it is better to forgive a thousand unbelievers than to spill one drop of blood of a believer’.380 
He enumerated a number of excuses for those who follow a certain opinion without being aware that it 
implicitly leads to denial of the truth. Among his examples are the view that voluntary acts are brought 
forth by an independent force in man, and the ideas that God resembles a body, and that He has ideal 
but not substantive attributes.381 All those who hold such erroneous opinions on topics that are central 
to al-Sanūsī’s theology are nevertheless excused, he says, if they do not realise that the logical 
consequences would affect the concept of God’s oneness. It is true that al-Sanūsī stressed the necessity 
of studying tawḥīd and the rules of reasoning, but he does not judge that harshly those who went by 
the wrong information out of ignorance.  
 
That al-Sanūsī’s view of taqlīd was nuanced, or at least complex, is also confirmed by the distinction 
he makes in his Muqaddima between vicious and praiseworthy imitation (al-taqlīd al-radī and al-
taqlīd al-ḥasan). He understands the former as the adoration of others than God, in mimicry of parents 
and ancestors, as the pagans of the ancient period did.382 Yes, such imitators were unbelievers. But the 
imitators—perhaps ‘followers’ would be a better translation here—of Mu‘tazilis and Murji’is, whose 
theology he disputed vigorously, were not unbelievers, let alone ‘imitators’ of his own doctrine, 
people who subscribed to it without understanding it completely.383 On the contrary, al-Sanūsī 
approved of praiseworthy imitation, ‘such as the imitation by believers of the sunni scholars in the 
field of applied law’. This imitation ‘is considered by most authors to be sufficient, if a person is 
firmly convinced of the Truth, or if he lacks the capacity to understand the evidence.’384 
 
In spite of all this, if al-Wālī derived his categorical rejection of taqlīd from al-Sanūsī, he was not the 
only one. Some of al-Sanūsī’s commentators, for instance a certain Yaḥya al-Shawī (d. 1685) and ‘Isā 
al-Saktanī (d. 1652), both theologians in the Maghrib, shared a disparagement of imitation, which they 
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based on the opinion of the master from Tlemcen.385 In the same period, a group of ‘ulamā’ in the west 
Saharan town of Sijilmasa apparently indulged in ‘inquisitory practices’, based on the view that those 
who could not produce the answers to philosophical questions regarding tawḥīd were unbelievers.386 It 
seems, then, that the idea of the ‘imitator’ as an outsider circulated in West Africa on a wider scale.  
 
But we know this because a contemporary of these inquisitory ‘ulamā’, al-Ḥasan b. Mas‘ūd al-Yūsī (d. 
1691), criticised them sharply, explaining that one who did not know all the desired details could 
certainly be a true believer.387 Aḥmad b. ‘Isā al-Anṣārī (d. 1826 in Sudan) was hesitant: he wrote a 
commentary on the Ṣughra in which he remarked, of the duty to know what is necessary, possible and 
impossible with respect to God, that one must avoid calling others doubters, and that there are 
different opinions about the imitator; that al-Bāqillānī for instance says that the faith of an imitator is 
true.388 Another commentator, Muḥammad b. Aḥmad al-Dasūqī (d. 1815), was more explicit. 
Commenting on al-Sanūsī’s own commentary, he wrote: ‘The words that the imitator is not a believer 
are regarded as dubious, because it would imply takfīr on the part of most common believers, and they 
are the majority of the umma.’389 Of course these commentators are from other regions, and partly 
from a later period than al-Sanūsī or al-Wālī. But their opinions serve to demonstrate that among 
Ash‘arī theologians, taqlīd was never an issue that had simply been decided. Against that background, 
the insistence in The peerless method that it had been so decided is striking, and draws our attention to 
the central importance of the theme of ‘blind acceptance’ versus learning and knowing in this text.  
 
The position of The peerless method is clear: Muslims had to gather intellectual, as opposed to 
intuitive, knowledge about their religion, and to use their intellect (‘aql) to understand it. This point is 
emphasised by a stylistic turn. Where al-Sanūsī wrote ‘know that rational judgement consists of three 
categories’, The peerless method repeats (words from the Ṣughra in italics): ‘Know, you who are eager 
to enter the group of friends of God, that al-‘aqīda al-ṣughra teaches you what you must know of 
tafsīr, ḥadīth and fiqh. Rational judgement consists of three categories.’ The word ‘know’ has been cut 
loose from al-Sanūsī’s sentence and appropriated by the commentary, emphasising the essential 
importance it has for its authors. I‘lam (know) is of course a very common word in texts about 
religious doctrine. It has been used for centuries almost as a conjunction, to posit a thesis and begin a 
sentence. The literal meaning in those cases fades to the point that in translations the word often 
disappears altogether. Here, however, the imperative is anything but casual. Isolated in terms of both 
syntax and quotation, it takes on a solemn character and recalls the sacred word of the archangel Jibrīl 
to the prophet Muḥammad, iqra’, recite! At the same time it is linked to the idea of people entering, as 
if it were transferred from the abstract categories of judgement of the Ṣughra, to a place where it 
stands as a heavy gate, guarded by ‘ulamā’ who will ask for the password.  
 
As the text of The peerless method progresses, the figure of the imitator is ever more present. There is 
increasing emphasis on the exhortation to learn, ‘so that you are not an imitator’. Starting about 
halfway through the text of the commentary, sentences from the Ṣughra (in italics in the example 
below) about God’s necessary ideal and real attributes are time and again expanded by the added 
formula,390 ‘if you are asked about proof—according to reason/according to revelation—of [x], then 
say [y], so that you are not an imitator.’ For instance: 
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‘If you are asked about the proof of the existence of God the Exalted, according to reason, then 
say, so that you are not an imitator: ‘as for the proof of God’s existence according to reason, 
that is the creation of the world.391 
 
At times, the proof from reason that the believer is supposed to be able to reproduce is quite complex, 
like this example about the creation of the world (which is part of the proof that there is a Creator):  
 
And if you are asked about proof for the world’s creation, then say: ‘the proof of the creation 
of the world, that is of this earthly world, is its being inseparable from properties that are 
accidental in time, like movement and rest and such things, for instance uniting and dividing; 
and that which is inseparable from properties that exist in time, is itself temporal. 
If you are asked about the creation of the accidental, then say: ‘the proof of the creation of the 
accidental is the observation of its transformation from non-being to being and from being to 
non-being.’ If the accidental properties were eternal, then they could not be non-existent. But 
their non-existence has been observed in numerous bodies, just like their opposite, existence.  
So the observation of the transformation of occasional things is proof of their creation, and the 
link to temporal occasional things is proof of their creation, and their creation is proof of their 
existence in time, and their existence in time is what is pursued. Praise God who guides us 
when we desire this proof of existence according to reason.392 
 
The reasoning reflects the standard kalām argumentation for the existence of the Creator.393 It was well 
known among scholars in the historic heartlands of Islam, who had studied works on such topics as 
uṣūl al-dīn by al-Bāqillānī (kitāb al-tamhīd) or al-Ash‘arī (kitāb al-luma‘). But, judging from Hall and 
Stewart’s ‘core curriculum’, not many West African scholars can have been familiar with such works, 
and even if they had been, the reasoning seems hardly fit for testing the basic religious knowledge of 
the common believer. For al-Wālī however, basic knowledge was really not enough. Whoever wrote 
this paragraph—an earlier Fulani scholar or al-Wālī himself—was interested in science at a high level. 
As usual in Ash‘arī kalām, the proof from reason is followed by proof from revelation (in this case Q 
14;10: ‘Can there be doubt concerning Allāh, the creator of the heavens and the earth?’). Then follows 
a most suitable verse from ‘the poet’, that is Abū l-‘Abbās  al-Maqqārī, who wrote: ‘Our proof for the 
existence of the world is, when you are learned, that the world was created.’394 
 
The point is that in The peerless method al-Sanūsī’s connection between the shahāda and knowledge 
is, if not entirely replaced, nonetheless overshadowed by a connection between imitation and unbelief, 
because the intention of The peerless method was to draw a line between ‘imitators’ and believers. It 
maintained that the person who, when asked, could not reproduce the required proof, would be 
considered an imitator, and therefore an unbeliever—and that was that. Where did this intransigent 
view come from? I suggest three influences: first, a local concern with obedience, notably to the 
‘ulamā’; second, the sudanese tradition of reform described by Hiskett; and third, a contemporary 
reform movement in the Middle East. 
 
 
Obedience to ‘ulamā’ 
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As we saw in the previous chapter, things were changing for ‘ulamā’ in this period: the spread of 
Islam to rural areas, the rise of popular Islam, and an increasing number of specialists of the religion, 
not all of whom had the same scholarly education, fed the idea that ‘ulamā’ could be ‘bad’. At the 
same time, some influential ṣūfīs claimed that the intellectual learning of ‘ulamā’ was not the only 
way to gain knowledge of the truth. Moreover, the good relationship between ‘ulamā’ and the ruling 
class, which had lasted more than five centuries, now appeared to be less strong. Now, the rejection of 
the imitator dove-tailed with, and may, indeed, have originated in the collective concern of ‘ulamā’ 
with classical book learning, who were losing some of their status among Muslim communities. At the 
same time, this rejection answered the needs of rural communities, which were struggling to define 
their new Muslim identity. Both factors—the latter will be further explored in the next chapter—
belong to the social history of central sudanic Africa.  
 
In accordance with Ash‘arism, al-Sanūsī had written in his Muqaddima that any truthful doctrine must 
be in agreement with both reason and tradition, but he had left it to his readers to find examples from 
revelation to support his tenets. In many cases, The peerless method does supplement proof from 
reason (dalīl al-‘aql) with citations from tradition (dalīl al-naql)—that is, the sunna or the Qur’ān. For 
the student of theology, proof from reason and proof from tradition functioned in the same way at a 
cognitive level; only the source or method of proving were different. As we have seen, dalīl is proof in 
the sense of an unmistakable sign. ‘Proof from reason’ did not mean that the student was supposed to 
‘invent’ his own logical proof, but that he must remember and be able to reproduce the proof that had 
been established before by authoritative scholars, just as he had to learn which Quranic verses or 
ḥadīths proved certain theses. Both types of information depended on the specialised knowledge of 
scholars.  
 
Against this background, the imitator in The peerless method is not someone who follows pagans or 
the wrong ‘ulamā’, but someone who does not pay due attention to the ‘ulamā’ and what they stand for 
at all. He is someone who repeats single phrases from the Muslim tradition and who merely poses as a 
believer—someone who has picked up scattered details about Islam but who cannot reproduce enough 
propositions and proofs regarding the attributes of God and the Prophet, including quite complex 
philosophic lines of reasoning from the Mu‘tazila repertoire. 
 
In contrast, the believer was the person who had memorised—in Arabic, not in his mother tongue—
parts of text on the subject of tawḥīd. In actual practice this was the person who was regularly 
spending time with an ‘ālim, sitting at his feet to hear the text and memorise it. Indeed, popular texts 
from a tradition that expounded ‘the benefits of learning’ tell students that ‘he who is not present at the 
place of a scholar for 40 days in a row is [one of the people who side] with Pharaoh.’395 The believer, 
then, was the person who visited the ‘ulamā’, paid his respects to them, and submitted to their 
authority. In the preface of The peerless method it says, intricately but tellingly:  
 
Verily, God created four kingdoms. One in the east, one in the west, one in the south and one 
in the north. They never stop exclaiming, each morning and evening. Those who are in the east 
[exclaim]: If only we had not been created! And those in the west: If only we knew, when we 
were created, why we were created! Those in the south [exclaim]: Alas, if we knew why we 
were created, we would act according to what we knew. And those in the north: Alas! If only 
we had not acted according to what we knew, we would have resigned from what the ‘ulamā’ 
prohibit us!396 
 
What this means is that the knowledge that ordinary human beings have is always insufficient. Only 
the ‘ulamā’ have the knowledge that can bring salvation. And relevant salvation in this cultural context 
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was in this life, here and now. It was to be a member of the Muslim community and not an outcast. 







The distinction between good and bad Muslims, and therefore the discussion about the grounds for 
anathematising (takfīr), had long been a central theme for reformers in all parts of the Muslim world, 
including West Africa. Here, qāḍī Iyāḍ (d. 1149) had written, in his famous Kitāb al-shifā’, that 
unbelief was in the first place ignorance of God. He differentiated between three kinds of unbelievers: 
born unbelievers (such as Jews and Christians), apostates, and those who were to be adjudged 
unbelievers on account of their actions and beliefs. Committing a sin, even a capital one such as 
murder, adultery or treating the prophets with levity, made one a sinner, but not necessarily an 
unbeliever. But denying revelation and divine law by doing things that only an unbeliever would do, 
or saying things only an unbeliever would say, like declaring the drinking of wine or other sins lawful, 
did make one an unbeliever.397 
 
As we know from his letters to Askia Muḥammad and Muḥammad Rumfa, al-Maghīlī adopted this 
view. He also discussed other grounds for takfīr that were related to diverging intellectual positions. 
Maintaining, for instance, that God is knowing but has no knowledge, as did the Mu‘tazila, while 
being aware of the logical implication that God is thus denied one of His necessary attributes, made 
one an unbeliever in the eyes of some, said al-Maghīlī, although he acknowledged that there was no 
agreement on the matter.398 He also warned against the mixing of the Muslim faith with practices 
related to traditional beliefs. 
 
The next discussion of the theme that is well documented and preserved is that between ‘Uthmān dan 
Fodio and his teacher, shaykh Jibrīl b. ‘Umar. It took place more than a century after the period in 
which al-Wālī was active, but it responds to developments that had been building up in the eighteenth 
and possibly the seventeenth century. It can therefore add to our ‘oblique’ view of the second half of 
the seventeenth century, and it will allow us to compare al-Wālī’s ideas with those of one of his 
readers. Shaykh Jibrīl maintained that people who were disobedient by virtue of having committed a 
grave sin were unbelievers, and that even those who refused to listen to what ‘an intelligent person 
says’ while they themselves were ‘of little knowledge’ and befuddled by ‘fanciful opinions on their 
Islam’ were unbelievers.399 What intelligent people would say, according to Jibrīl, was that someone 
who commits sins such as having more than four wives, not veiling his womenfolk, partaking in or 
allowing the mingling of men and women, taking women in tribal warfare and depriving  orphans of 
their rights, necessarily becomes an unbeliever.400 Arguably, this view was in keeping with the idea 
that doing things that only unbelievers would do made one an unbeliever. Hiskett commented ‘the 
teaching of Sheikh Jibrīl b. ‘Umar set off a controversy in the Sudanese towns, centred round the 
relation of “disobedience” (here synonymous with non-Islamic local custom) to unbelief.’401 
 
Dan Fodio was much troubled by the extremely judgemental attitude of his venerated shaykh and of 
many others around him,and referred to al-Maghīlī and al-Suyūṭī to justify his view that a sinner was 
not an unbeliever. In the course of his career, he wrote a few dozen sermons and treatises warning 
against anathematising. He specifically rejected the practice, which had become quite popular by then, 
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of questioning people on their knowledge of religion and accusing them of unbelief if this knowledge 
was insufficient.402 
 
Nevertheless, obedience was an issue for Dan Fodio too. In his Nur al-albāb he wrote that there are 
Muslims, unbelievers and groups about whose status there is no agreement. He divided unbelievers 
into the same two categories: al-Maghīlī and qāḍī Iyād. Believers were also found in three groups: 
they were the ‘ulamā’, the students (ṭalaba) and those who listen to the ‘ulamā’ and follow their 
example—almost a social category. One of the groups about which there was no agreement was made 
up of the ignorant who had entered Islam but did not understand on what it is based, and yet did not 
pursue taqlīd; ‘they pronounce the shahāda without sound belief, but do not study or question the 
‘ulamā’ or attend their gatherings, because of their lack of interest: in the eyes of God they are 
unbelievers, but insofar as they do nothing in word or deed that reflects unbelief, their fellowmen must 
accept them as Muslims.’403As a great social leader, Dan Fodio was more moderate than his teacher 
regarding sin and much more moderate than al-Wālī regarding taqlīd. But even for Dan Fodio the 
decisive matter, the question that made one an unbeliever or not ‘in the eyes of God’, was whether one 
studied and attended the ‘ulamā’’s lessons. By this time, the ‘ulamā’’s grip on the Muslim community 
was a major issue. 
 
Hiskett, Hunwick and Brenner have convincingly demonstrated the continuity of reformist themes, 
terminology and quotations from qāḍī Iyād to al-Maghīlī and then to ‘Uthmān dan Fodio. How this 
tradition developed in between these landmarks, which are each three centuries apart, is still largely 
unknown, but The peerless method adds another link to the chain of its transmission. It demonstrates 
that the promotion of anathematising was not so much initiated, as Hiskett remarked, but rather 
elaborated on by shaykh Jibrīl, because before him, in al-Wālī’s time, it was already a burning 
question. ‘Uthmān dan Fodio rejected the austere stance in the matter of unbelief his shaykh Djibrīl, of 
al-Wālī, and of the sectarian ‘mutakallimūn’ who used the knowledge recorded in The peerless method 
to test people’s devotion. But he shared al-Wālī’s idea that faith and loyalty to the ‘ulamā’ were as 
good as synonymous.  
 
Fundamentally, The peerless method is preoccupied with determining what sorts of people did or did 
not belong to the community of believers. The commentary, in spite of the many lines that were added 
to the Ṣughra’s ruminations about God’s attributes, is in the end not so much about abstract principles 
of faith or theology, but about the practical matter of sifting the wheat from the chaff in daily life. 
Within this tradition, the theme of taqlīd served as the litmus test that demonstrated whether a self-
professed Muslim was wheat or chaff. 
 
 
Influence from the Middle East 
 
It has been suggested that, from the late eighteenth century onwards, the movement of reform in 
central sudanic Africa was influenced by Wahhabism.404 It is a fact that Wahhabism also explicitly 
rejected imitation of medieval scholarly opinions and propagated the doctrine that disobedience in 
religious matters involve unbelief. Nevertheless, The peerless method shows that, in sudanic Africa, a 
rigorous position regarding the imitator had developed well before Muḥammad b. ‘Abd al-Wahhāb 
(1703-1792) was born. On the other hand, African theologians such as al-Wālī were evidently 
influenced by discussions in the Middle East, notably in the holy cities, where pilgrims from the far 
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corners of the Muslim world met ‘to imbibe the doctrines and ways of recentered Sunnism.’405 In al-
Wālī’s day, a lively debate was taking place there about the relation between taqlīd and ijtihād, of 
which he must have been well aware. On one of his journeys to Mecca, he was reported to have visited 
Muḥammad b. ‘Alā al-Dīn al-Bābilī (1592-1666). This remarkable man, a Shāfi‘ī, published only one 
book, because modesty held him back from writing anything that would not add significantly to what 
others had already done before him. But he had a great reputation as a jurist and a teacher of ḥadīths, 
and many of his students would go on to earn fame in their own right. One of these was Muḥammad 
Ḥayyā, who was to become one of the teachers of ‘Abd al-Wahhāb. Al-Bābilī studied not so much the 
chains of transmission of ḥadīths, as had been the vogue for centuries, but rather the texts themselves 
and their meaning as sources of law. This formed the core of his reformist ideas. John Voll identified 
al-Bābilī as one of the focal points of a network of  revivalist ‘ulamā’ in Cairo, Madīna and Mecca, 
who all shared this pursuit to return to the sunna and the Qur’ān as the direct sources of sharī‘a, by 
way of individual unrestricted ijtihād instead of taqlīd.406 
 
Students and scholars who participated in this network were from various geographical regions, 
including Persia, North Africa and India and also from various legal schools. Some of them were 
Ḥanafī, more were Mālikī, but most were Shāfi‘ī. Strict adherence to one of the schools or its legal 
doctrine was not as important to them as it had been in earlier periods. Moreover, many of these 
revivalists subscribed to a ṣūfī  ṭarīqa, and often to more than one. They were not opposed to 
mysticism as such. But as Voll pointed out, there was certainly a tension within their circles, between 
their appreciation of the popular ways of the ṭuruq and the ‘ulamā’’s struggle to uphold the more 
formal tenets of religion.  
 
This tension is further analysed in the previously mentioned article on reform in pre-modern Islam by 
B.M. Nafi. He shows how sentiments in these circles turned against the excesses of popular Sufism, 
but also against the ṣūfī understanding of two separate fields of knowledge, one concerning inner 
truth, the other, the rules of outer truth, to which the sharī‘a belongs. These scholars objected in 
particular to the idea that knowledge of inner truth could be gained without a good measure of 
knowledge of the outer truth or strict compliance to the sharī‘a. Others among them accused Sufism of 
asserting too close an association between the divine and the contingent in their doctrine of waḥdat al-
wujūd. On the other hand, the reformers felt that many philosophical systems, including the Ash‘arī 
interpretation of God’s attributes, had gone too far over the centuries in their abstraction. In any case, 
the position of the Qur’ān and the Sunna as the fundamental sources of religion and law had to be 
reasserted. 
 
Al-Wālī was clearly interested in this reconsideration of the Qur’ān and the sunna. Many examples 
from both sources were added in The peerless method as proof of God’s attributes, and many were 
also included in Valid arguments. It is possible that al-Wālī also heeded the concerns discussed in the 
court-yards of al-Bābilī, about extravagant ṣūfī customs and the excessive importance that some ṣūfīs 
accorded, in the eyes of the reformers, to the intuitive path to the knowledge of inner truth. Listening 
to and participating in these discussions, al-Wālī can hardly have missed the link with what he had 
heard or seen himself of ṣūfī’s such as shaykh ‘Abdallāh b. ‘Abd al-Jalīl in Kalumbardo, the shaykh 
who was so proud of the knowledge he obtained without learning, and was moreover suspected of 
preaching disobedience to Bornu’s ruling class. The opinions of al-Wālī’s Caireen and Middle Eastern 
peers must have strengthened his own conviction that the value for religion of cognitive learning—that 
is, of the type of (ẓāhir) knowledge in which the ‘book-learned’ ‘ulamā’ were specialists—had to be 





                                                     
405 Bulliet 1994, 177. 
406 Voll1975, 32-39. See also Levtzion 2007, XII. 
 104
The peerless method builds on two traditions of canonical texts: al-Sanūsī’s written Al-‘aqīda al-
ṣughra, and the oral commentaries on it that Fulani ‘missionaries’ transmitted to new Muslims in a 
large part of West Africa, and which were called the kabbe. Comparison between The peerless method 
and these other traditions offers an opportunity to investigate why the former was composed in the 
first place. Two questions arise: Why did al-Wālī write his version, and what was its message? I will 
explore the first question in chapter 7. The second was the subject of this chapter.  
 
The second part of The peerless method follows the Ṣughra sentence by sentence, so that there seems 
to be little room for independent ideas. Nevertheless, I have argued in this chapter that the Fulani 
commentators, ending with al-Wālī, did more than just explain a canonical work in their own 
language. The first kabbe commentaries had translated the Ṣughra in a double sense: linguistically and 
culturally, from Arabic to Fulfulde and from the North African environment, where Islam had been the 
religion of the majority much longer and was taught in numerous madrasas, to the religion’s frontier in 
sudanic Africa. They added ideas stemming from their experience as educators about the organisation 
of a text in order to facilitate memorisation; from previous discussions they raised certain issues and 
left others out, and they inserted new notions. In short, they adapted al-Sanūsī’s text for their own 
audience.  
 
However, the purpose or the general drift of the first Fulfulde comments was comparable to that of the 
Ṣughra. Al-Sanūsī’s ‘small creed’ was a scholastic work, with an educative aim. It was meant to 
impart to believers more knowledge of the philosophical foundations of the doctrine of the attributes 
of God, the central doctrine of Ash‘arism. Written in an environment where fusḥā’ Arabic was widely 
understood, the Ṣughra was intended to imbue Muslims with the sense of duty needed to understand 
basic principles of their religion, and to make better Muslims out of the majority of believers. The 
final lines of  al-Sanūsī’s text take into account that intellect was not the only route to the knowledge 
of religious truth, and declare that it could also be reached by methods of mysticism, in particular by 
internalising the knowledge represented by the words of the shahāda. Essentially, al-Sanūsī’s aim was 
the commitment to Islam of as many believers as possible. It was an inclusive goal, with an aspect of 
emancipation. 
 
The same can be said of the oral kabbe tradition. It reformulated the Ṣughra and expanded it, 
explaining it to Muslims in West Africa and adding general information about the culture and the 
religion of Islam, so that new converts would know what Muslims do. It did so in Fulfulde, the 
language of the ‘missionaries’ and their first audience. Kabbe versions of the nineteenth and twentieth 
centuries continued to address a very broad audience. They, too, present their content as one of two 
equally important ways to obtain religious knowledge—notably, knowledge about the manifest laws 
and principles, and knowledge about hidden truths, which could be obtained by following the path of 
the mystic.  
 
In The peerless method, however, the first characteristic that the kabbe and the Ṣughra share— 
inclusiveness—is replaced by its opposite. A further characteristic of the kabbe—its presentation of 
rational knowledge along with a recognition of the equally valid possibility of mystical knowledge—
seems to be pushed into the background in The peerless method. The result is a marked tension 
between an approach to religious knowledge as esoteric and the more orthodox approach to knowledge 
as something that can be had by means of reason. 
The text features various references to Sufism. However, one of the supposed indications of Sufism, 
the literary method of explaining concepts by attaching meaning to each letter of the word that 
represents them, may well have served the practical purpose of a mnemonic aid. As I have argued, the 
method does not necessarily signal an interest in ‘ilm al-ḥurūf, the mystical means to discover hidden 
truths through the study of values that letters share with other realms of creation. Other references to 
Sufism are weighed down by the strong emphasis, throughout the text, on reason, on naẓarī 
knowledge obtained through intellectual reflection, and on the transmission of ḥadīths and knowledge 
of the Qur’ān—all sorts of knowledge that only cognitive learning can impart.  
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The peerless method does not address believers who aspire to reach the exalted level of 
friends-of-God, and not even individuals who seek salvation in the hereafter. It addresses individuals 
who need to know the basics of Islam, so that they are not considered ‘imitators’, unbelievers, or 
outcasts. Apart from knowledge of God, these basics include knowledge of Islamic social life, in 
which one must know one’s place, and that of the shaykh, the faqīh and the imam. In other words, the 
objective of the authors of The peerless method was the transformation, not of the soul (as with  
Sufism), but of society.  
 
In the society thus envisaged, there is no place for imitators, because they are unbelievers, without 
exception and without doubt. This notion of the imitator as an unbeliever is the most idiosyncratic 
element that The peerless method adds to the Ṣughra. The idea does seem to be related to the practice 
that the Maghribī scholar al-Yūsī recorded in the same period, of testing people’s knowledge of 
tawḥīd. But it had not, up until then, been integrated in a serious scholarly work. And surely, The 
peerless method’s pronounced stance against taqlīd fits into a trend, which grew in the seventeenth 
century, whereby the rational sciences grew in popularity. It was also in keeping with the insistence on 
ijtihād in certain circles in the Middle East. But in The peerless method, all the inspiration is put to this 
specific use of defining the muqallid in a way that no other sunni theologian had followed. That the 
imitator is an unbeliever is far from a casual idea. The author or authors rather hammered away at it 
with a repeated formula. The ‘imitator’, who does not accept the importance of study and reason, is the 
motor that turns the inclusive character of the Ṣughra and the kabbe into exclusiveness, into a method 
of defining who does and who does not belong to the community of Muslims.  
 
The aim of this chapter has been to find out what The peerless method  is really about. Commentaries, 
Hughes wrote, use canonical sources to express the basic values of a new community. A basic value of 
the new Muslim communities in the central sudanic countryside of the second half of the seventeenth 
century was firmness of belief, as opposed to doubt or ambiguity about religious and therefore social 
loyalties. Another text by al-Wālī  begins with greetings to the Prophet, his companions and ‘those 
who consolidate faith and are steadfast in certainty’.407 Firm belief and commitment were at the core 
of a new Muslim identity, which was expressed by a communal lifestyle with new daily routines of 
prayer and formal learning. The peerless method reflects and reinforces this identity, because it is 
about marking the cultural boundary between dedicated Muslims and ‘doubters’, between people who 
                                                     


























sit down with an ‘ālim to learn and others who do not and who are therefore suspected of loyalty to 
their traditional religion. The role of the ‘ālim was crucial: in a time when Islam expanded to the 
countryside and the position of the ‘ulamā’ was changing, their specialised knowledge was presented 
as indispensable for the ordinary believer who does not want to be mistaken for an unbeliever.  
 
The analysis of The peerless method has also shown that the author of its final version, al-Wālī, 
negotiated between different levels of Muslim culture. To begin with, his basic material—consisting 
of the ‘mainstream’ Ṣughra and the regional tradition of the kabbe—had a hybrid character. I have  
argued that al-Wālī himself was inspired on the one hand by ideas he had discussed with peers in 
Cairo or Mecca, in the circle of the Shāfi‘ī scholar of ḥadīth al-Bābilī. On the other hand, his Peerless 
method responded to social dynamics at the local level—that is, to the need of both ‘ulamā’ and 
ordinary believers to rethink their role as Muslims in a time when Islam was spreading to new 





























































The previous chapter demonstrated how The peerless method used the status of a text from an 
important centre of Muslim learning not only to vulgarise Islam, but also to promote a view of 
particular concerns on the part of Muslims in the region—that is, on the definition of the believer and 
the position of  ‘ulamā’. Knowledge, and reason or intellect (‘aql), were central themes in both 
matters. This chapter continues the discussion of these themes in three ways. First, it focusses on 
something that could harm the intellect, in the perception of the ‘ulamā’: the new commodity, tobacco. 
Second, it looks at the interaction between popular culture and a scholarly text, exploring how al-Wālī 
transposed an argument against smoking from the context of ordinary local believers to Middle 
Eastern establishments of learning. Third, it shows al-Wālī commenting on kalām and practising 
ijtihād. Valid proofs for proclaiming smoking forbidden is an ambitious text, written in reply to one of 
the most respected scholars at al-Azhar, the Caireen institution of religious studies. The topic was 
relatively new, and al-Wālī searched for new arguments in the sunna and introduced rather unscholarly 
notions to a treatise addressed to his peers in this leading centre of learning.  
 
The following pages will first present a short history of tobacco in the Muslim world, and of the 
debate about it in the seventeenth century. This is the background against which al-Wālī’s maverick 
opinion on the issue can be outlined. It raises the question of what inspired him to defend this opinion 
in the Middle East. I will argue that his motivation was twofold: that, on the one hand he was deeply 
convinced that he was right, and that he shared this conviction with people in his direct cultural 
surroundings, not so much Fulani scholars, but new Muslims from other social backgrounds, the 
indigenous people in the region. This is, indeed, the main theme of this chapter. I will also argue that, 
on the other hand, he wished to raise his scholarship to the level of that in the traditional centres of 
Islam, to attract the attention of his peers there, and to show that he was active at a supra-national 
level—an ambition that I discuss further in chapter 7.   
 
 
1. How tobacco conquered the Islamic lands 
 
Tobacco crossed the Atlantic Ocean from the Americas to the Old World sometime in the last decade 
of the sixteenth century. Initially, it was hailed as a medicine, in Europe and the Islamic world. The 
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leaves were applied to wounds as a healing plaster, an infusion of tobacco was drunk, and the leaves 
were smoked as a laxative or against tuberculosis and cancer. In line with Galen’s theory of the 
humours, smoking tobacco was considered to be especially beneficial for those who had a 
predominantly humid temperament. (‘But how do ordinary people know what their temperament is?’, 
asked al-Wālī.409) Soon, however, smoking tobacco became fashionable with men and women for 
pleasure, and it started to arouse deep aversion among many others. The product, the habits, the tools 
(pipes of wood, stone or bone, and the water pipe) were all new, foreign or addictive, and that was 
more than enough to cause social unrest, authoritarian violence, and intellectual debates that went on 
for decades.410  
 
In Europe as in the Ottoman Empire, the weapon of the fiercest opponents was religious indignation: 
smoking or chewing tobacco transgressed the laws of God. Although, in order to use this weapon, 
these opponents sometimes had to be quite imaginative. In 1661, Christians in Switzerland, for 
instance, succeeded in passing a law that made smoking punishable as a violation of the seventh 
Commandment, thou shall not commit adultery.411 For Muslims it was somewhat easier to find rules 
against which smokers were sinning. A principal objection of opponents in the Ottoman Empire was 
that tobacco ‘obscured’ or ‘clouded’ the mind (yughayyibu/yughaṭṭī al-‘aql) like wine does, and was 
therefore forbidden by divine law (ḥarām). By the end of the seventeenth century, however, after a few 
decades of heated discussion, most Muslim jurists in the Middle East, North Africa, and the Maghrib 
had come to the conclusion that obscuring the mind only happened to some smokers, when they 
inhaled great quantities of tobacco smoke, and that no legal principle applied to proclaim tobacco 
forbidden. In sudanic Africa, Aḥmad Bābā al-Tinbuktī (who came from a family of important 
merchants, the Aquits, and possibly had the commercial interests of his brothers in mind) had already 
set the tone in favour of tobacco before 1607. The herb had medicinal properties, he wrote, that cured 
anything from flatulence to scorpion bites.412 These were views that al-Wālī opposed vehemently.  
 
Many seventeenth-century treatises on tobacco start with a short history of the herb in the Islamic 
world, and say that it was introduced there towards the end of the tenth century—that is, the end of the 
sixteenth century CE.413 Although there has been some discussion of whether tobacco may have been 
known in Persia and India a century earlier, modern historians agree with the view of these authors 
that tobacco leaves and the tobacco plant were first brought to Syria, Morocco and Egypt by 
Portuguese and British seamen and traders, who obtained it from the New World. 414 According to Al-
Laqānī, the English carried the drug to Egypt, and the first who imported it into the Maghrib was a 
Jew.415  
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word many languages use for smoking). Texts from central sudanic Africa also speak of ‘eating’ or chewing 
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411 J. Walton (ed.) The Faber Book of Smoking. London: Faber and Faber, 2000. 42. 
412 Al-Tinbuktī’s treatise is entitled Al-lamʿ fī l-ishāra ilā ḥukm ṭibgh. See Batran 2003, 169–90. 
413 Among these are the essays on the subject by al-Laqānī, al-Karmī, Hajj Khalifa en al-Nābulsī. See below. 
414 Matthee, E.I. 2; Grehan 2006, 1354, 1355. 
415 Or. 8288, 120v. 
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In the Middle East, the drug seems to have been quickly accepted among certain ṣūfīs. They had 
already learned to appreciate coffee, which had been introduced shortly before tobacco, because it 
helped with vigils and meditation. It may be that this smoothed the way for the new stimulant too.416 
Whether the association of smoking with ṣūfīs was justified or not, most opposition to smoking or 
chewing tobacco came from the religiously orthodox, and it seems quite plausible that this had to do, 
as J. Grehan argues, with the radical social changes these habits entailed. Grehan points out that the 
initially forcible and cruel repression of smoking by Ottoman sultans was caused by consternation 
over social and cultural transformations that it was accelerating. Smoking was enjoyed predominantly 
in coffeehouses, which were also new at the time. ‘In the long term, smoking would help to redefine 
patterns of social interaction, promoting more relaxed attitudes about pleasure and opening up new 
avenues for leisure and escapism.’417 Clerics feared the breakdown of moral restrictions in 
coffeehouses, and rulers feared that what smouldered there was not only coffee and tobacco, but 
political opposition as well. The Persian Shah Abbās (r. 1587-1629) had those who violated his ban on 
tobacco tortured and killed, including foreigners and sellers of tobacco.418 In Istanbul, sultan Aḥmad I 
(r. 1603-1617) and later sultan Murad IV (r. 1623-40) did the same. The latter was particularly fanatic 
about it, as Katib Chelebi (d. 1657) relates.419 At least one of the Ottoman decrees that prohibited 
smoking reached central sudanic Africa in some form at some time: an undated manuscript collected 
in Nigeria informs us that ‘the Prophet has prohibited [tobacco]. The proof of that is that the sultan of 
the believers, the sultan of Istanbul, sent a messenger to all places under his reign, to the people there, 
to China and India, to Rūm and ‘Adhar420, to Zaytūn and the Yamīn, to Mecca, Madīna, the Shām, 
Baghdād, the land of Mīl (?), Kūfa, Iskanderiya, Miṣr, Fez, Faris and every part under his reign.’421 
However, even in the lion’s den, in Istanbul itself, the punishments were ineffectual. Katib Chelebi 
wrote, ‘Gradually His Majesty’s severity in suppression increased, and so did people’s desire to 
smoke, in accordance with the saying “Men desire what is forbidden”, and many thousands of men 
were sent to the abode of nothingness.’422 Many more became addicted. Eventually, Katib Chelebi 
believed, there were more smokers than non-smokers, and rulers acquiesced.  
 
Of course some circles persisted in their aversion. As late as 1699 a group of North Africans in Cairo 
became so enraged by people who were smoking in the vicinity of the procession carrying a new cloth 
to the Ka‘ba, that they turned to violence and were put in jail, where some of them died.423 By the end 
of the eighteenth century Wahhabists had taken up preaching against smoking, but governments no 
longer forbade it. On the contrary, muftis in Istanbul, Damascus and Cairo officially permitted tobacco 
in the late 1710s.424  
 
One question concerning the history of the introduction of tobacco on this side of the Atlantic remains. 
By what routes was it transmitted within Africa? There is no consensus among historians and 
archaeologists.425 Another unresolved question is: Who were the first to bring the stimulant to 
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Morocco—English or other European sailors, as Ozanne wrote, or, as Philips believes, Africans from 
the west coast south of the Maghrib, who had had it for a few years already? One indication in favour 
of the latter view is found in a Maghribi source, according to which tobacco was smoked by the 
African keepers of an elephant that was sent to Mawlay Aḥmad al-Mansūr (r. 1578-1603) in 
Marrakesh in 1597. According to this source, they were the first who possessed tobacco. Where did 
they find it? Perhaps in Wādī Dar‘a, on the southern slopes of the Anti-Atlas, where there was a sugar 
plantation, and where the caravan had made a stop. What is certain is that, around 1600, tobacco 
quickly became popular among sudanic slaves on the Moroccan sugar plantations, as a drug that stilled 
hunger and thirst. An English trader already noted a significant demand for tobacco in ‘Barbary’—that 
is, Northwest Africa— in 1612.426 From there it may have spread to Timbuktu and beyond.427 
Whatever the route was, from the beginning there was a strong association—we see the reflections of 
it in fatwas for instance—of tobacco with ‘pagan’ black Africans,428 as well as with unconventional 
behaviour such as dancing and ‘wild hilarious conduct’.429  
 
 
The debate in the Middle East 
 
Everyone in this period had an opinion about smoking, it seems, and many wrote it down, as we shall 
see from quotations in the texts considered below. In the seventeenth century over 70 fatwas on 
smoking were produced in North Africa alone.430 The majority of those that have been preserved 
present arguments about why tobacco should be allowed or why it could not be forbidden. 
 
Because neither the Qur’ān nor the traditions of the Prophet and his companions mention tobacco, and 
because it was an issue on which consensus (ijmāʿ) could not have been reached among the classical 
jurists (because tobacco was not known in their part of the world in their lifetime), Muslim jurists in 
the seventeenth century had to figure out themselves whether this novelty was allowed. Generally, 
they applied the method of qiyās—that is, analogy or syllogism— to derive the implications of textual 
sources beyond the scope of their immediate and literal rulings. These jurists used this logical method 
to extend to tobacco the validity of verdicts on other drugs or stimulants, and to determine whether 
tobacco should be prohibited, tolerated or accepted—that is, to see which of the five categories of 
judgement (aḥkām, sg. ḥukm) applied.  
 
An important source was the principles that the thirteenth-century Mālikī scholar al-Qarāfī (d. ca. 
1283)431 had established about substances that were intoxicating, corruptive or soporific. In an effort to 
clarify the discussion of products such as hashish and henbane (banj), he had described as intoxicating 
(muskir) that which ‘absents’ or clouds the mind and at the same time gives joy (nashwa) and self-
confidence (qūwat al-nafs). Corruptive (mufsid) products were those that cloud the mind without 
promoting joy. Soporific (murqid) were products that cloud both the mind and the senses. These 
categories, and whether and to what extent the items falling within them were allowed or prohibited, 
have since then always played a role in Muslim discussions about various drugs and alcoholic drinks. 
These discussions, notably about hashish and, later, coffee, informed the deliberations of the jurists 
who wrote about tobacco. Some of these wrote about coffee and tobacco in a single treatise.432 There 
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was general agreement that what intoxicates is impure (najis), and therefore ḥarām. If it was assumed 
that it gave pleasure, the principal task of the first jurists to consider tobacco was to establish whether 
it also affected the mind. The Mālikī shaykh al-Sanhūrī (d. 1606), for instance, thought that it did.433 
That left unanswered important questions, however, such as in what circumstances a substance is 
actually intoxicating: only from the moment in which it affects the mind, or also before that, when it is 
potentially intoxicating? And in what quantity? Many jurists maintained that a quantity that did not 
cloud the mind was not impure, and some said this was even so for wine, so that a small amount of it 
could be taken, for instance as medicine.434 In fact, the analogy between wine and tobacco did not 
make things much easier for those who pleaded for a prohibition on smoking.  
 
Faced with such legal intricacies as well as doubts about any ‘mind-obscuring’ effect of tobacco, 
opponents tried another approach: a more prosaic demonstration of impurity. They embraced the 
rumours of how this luxury was often covered, kneaded, or sprinkled with wine or pig fat, either 
because the Christians who traded tobacco liked the taste, or because they intended to harm Muslims. 
Other stories relate how tobacco was polluted by human or dog’s urine, and mixed with or even 
replaced by dung.435 Certain jurists replied that even if this was so, it did not necessarily make tobacco 
impure, because wine, for instance, could be rinsed from the tobacco so that the impurity would also 
disappear, or because the smoke of something impure was not itself impure.436 It was hearsay versus 
logic. The advantage of the former was that the concerns about dirt mixed with tobacco dove-tailed 
nicely with the worries that some clerics and rulers had about immorality or rebellious sentiments in 
coffeehouses and among smokers in particular. Both groups had an interest in depicting smoking as a 
habit of the lowest classes, of riffraff.437 The coffeehouses offered them another argument, of guilt by 
association: a pipe was often passed around, just like a wine cup, while the Prophet had said that even 
water should not be drunk that way.438 
 
Another argument in between fear and law was derived from the belief that tobacco made one lazy, 
stingy, hungry (for sweets especially), effeminate and numb or weak (futūr). Opponents of tobacco as 
well as hashish often repeated the ‘ḥadīth of Aisha’, in the Sunan of Abū Dawūd, according to which 
Muḥammad said that everything that is intoxicating is ḥarām. They claimed—although there is no 
mention of this in any of the authoritative ḥadīth collections—that, when the Prophet had said this, he 
had added that anything that numbs one or saps one’s energy (mufattir) was also ḥarām.439 Others 
brushed this aside, saying that such a ḥadīth was not authentic.440 If it were true, said the ṣūfī shaykh 
and rebel Ibn Abū Mahallī (d. 1613), a Maghribī jurist, the verdict should also apply to taking a bath, 
having sex, or eating butter on a hot afternoon.441 Al-Ajhūrī, the first target of al-Wālī’s zeal on the 
subject, repeated the argument, replacing sex with the use laxatives.442 
 
Al-Wālī directed his gaze to opinions in the east, and so will we, although many of the texts involved 
are, frankly, rather dull. Very often, their style followed that used in other legal debates of the time, 
which featured a lot of qīla wa qāla—one said this; the other, that—with quotes from every single 
person of supposed significance, regardless of how tediously repetitive that became. The arguments of 
authors such as al-Karmī and al-Laqānī, for instance, follow this method so faithfully that it is well-
nigh impossible to discern a logically coherent point of view on their own part. Now a number of 
modern historians have written about the first reactions to tobacco in the Muslim world, and this has 
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434 Rosenthal 1971, 106, 107. 
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made some of these texts more accessible.443 One thing they show clearly is the tension in the Ottoman 
centres in the seventeenth century between religious puritans and liberals. The latter also took on the 
issue in order to discuss the limits to the sultan’s powers.  
 
There is no indication that al-Wālī read one of the first treatises on the topic, by Marʿi al-Karmī (d. 
1623) 444, but this text deserves special attention because it offers very thorough and reasonable 
explanations. Al-Karmī was born in Nablus and had studied in Jerusalem and Cairo, where he became 
a professor of Ḥanbali law at al-Azhar. Personally, he detested smoking, but he saw no legal grounds 
for a prohibition. His Taḥqīq al-burhān fī shurb al-dukhān (Verification of the proofs regarding 
smoking) is an essay—twelve pages in Or. 6275—that considers the rules that apply to the practice.445 
It begins by enumerating what opponents of smoking asserted: that it was repulsive (karīh, so that the 
legal category of makrūh, disapproved, would apply to it), that the breath of smokers stinks like that of 
people who have eaten onion (and whom the Prophet forbade to enter a mosque when others were 
praying there446), that smoke is what will pervade heaven and earth on the Last Day, and that the habit 
of smoking is bid‘a, a prohibited novelty. That tobacco was repulsive was hard to maintain, al-Karmī 
understood, because it was a matter of taste. As was often done in such cases, he took the people of 
Mecca and Medina as a standard and it so happened that many there rather liked tobacco. As for the 
last assertion, al-Karmī argues that, when considering a novelty, the possibility of allowing it must 
always be the point of departure. To declare a novelty prohibited, it must be proven harmful for 
normal people in normal quantities, or there must be a clear analogy with other prohibited things. He 
finds it hazardous that some jurists base their prohibition of tobacco on its supposedly ‘foul’ (khabīth) 
nature.447 Another accusation was that tobacco was an excuse for idleness, and there the opponents had 
a point, al-Karmī thought. It was also true, he held, that the drug came from the countries of the 
Christians and that one could not know what they put in it. Rumour had it that wine and pig fat were 
among these secret additives. But tobacco grown in Muslim countries did not have these impurities. 
Although the drug could be disapproved of in certain circumstances, nothing indicated that it should 
be forbidden in principle. Al-Karmī said it all, and nothing really new was ever added.  
 
ʿAbd al-Nāfiʿ (fl ca. 1600), a Ḥanafī who lived in Medina, argued that tobacco was to be prohibited 
because God prohibited what was foul. (Q: 7:157) He seemed to realise, however, that the legal 
grounds for this argument were not very firm, and that it would be difficult to maintain that smoking 
was ḥarām. F. Klein-Franke believes that this is why ‘Abd al-Nāfiʿ described smoking as karīh and 
then tried to bring the categories of makrūh and ḥurma closer together.448 ʿAbd al-Nāfiʿ is mentioned 
in a text against tobacco that was written in Bornu in al-Wālī’s time (Falke 1850, see below), and it is 
not unlikely that al-Wālī was informed about his arguments. 
 
Another Ḥanafī scholar, a partisan of the revival of Islam who worked in Anatolia, was Aḥmad al-
Aqḥiṣārī (d. perhaps in 1615). He was convinced that tobacco was harmful to the human body, and 
therefore, he wrote in his Epistle on tobacco (Risāla dukhāniyya): 
 
[t]he principle in it shall thus be that it is prohibited. But even if there was some doubt about 
the matter, the side of prohibition would still prevail, as asserted by the Legal rule. [The 
Prophet] has indeed said, blessing and peace be upon him: ‘What is lawful is clear, what is 
prohibited is clear and, between the two, there are unclear things that are not known by many 
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people. Someone fearing these unclear things preserves his religion and his honour whereas 
someone falling in these unclear things falls within what is prohibited.449  
 
Smoking was therefore ḥarām, he held, even if ‘ulamā’ had different opinions. To reinforce his point, 
al-Aqḥiṣārī quotes a number of ḥadīths that Y. Michot, who translated and edited the epistle, describes 
as belonging to two categories: ḥadīths about the Prophet’s dislike of bad smells and his prohibiting 
people who had eaten garlic or onion to enter a mosque, and ḥadīths in which smoke and fire are 
associated with hell. The epistle ends with the (negative) views of earlier jurists on hashish, banj, 
coffee, opium and other drugs, from which a prohibition of smoking can be deduced. In jurisprudence, 
the Ḥanafī approach was firmly based in reasoning and strongly associated with Mu‘tazilism. Al-
Aqḥiṣārī argues that, although some maintain that independent reasoning or ijtihād is not allowed any 
more, this is not a tenable point of view, especially if the reasoning is done by deduction from general 
principles to particular rules (takhrīj), which is a more ‘modest’ way of legal reasoning than by 
syllogism. It is quite possible that al-Wālī read al-Aqḥisārī’s Risāla—a possibility I will discuss more 
fully below. 
 
It is certain that al-Wālī read Naṣīḥat al-ikhwān b-ijtināb al-dukhān (Advice to the brothers to avoid 
smoking), by the highly respected dean of the Mālikīs and Azhar professor Ibrahīm al-Laqānī.450 He 
had also read al-Laqānī’s commentary on al-Sanūsī’s Ṣughra, and he was an admirer of his work. The 
‘advice’ is a short but fiery treatise that, also through the propagandising on the part of al-Laqānī’s 
sons, inspired the next generation of opponents and is even quoted in a twentieth-century pamphlet 
from Indonesia.451 Written in 1616, it brings to bear all the arguments that al-Karmī wanted to 
invalidate. The text is divided in 11 paragraphs (fuṣūl), but that seems to have been inspired more by 
the moment the author took up his pen than by any thematic principle. Central throughout the treatise 
is the theme of clouding the mind or intellect. Just like hashish and banj, tobacco can harm the mind 
and body, al-Laqānī writes. He knows that some users argue that it does not always have that effect, 
but when it does, it is obviously an intoxicant, according to the categories of al-Qarāfī, and therefore 
ḥarām. He quotes a whole list of authorities, including many anonymous Ḥanafis, who he says find 
tobacco repulsive, a waste of money and the cause of physical weakening, and point out that smoke is 
associated with hell. He comes to the conclusion that tobacco is an innovation from the Christians, 
notably from ‘Jebel Inklīz’ (the English mountain), from where a Jew brought it to the Maghrib.452 
Although it may be beneficial as a medicine for people with a humid humour, it is a satanic inspiration 
(nazaghat al-shayṭān). However, al-Laqānī’s popularity among the anti-smoking lobby is somewhat 
surprising, because ultimately he argued that the legal category applying to smoking was only that of 
‘doubtful’ (shubha) matters, not disapproved (makrūh) or ḥarām. But it is true that it is not easy to 
unearth this precise legal conclusion from his rambling presentation. 
 
After the first two decades of the seventeenth century, the tone of most of the texts about tobacco 
changed, certainly among Mālikīs. The most important scholarly rival of al-Laqānī was Nūr al-Dīn al-
Ajhūrī (d.1656).453 After the death of the former, al-Ajhūrī succeeded him as dean of the Mālikis in 
Cairo and beyond. During their life, the two men were diametrically opposed, among other issues on 
the matter of tobacco. One day, the story goes, they were discussing it, when al-Laqānī ended the 
debate, saying, ‘Whoever of us is wrong, may he become blind’. And lo and behold, at the end of his 
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life (he died at 90) al-Ajhūrī was blind.454 In his opinion tobacco was not an intoxicant, because even if 
it did distract the mind—which, he said, was not always the case—it did not generate joy. As for al-
Qarāfī’s criteria, al-Ajhūrī argued that, while consumers should be denied tobacco when they were 
harmed by it, tobacco could not be prohibited on the basis of its essential properties. He remarked that 
even al-Laqānī had considered tobacco unlawful only in amounts that would influence an individual’s 
mind, and that he had not objected to smoking in principle, provided that it did not distract from the 
observance of religious duties, and that the tobacco was not soaked in wine. But it was well known, 
said al-Ajhūrī, that in most cases wine can be rinsed out of tobacco.455 In the second part of his treatise 
Ghāyat al-bayān li-ḥilli ma lā yughayib al-ʿaql min al-dukhān (The ultimate demonstration of the 
legality of the amount of tobacco that does not ‘absent the mind), he counters a number of al-Laqānī’s 
arguments. Later, al-Wālī would do the same with al-Ajhūrī’s treatise.  
 
Two more treatises from this period may be mentioned, not because al-Wālī read them—we do not 
know whether he did— but because they demonstrate that, by the second half of the seventeenth 
century, the discussion about the legality of smoking tobacco among scholars in the Middle East was 
petering out. The first, and the most agreeable to read for modern readers, was written by Musṭafā b. 
al-Ḥajj Khalīfa456 (1609-1657), a scholar at the Ottoman court in Istanbul, who is better known as 
Katib Chelebi. His Mizān al-ḥaqq (The balance of truth), 457 published in 1656, contains a number of 
articles about major issues that concerned the elite in the cultural centres of the time: issues that were 
bones of contention between a number of Ottoman theologians and mystics, such as dancing, shaking 
hands and the chances of salvation for the parents of the prophet Muḥammad. Smoking was another 
example, but for Katib Chelebi it also provided a test case through which to demonstrate where the 
limits to the sultan’s powers should be drawn. Tobacco, or anything else, should not be proclaimed 
ḥarām solely because it pleased the sultan to forbid it. Legally, he argued, one could prohibit tobacco, 
but only as far as it was consumed in the public space. At home, people could smoke. Moreover, it 
was not certain that smoking was bad for the mind, nor that it harmed physical health. He concluded 
with a radical recommendation to the sultan: not only allow tobacco, but have the state cultivate it and 
levy taxes on its sale. Somewhat later, in 1682, the famous Syrian jurist ʿAbd al-Ghanī al-Nābulusī (d. 
1731) published his tract Al-ṣulḥ bayna al-ikhwān fi ḥukm ibāhat al-dukhān (Reconciliation between 
the brothers regarding the judgment on smoking).458 When he wrote it, he disliked tobacco, but saw no 
reason for a prohibition. He denied that the herb necessarily causes harm and decay, and he dismissed 
other arguments—that tobacco was disgusting and weakening, that it was associated with hell, and that 
it involved a waste of money. Like Katib Chelebi, al-Nābulūsī argued that smoking could not be 
labelled evil merely because the sultan had forbidden it. Ten years later, by then an inveterate smoker 
himself, he remarked that the whole discussion was really futile and that intellectuals should address 
themselves to real problems such as bribery and corruption.459  
 
These tracts and pamphlets include both new and well-worn arguments, which in time were more or 
less sorted out in terms of their legal substance. The argument against tobacco that had carried the 
most legal weight was the claim that it was harmful and even impure because it ‘obscured’ the mind—
and should therefore be classified as an intoxicant. A majority of jurists, however, argued that a 
capacity to obscure the mind was not inherent to tobacco. In the end, things happened as al-Karmī had 
predicted in the first quarter of the century, when he wrote:  
 
I have considered the matter of this smoking, and the differences of opinion about it, and have 
seen that there is a similarity to the introduction and authorisation of coffee. Some then said 
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that it was forbidden, and they had no support for that but their own opinion. Law did not 
support it, and syllogism produced no evidence for it. Others said it was allowed, based on a 
consideration of the principles in matters of allowing and authorising. Then the voice of those 
who pleaded for prohibition grew weaker. In our times there is plenty of agreement about 
allowing it and I think for smoking the outcome will be the same.460 
 
 
2. Al-Wālī’s point of view 
 
By the end of the seventeenth century, most jurists in the centres of the Middle East as well as the 
Maghrib, and certainly most Mālikī jurists, had come to the conclusion that smoking tobacco was 
allowed. Not those in Bornu, however. One of them was al-Wālī’s contemporary al-Hajrami (see 
chapter 2), author of the didactic poem Shurb al-zulāl, which lists foodstuffs that, according to the 
Sharī‘a, may or may not be consumed. In this text, he wrote that al-Laqānī and others had classed 
tobacco as dubious, and argued that it should not be smoked and not be traded.461 In The peerless 
method, al-Wālī went farther and categorised smoking tobacco as one of the capital sins, together with 
adultery, stealing, slander, and defamation. (Listing different types of leaders, in the preface to the 
commentary, he wrote: ‘The venerable and righteous scholar is he who leaves behind corruption such 
as adultery and theft and slander and defamation and smoking.’) 462 That was a rather extreme view, 
which he did not repeat – assuming that he wrote his anti-tobacco tract later—in the more legalistic 
discourse of Valid proofs to proclaim smoking forbidden.  
 
Valid proofs is in two parts. The first—folio 1 recto to 7 verso—presents ten reasons why smoking is 
ḥarām; the second—folio 8r to 23v—continues with a refutation of al-Ajhūrī’s Ghayat al-bayān. (See 
the translation and edition in annex I and II.) In the first part al-Wālī presents himself as the defender 
of al-Laqānī. His illustrious predecessor had already sufficiently demonstrated that smoking should be 
prohibited, he wrote, but since then information had accumulated and al-Wālī would help him, as God 
had commanded. It must be assumed that al-Wālī thought he was not just supporting, but actually 
improving al-Laqānī’s argumentation in ‘Advice to the brothers to avoid smoking’. In fact he did, with 
regard to three aspects: first of all, he added clarity. Al-Wālī himself said that his list of arguments is 
concise (‘alā wajh al-ikhtiṣār, f 1b)—and so is his style. Second, he added a great number of ḥadīths 
and some Quranic citations to support the argument. A number of these ḥadīths had not been put 
forward before by other opponents of tobacco. Other ḥadīths (for instance about the Prophet’s dislike 
of bad smells, the association between smoke and the Day of Judgement) had been cited before, but 
generally without giving any sources. By contrast, al-Wālī always informs us where a ḥadīth he quotes 
can be found. It is evident that he made a thorough study, for this treatise, of many ḥadīth collections.  
 
Third, al-Wālī asserted that tobacco had a foul essence and that it was associated with the devil. 
Throughout the text, but especially in this first part, there is a conclusory, ‘and that is the end of it’ 
element. ‘This is the ultimate report’, are the first words, echoing the title of al-Ajhūrī’s treatise, and 
promising a clarion call. Al-Wālī’s aim was to put an end to the endless disputations about legal 
conditions and degrees of disapproval or prohibition. For him, it was a matter of truth versus falsity463, 
of clarity ‘like the morning sun and the full moon at dusk’ versus obscurity464, and of God’s path 
versus erroneous ways.465 
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Al-Wālī listed ten objections to smoking: it was bidʿa (an illegal innovation); it led to idleness and 
copied a habit of unbelievers (who had introduced it; the smell of tobacco was offensive and filthy; the 
habit of smoking distracted from religion and was promoted by the devil; tobacco harmed the body 
and was a soporific or corruptive substance (‘and that is enough to prohibit it’) as well as a waste of 
money. Smoke was one of God’s punishments on the Day of Judgment (and who would want to 
associate with that?) and finally, smoking was incompatible with ‘manliness’ or decency (murūʾa) – 
and if we realise that tobacco was much stronger then than it is now, and led to running noses and 
snorting, we may imagine that to al-Wālī, with his Fulani’s aversion of lack of self-restraint, this was 
not the least of his objections. 466 All these arguments had been mentioned by others, although few 
listed so many in one text. But none of the arguments had been sufficient to convince a majority of 
jurists to proclaim that tobacco was forbidden. Al-Wālī is aware of this and presents these objections 
not for the sake of a legal argument, but to ask rhetorically: would an intelligent or rational person (al-
‘āqil) doubt the prohibition to consume this herb? However, the core of his plea, and the basis for all 
of his objections, is that tobacco is foul, khabīth. In the first part of the treatise (covering 16 pages), 
the words khabīth and its synonyms shanīʿ and qabīḥ occur 15 times. Others such as al-Laqānī and al-
Nāfi‘ had also called tobacco foul, but al-Wālī hammers it in, perhaps because he felt that piling on the 
khabīths—not a legal category—would amount to ‘impure’ (najis), a legal category entailing 
prohibition. At the same time, he does not once use the synonym karīh, which had been al-Nafīʿ’s 
strategy to make at least the legal category of makrūh applicable. Perhaps it is because al-Wālī aimed 
only for the highest, for total condemnation as ḥarām. 
 
As we have seen, even al-Laqānī admitted that tobacco did not obscure the mind, and deduced from it 
that it was not an intoxicant and therefore was not impure. At this point, al-Wālī did not agree 
(although he hid the fact that al-Laqānī’s view was different from his). Whatever jurists said about the 
intoxicating nature of tobacco, al-Wālī wanted to secure a consensus that tobacco was impure. 
‘Surely,’ he explains, ‘the things that necessitate its prohibition are other than distraction (ghaibūbiya) 
of the mind caused by smoking it.’467 And in answer to al-Ajhūrī’s statement that tobacco is not 
impure because the mind is not clouded by it, he says, ‘[T]here is no connection between a substance’s 
clouding the mind and its being impure.’468 What he had on the tip of his tongue was that tobacco was 
in fact impure. That was essential to him, because impurity or foulness was the middle term, in 
philosophical jargon, in the syllogism on which he had based his reasoning. The middle term of a 
syllogism is the basis for the validity of a proof. The syllogism was: tobacco is impure; what is impure 
is ḥarām; therefore tobacco is ḥarām. Finding the middle term of a syllogism was a pre-eminent 
method of verification (taḥqīq).469 The problem for al-Wālī was that foulness could not be legally 
established, which may be one reason why he did not make his logic more explicit. (The second part 
of the treatise would have been the place to do so.) But foulness could be so strongly implied that one 
could not get round it, and this is the goal of the first part of Valid proofs.  
 
The second part of Valid proofs is very different. In its first lines, al-Wālī is as pugnacious as in the 
first part. Soon, however, he presents himself as a scholar of ḥadīth and of legal science who is well 
versed in kalām. He shows his sophistication and awareness of the norms of scholarship, not only in 
the arguments he adduces, but also in his style. For instance he is quite formal and polite to al-Ajhūrī, 
and he quotes three poets, two of whom enjoyed widespread fame in the Muslim world (al-Mutanabbī 
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and al-Busīrī), while the third, al-Maghīlī, was especially famous in West Africa. Demonstrating his 
schooling in the logic of jurisprudence, al-Wālī starts with some preliminary remarks on the possibility 
of drawing conclusions about issues that are not addressed in the Qur’ān, by using syllogisms in the 
correct way (ff 8 r,v). He uses an example that was quite commonly used in the instruction of kalām to 
explain the relation between dalīl and madlūl, between ‘proof’ and what is proven. Then he starts his 
disputation in the classical style of the genre (‘If you say x, then I say y’), in which al-Ajhūrī functions 
as the opponent, giving his opinion about statements in the order in which the prominent Mālikī 
presented them.470 And while in the first part of the treatise al-Wālī had offered support, especially 
from sunna and Qur’ān, for the correctness of his judgement, he now concentrated on logic, following 
with what his adversary had done. At times al-Wālī’s comment draws heavily on al-Laqānī’s 
formulations (see Annex II), here and there giving the commentary the aspect of a compilation of texts 
as well.  
 
From al-Wālī’s comments, we can deduce that there are three pillars in his own legal reasoning. The 
central idea is again that smoking is ḥarām, not because of, or only in case of the occurrence of 
negative effects such as harm, corruption, or clouding the mind, as al-Ajhūrī would have it, but 
because it is intrinsically foul. (And because it was foul, and therefore ḥarām, he argued in a 
roundabout way, it always corrupted the consumer.) Impurity, the middle term in al-Wālī’s reasoning 
as a mutakallim, is the ‘illa in his legal kalām, the attribute of smoking that leads to the legal category 
ḥarām.471  
 
The second pillar is the analogy between tobacco and hashish, which had been judged ḥarām by the 
jurist ʿAbd Allāh al-Manūfī472 (d.1348/49), because in his addiction, the consumer of hashish behaved 
like a drunk. Al-Wālī supported this judgement with the words that opponents of tobacco used to 
attribute to the Prophet the idea that every intoxicant was ḥarām and that every soporific was an 
intoxicant.  
 
Third, al-Wālī put quite some emphasis (on ff 13r, 14v, 15v and finally 23v) on a principle that was in 
line with his wish for a clear-cut choice between truth and error: that in case of doubt among the jurists 
about the legality of something, one should abstain from the matter, to avoid the risk of doing 
something prohibited. This, he wrote, was a point that had been made by ‘a certain friend of God from 
among the Byzantines, in an essay that sīdi Ibrahīm al-Laqānī has transmitted’. This jurist had argued 
that when ‘there is disagreement about things that the sharī‘a does not give a judgement about, it is 
preferred to prohibit what is harmful, and not other things.’473  
 
This last phrase recalls a passage in the Epistle on tobacco by Aḥmad al-Aqḥiṣārī, who was indeed 
born a Byzantine: he was born in 1570 in Cyprus, to a Christian family. As a child he was abducted  
by Ottoman conquerors and he converted to Islam.474 A little detour is useful here. It seems beyond 
doubt that al-Aqḥiṣārī is indeed the friend of God to whom al-Laqānī referred, and the Egyptian 
Mālikī borrowed quite a lot from this Ottoman and Ḥanafī colleague, without ever mentioning his 
name.475 Not only much of the argumentation, but also, for instance, the colourful description of the 
head of smokers becoming ‘like a roasted, that is a grilled head’ on the Day of Resurrection is from al-
Aqḥiṣārī, as is the quote from Galen, that without the harm of soot and smoke, man would live a 
                                                     
470 Al-Ajhūrī himself had reacted to al-Laqānī in the same style, and Aḥmad Bābā to al-Mahallī. 
471 On ‘illa, see Van Ess, ‘The Logical Structure of Islamic Theology’ in Islamic Philosophy and Theology. Vol 
II Revelation and Reason. London: Routledge, 2007. 31-55. 38. Also R. Peters 1980, 135. 
472 According to A. Batran he died in 1348. (2003, 153, 192) However, Al-Ajhūrī mentioned that he was a 
shaykh of Shihāb al-dīn al-Qarāfī, who lived from 1228 to 1283 or 1285. 
473 Or. 8362, 12v, 13r.  
474 Michot 2010, 1; and 51 for al-Aqḥiṣārī’s view on prohibiting harmful things. 
475 Why did al-Laqānī nor al-Wālī quote his name? Perhaps they thought a Ḥanafī jurist in Istanbul was not the 
best source to lean on, in their debate with Mālikis. Or perhaps they thought al-Aqḥiṣārī was not authoritative 
enough because he was ‘only’ a contemporary, or because he was not born a Muslim. 
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thousand years.476 Such phrases are again repeated by al-Wālī, perhaps without his realising that al-
Aqḥiṣārī was the source. On the other hand, in a number of cases al-Wālī skipped exactly those 
passages that al-Laqānī had added to al-Aqḥiṣārī’s Risāla. It could be that al-Wālī read the Risāla 
himself, and that like al-Laqānī he did not see the point in mentioning the name of a scholar who had 
not yet acquired the patina of history.477  
 
If we return to the legal reasoning, we see that the rejection of a matter when there is doubt about its 
legal status, is the main point of the second part of al-Wali’s treatise. Here, the reasons presented in the 
first part are described as ‘minor evidence’, while ‘major evidence’ comes from the analogy of 
tobacco with the judgement on hashish by al-Manūfī—a judgement that leads al-Wālī to say, ‘Indeed, 
if this substance is not intoxicating, it is [nevertheless] corruptive and soporific, and its use is 
prohibited except for the amount that is confirmed not to influence the mind. But this amount is not 
known for smoke. Therefore the procedure is to reinforce the prohibition as a precaution’ (15v).478 In 
legal terms, this sentence represents the most refined view of al-Wālī. 
  
It must be admitted that in many other places in this second part of the treatise, too, the legal reasoning 
is not very sharp. Most awkward is the fact that he has no reply to al-Ajhūrī’s argument that smoking 
can be allowed, because it does not obscure the mind. He had used the most basic syllogism to make 
his point: smoking does not obscure the mind; what does not obscure the mind is allowed; ergo, 
smoking is allowed. Al-Wālī cannot get a word in edgeways. Instead of trying to demonstrate the 
invalidity or insufficiency of the second proposition of the syllogism, which would have been the 
obvious thing to do, he weakly replies: ‘I say: what he wrote here, God bless him, in the manner of 
logic (bi shakl al-manṭiqī), does not lead to authorization to smoke tobacco; it would merely indicate 
that it does not have an intoxicating essence. But there is no relation between the lack of intoxicating 
properties and allowing it’ (15r). 
 
Al-Ajhūrī had introduced this passage with the remark—which al-Wālī duly quoted—that ‘it is not 
possible for an intelligent person to say that [smoking] is ḥarām in essence, unless he were ignorant of 
the kalām of the legal schools, or arrogant’. Al-Wālī’s answer is: no, he is ignorant who firmly 
believes what the arguments contradict, and arrogant is he who knows the truth but refuses to accept it 
(15r). And this is not the only time he uses this gauche stylistic figure. On folio 17, in answer to al-
Ajhūrī’s line that the claim that tobacco is essentially harmful is unsustained by proof, al-Wālī writes: 
‘I say that his words are a claim without proof.’ In other cases, al-Wālī’s only reply to al-Ajhūrī is that 
he is just not interested in a certain argument (ff 16r, 16v, 20r) or that what al-Ajhūrī says is simply 
not true (18r).  
 
No, al-Wālī was not a great jurist, nor a great master of kalām. But this is the field in which he tried to 
frame his objections against smoking as a legal plea. The second part of Valid proofs was evidently 
written in reaction to the opinion of al-Ajhūrī and based on a study of texts by authors such as al-
Laqānī and older legal sources, most likely also after lively discussions with other jurists who may 
have pointed out the weaknesses in the argumentation of the 10 ‘proofs’. The first part, on the other 
hand, reflected arguments that came from al-Wālī’s home environment in Baghirmi and Bornu. 
 
                                                     
476 Cf. Michot 2010, 77 and Or. 8288, 129b for the roasted head, and Michot 2010, 81 and Or. 8288, 123a for 
Galen. 
477 There are too many correspondences between the three texts to point out here, but two examples where al-
Wālī seems to keep closer to al-Aqḥiṣārī’s text is where the analogy between tobacco and garlic, onions and 
leeks are discussed and where Ibn Sīnā and Galen are quoted. For tobacco and smelly vegetables cf Or. 8362, 4v 
and Michot 2010, 78-79 and Or. 8288, 125b-126b. For Ibn Sīnā and Galen cf Or. 8362 and Michot 2010, 81 and 
Or. 8288, 123a-b. 
478 Al-Wālī and al-Ajhūrī both seem to have used the terms ‘ṣughra’ and ‘kubra’ in a different way than was 
usual in the juridical dialectic based on Aristotelian logic. Usually ‘minor’ and ‘major’ referred to premises—
that is, to the extreme terms or propositions (qaḍiyyāt) A and C of an argument. Al-Ajhūrī and al-Wālī use 
ṣughra and kubra in more quotidian manner, to indicate arguments of minor and major importance. 
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3. A folktale about the devil’s pee 
 
Near the end of the treatise, al-Wālī mentions a strange story about tobacco that had been presented as 
a ḥadīth. This story was first told—as we know from the Maghribi al-Fakkūn—in the region of 
Algeria, early in the seventeenth century.479 Al-Fakkūn had not written it down in its entirety, but had 
described it in 1616, mentioning four elements: Tobacco was created from the urine of Iblīs;480 the 
Prophet has said that smokers do not belong to his umma; the Prophet predicted smoking to either his 
companion Abū Hurayra or Abū Ḥudhayfa481; it was when God told Iblīs that he would have no 
authority over His people and would be an outcast (for instance Q 7:11-13, Q 15:42) that Iblīs urinated 
in shock. 
 
The first two elements form the core of the narrative, and in other versions they are combined: it is the 
Prophet himself who says that tobacco grows from the devil’s urine. This last statement ‘is simply 
arbitrary and nonsensical’, says al-Fakkūn.482  
 
Al-Wālī says he believes that al-Ajhūrī refers to this story when he writes that ‘the oft-repeated 
traditions [to refute tobacco] are fabrications... concocted in contemporary times’483 and he confirms 
his opinion. However, unlike al-Ajhūrī, he repeats the information concerning the relation between 
tobacco and the devil, together with the unquestioned context of the Quranic verse. And instead of 
denouncing the ḥadīths as false, he says, ‘We do not know their source’: 
 
Among [the ḥadīths that are fabricated] we must mention the derogation of tobacco as coming 
from the urine of Iblīs, may God curse him, when he was terrified after hearing the words of 
the Highest, ‘As for My servants, you have no power over them’,484 and he was shocked and 
urinated, and this plant sprang up from his urine. And also the ḥadīth related by Ḥudhayfa ibn 
al-Yamān, who said: ‘I went out with the Prophet, God bless him, and he saw a plant and 
shook his head. I asked: ‘Oh messenger of God, why do you shake your head?’ He told me: A 
time will come to the people when they will drink from the leaves of this plant.’ And more 
ḥādiths like these are being related, of which we do not know the source.485 
 
Although he agrees that these ḥadīths are unsound, al-Wālī is taking the feelings of those who do 
believe them very seriously. Is it because, practically speaking, he can use the narratives in his 
argument that tobacco is intrinsically foul and disgusting, or is it also because he has really taken these 
stories to heart himself? If so, what was their appeal for him? As far as I know, the story about 
tobacco’s origin in the devil’s urine has not survived in the Maghrib or the Middle East. But there are 
a number of undated versions of it in the Kano collection of Arabic manuscripts from the region of 
Bornu and Baghirmi, where the story still survives today. 486 The question is thus more specifically 
why it survived there, and what its appeal was there. To answer that, we will dive deeper into it.  
                                                     
479 Al-Fakkūn refers to a certain al-Sūsī as his source for the story. This was probably Abū ʿAbd Allāh al-Sūsī, 
who died in 1614. See Batran 2003, 216. 
480 Iblīs is an alternative name for the Devil, especially associated with the story of the creation of the world. See 
P. W. Awn, Satan’s Tragedy and Redemption: Iblis in Sufi Psychology. Brill: Leiden, 1983. 
481 Both are interesting choices by the composers of the story: ever since the end of the eighth century the name 
of Abū Hurayra had lent itself to be inserted in isnād strands that originally contained no companion of the 
Prophet. Abū Ḥudhayfa was a companion who played a very minor role as a transmitter of ḥadīth. See G.H.A. 
Juynboll, Encyclopedia of canonical ḥadīth. Leiden: Brill, 2007. 45, 724-25.  
482 Batran 2003, 253. 
483 Batran 2003, 157. 
484 Q 15:42 
485 Or 8362, 19r. 
486 See Falke 2017 (two folio’s, writing on both sides), Paden 204 (two folio’s, writing on both sides), Paden 76 
(four folio’s, writing on both sides). All three are separate texts, and undated. However, there is some overlap in 
their content. The paper of Paden 204 has the watermark of ‘Beniamino Arbib’, which was produced at the end 
of the nineteenth and beginning of the twentieth century. (Bloom 2008) The text seems to originate from at least 
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The shortest compilation of these ‘ḥadīths’ runs as follows: 
 
Bismillah and greetings to our lord Muḥammad, his family, companions, wives and slave- 
girls. This text is communicated by the noble [Prophet], [who was] consulted by ʿAlī b. Abī 
Ṭālib. By the authority of the Prophet, God bless him and grant him salvation: all inanimate 
nature is pure, except this one plant that grows in the urine of Iblīs and is from the bottom of 
the hell. It is more reprehensible than wine. He who eats of this plant, the Prophet says that he 
rejects him and that he is not of his umma. For he who chews it is an unbeliever. There is no 
peace for him, nor religion, nor jihād, and he is damned in the Torah as well as in the Gospel, 
in the Book of Psalms and in the Furqān.487  
God, the benevolent, the exalted, said that vicious things are forbidden to them: wine, 
gambling, calumny and pigs and adultery and slander. These are the first things that are evil to 
him. By the authority of Abū Hurayra488, may God be pleased with him, and from the prophet 
who said, “Beware of this plant.” He said it is [like] wine, more than wine. It is told, on the 
authority of Abū Ḥudhayfa, may God be pleased with him, that Abū Ḥudhayfa said that he 
went out with a party of the Messenger of God and [said], “I saw this plant and [the Prophet] 
said: “This is from Iblīs’ urine.” He also said: “A time will come after me, when they will 
drink this plant and be drunk from it and will err from the path of God. They will be punished 
according to the verse from the Book of God. And he who says to them, ‘Leave this plant!’, he 
will be an enemy to them.489 But they are the worst of people and I have nothing to do with 
them.’”  
ʿAlī b. Abī Ṭālib said: “The Messenger from God, peace be upon him, said, ‘He who eats from 
this plant belongs to the depths of hell. May God, the Exalted, curse him—He does not care.’”  
ʿAlī said, “There is no peace for them, do not befriend them, do not sit down with them, do not 
greet them, do not help them, do not laugh with them.490 
 
The rest of this manuscript is lost, but another version adds to this list of forms of social interaction 
that should not take place with smokers: ‘Do not eat with them from one dish, do not drink with them 
or smile at them and do not talk with them except when it is necessary.’491 The element of the original 
version, where the Prophet said that smokers do not belong to his umma, is here converted into an 
order to his umma to actively exclude users of tobacco. 
 
Although this story about the origin of tobacco is fantastical, these ‘ḥadīths’ would have made a 
truthful impression, because of the many authentic elements. They were fabricated, but they were not 
invented from scratch. For instance, Abū Hurayra had indeed been reported to have said ‘The Prophet 
said: beware of the green [plant], for it is the greatest wine’. It is just that he was apparently talking of 
hashish. His words were quoted in a work on hashish by the fifteenth-century author Taqī al-Dīn al-
Badrī, 492 which reported the ḥadīth on account of Ibn Ḥudhayfa, who said: ‘I went with the Prophet 
into the countryside. He saw a tree and shook his head. I asked him why he was shaking his head, and 
he replied: ‘A time will come for my nation when they will eat from the leaves of this tree and get 
intoxicated, and they will pray while intoxicated. They are the worst of the worst. They are the birā’ of 
my nation, as God has nothing to do with them (minhum bari’).’493  
                                                                                                                                                                      
two centuries earlier, because it mentions a message from the sultan in Istanbul, in which he prohibited the use of 
tobacco in all regions under his reign. See p. 31 above. Oral versions of the story still circulate in todays Chad. 
487 Synonym of Qur’ān, see below. 
488 A companion of the prophet Muḥammad. In canonical ḥadīth collections, he is one of the transmitters of the 
Prophet’s words ‘he who eats of this plant (garlic) should not approach our mosque and should not harm us with 
the odour of it’, which was used as an argument against smoking. 
489 Cf. the words of al-Fakkūn who wrote in 1616 that when he admonished people not to smoke, he was mocked 
and scandalized. See Batran 2003, 209. 
490 Falke 2017. 
491 Paden 76, 3r, 3v.  
492 d. 1503. GAL II 132, S II 164. 
493 The translation is by F. Rosenthal, 1971, 46. 
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Even more creativity was invested in the story of the devil’s micturition, but here too ready-made 
elements lay at the bottom. The Qur’ān does indeed describe the devil’s reaction when God told him 
he would be an outcast, as one of shock: the devil first asks for reprieve and then promises revenge, by 
misleading people (Q 15:30-33, Q 7:11, Q 38:73,74). And since then Iblīs had been understood to 
interfere with religion, not only in the matter of prayer but also of hygiene.494 There are a number of 
ḥadīths that tell the story of how the devil urinated in someone’s ear, so that the victim forgot his 
morning prayer. Al-Nawāwī explained that some understood this symbolically, while others laughed 
about it, but that al-qāḍī ‘Iyād, the celebrated Mālikī jurist, had argued that it was quite possible, since 
the ear is the organ of our attention, so that the devil’s choice would be understandable.495  
 
If the variants of these ḥadīths originated in the Maghrib (where, as we saw, tobacco was initially 
associated with ‘blacks’, pagans and riff-raff) they must have travelled via caravan routes and markets 
to the central sudanic region, where apparently they touched a chord: in Bornu and Baghirmi they 
were told again and again, in versions that were slightly adapted, and sometimes written down, until 
today. With their repetition, irregular handwriting, and spelling mistakes, the manuscripts are clearly 
records of stories that were passed on orally, among people who were not very skilled in Arabic. In 
two versions (Paden 204 and 76), tobacco is described not only as worse than wine, but as amounting 
to idolatry, the summit of sin. In later texts about tobacco from central Sudanese authors from the 
Tidjaniyya ṭarīqa (therefore originating from the second half of the nineteenth century, for instance 
Falke 1040 and Falke 1101) the story of the devil’s urine no longer figures but is replaced by 
references to, and comparisons of smokers with, dung beetles, the stench of an anus, riffraff, 
uncivilised behaviour and not heeding the law, while yellow pus is said to ooze from the corpses of 
smokers. Even today tobacco is sold in the outer section of the markets in Baghirmi, the section where 
barbers, with their indispensable but ambiguous trade of cutting hair and prepuces, also have their 
place.496  
 
Altogether, it seems that, over time, no means were spared to demonise tobacco, to label smoking as a 
capital sin and, for those who were not sufficiently sensitive to the threat of punishment in the 
hereafter, to depict tobacco not merely as soaked in urine, but as intrinsically soiled by it. Likewise—
that is, in a manner more attuned to an African worldview than to Muslim ethics—violation of the 
sanction on smoking was not punishment in the hereafter, but ostracism in the here and now. Whether 
this was also a characteristic of the versions al-Fakkūn heard in the Maghrib, is not known. In all the 
versions from Bornu, however, the sanction of expulsion from the community here and now is spelled 
out in detail. It suggests that these societies felt deeply threatened by tobacco-smoking. The next step, 
then, is to find out what this threat was. 
 
As we saw, in the Middle East tobacco caused fears of social disruption when it was first introduced. 
In the nineteenth-century accounts of European travellers in central sudanic Africa, there is no mention 
of coffeehouses or smoking holes such as those that could be found in Ottoman centres or the 
Maghrib, where vagabonds were thought to be wasting away and an urban underclass could concoct 
schemes against its masters. But some of the same worries seem to have troubled people here, too. 
This appears from an undated manuscript from Bornu, which contains another text arguing against 
tobacco, which will be further discussed in the next section. On the social effects of tobacco it says:  
 
                                                     
494 Awn 1983. 
495 The ḥadīth can be found in al-Bukhāri kitāb 19, bāb 13 and 59, 11; also in Muslim kitāb 6, 205, with al-
Nawāwī’s exegesis. 
496 The same was the case in markets of northern Nigeria around 1900, see the annex in Low 1972. A. Cohen 
(1970, 249, 252) notes about barbers in Bornu that they are at the bottom of the occupational hierarchy in Kanuri 
society, because ‘they are ignorant’, they know ‘bad things’ (related to sorcery), and they are ambiguous because 
they deal with blood when they perform surgical operations like circumcision, removing of the uvula and 
scarification. Cohen. On the other hand, tobacco was an important plantation crop in Sokoto (Lovejoy 1978, 
356), while in Futa Djallon on the west coast pupils of Quranic schools even used it to make the ink with which 
they copied verses. (Marty 1921, 346.) 
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[Smoking tobacco] keeps the mind from caring about matters. If a person is learned, it keeps 
him away from learning and work and from seeking refuge [with God]. If he is a worshipper, 
it keeps him from worship. If he is a slave, it keeps him from serving his master. If he is a 
merchant, it diminishes what is his and keeps him from his occupations. For the smoker 
drowns his heart with love for it and drowns his time night and day with smoking and with 
craving for it. [...] Is there worse fitna than this?’497  
Smoking, in this text, perturbs the social order and it leads to jāhilīya (idem, ff 2a and 4b), to chaos. In 
later texts from the region against smoking, the theme of jāhilīya is elaborated in all its aspects of 
ignorance, immorality and primitiveness. Smoking is frequently associated with riff-raff (al-raʿāʿ), as 
was also done in texts from the Maghrib, North Africa, and the Middle East. In all these regions, riff-
raff or people of the lowest standing were African slaves. A certain al-Isḥāqī, for example, said that 
smoking was the habit of contemptible sudanese and people of low standing.498  
 
As we saw in chapter 2, the idea of sudanese or black was equated with that of inferiority, slave status 
and paganism. At the same time ‘pagan’ or ‘Muslim’ were collective labels. The Muslim identity of an 
individual depended on a firm Muslim identity with his community. The passage from a non-Muslim 
to a Muslim identity was not easy, and rarely a linear process. In the seventeenth century Islam started 
to spread to larger parts of the population and to rural areas, but the attraction of traditional religions 
remained very strong. Still, these populations needed to be seen as Muslim communities, if they 
wanted to be left alone by slave-raiding neighbours. They had to make a choice between a culture of 
Islam and their old customs and be clear about it, in a society where being Muslim or not had such 
serious implications. I am not suggesting here that refraining from smoking was enough to present a 
community as Muslim. But in this context, the struggle against tobacco, in a region where slaves were 
the basis of the economy, may be understood as a struggle against the temptation for Muslims to fall 
back to non-Islamic loyalties.  
 
At a different level, smoking lent itself to the development of the narrative motif of smokers as people 
of the jāhilīya, as opposed to non-smokers as people of Islam. The ‘ḥadīth’ about tobacco helped to 
create an identity for the umma. It did so not only in religious terms, but also in terms of actual 
customs. Other options to do the same were limited. For instance, Muslims were allowed and 
sometimes ordered to wear a turban, but otherwise the clothing of (rural) Muslims and non-Muslims 
was the same. Muslim women had the same tasks as others, and remaining in their house or courtyard, 
as Muslim preachers commanded, was something rural women could not afford to do. Changing burial 
rites was psychologically and socially difficult,499 and even praying five times a day, one of the pillars 
of Islam and a religious obligation, was and is not easy to fit into the rhythm of farming. Smoking, 
however, was something one could choose not to do. Indulging in it—which must have happened, or 
we would not have so many texts on the topic—could be seen as a penchant for a novelty that came, 
literally and figuratively speaking, from the other direction, from the Christians and Jews in the West. 
Using tobacco could therefore serve as a sign of diminishing loyalty to a community under 
construction.  
 
The threat from tobacco-smoking was the threat of the attraction of an alternative identity. The 
rejection of smoking offered an opportunity to mark the boundary between Muslims and others. The 
practice of ostracising smokers gave an opportunity to strengthen the unity of these communities 
against those who opted out. The description of tobacco as filthy and stinking was an opportunity to 
defend the choice of Islam. Together the ḥadīths about tobacco may be seen as what J. Vansina, in his 
pioneering work Oral Tradition as History, has called an etiological story of origin, a narrative of how 
a group of people—not an ethnic group in this case, but the new Muslim communities of central 
sudanic Africa—became as they are, and a narrative that represents their worldview. Such stories are 
                                                     
497 Falke 1850, 6v. 
498 Muḥammad b. ‘Abd al-Mu‘tī  al-Isḥāqī. Batran 2003, 58. 
499 From a text about bidʿa by ʿUthmān dan Fodio (ms Hunwick 151) it appears that even in Sokoto people were 
not very willing to give up their traditional ways of burying. 
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typically accounts that are built up out of pre-existing material of the same nature in which history is 
used to relate a group to the overall worldview of the community to which they adhere. These pre-
existing materials may have to do with gods descending to earth, people turning into animals or hitting 
heaven while pounding sorghum, or tobacco eternally springing from the devil’s urine. ‘At some 
point’, writes Vansina, ‘we no longer know whether people take them seriously or not.’500 With this 
last remark, he doubted not the value of these narratives for a people’s identity, but their belief in the 
related events as facts. It is a point on which the anthropologist D. Sperber developed a view that 
complements Vansina’s. Sperber argued that people do not ‘really’ believe in dragons or an ancestor 
who hit heaven, or other fantastic examples. More precisely, he explained that such beliefs are not 
factual, and therefore there is no point in dismissing them as irrational. Such beliefs are rational if they 
are understood as representing a social truth. They are ‘des croyances culturelles, autrement dit des 
représentations acquises par le biais de la communication sociale et acceptées en fonction de 
l’affiliation sociale’ (‘cultural beliefs, or repesentations that have come about through social 
communication and that have been accepted in accordance with social affiliation’).501 This helps to 
understand how the cultural belief that smokers and what they symbolise must be separated from 
Muslims, was crucial to the representation of the emergence Muslim communities.  
 
A few more details can confirm the suggestion that the narrative about tobacco’s demonic origin and 
the other ḥadīths that were told in combination with it, were about making the choice for Islam. The 
theme of choosing, of separating good from evil, is amply represented in all the versions we have. The 
person who tells Abū Hurayra or Abū Ḥudhayfa that the Prophet said that tobacco grows in the devil’s 
urine and that smokers should be excluded from the community is ʿAlī b. Abī Ṭālib. ‘Alī was not only 
a close relative of the Prophet Muḥammad—he is also known and usually depicted as the man with the 
double-edged sword that separates Muslims from unbelievers: Dhū al-Faqār, the Purifier. In one of the 
manuscripts, ʿAlī b. Abī Ṭālib is nicknamed al-Karār, the Assaulter, ‘because he slew heathens with a 
sword in jihād.’502 Second, in all versions of the narrative, the word Furqān is used instead of Qurʾān. 
Furqān is a synonym for Qurʾān, but is used to evoke the meaning of the Book that distinguishes (from 
faraqa) good from evil. A deeply felt need to distinguish is also conveyed in the last lines of Valid 
proofs, where al-Wālī quotes al-Bukhārī—‘Leave that which makes you doubt for that which does not 
make you doubt’—and concludes: ‘I have clarified for you what we have resolved in refutation of said 
doubt.’ Just as in The peerless method, firmness of belief is the central value that is at stake in Valid 
proofs and the yardstick by which social boundaries are marked. 
 
 
4. From Abgar to al-Azhar 
 
In ALA, the two parts of Valid proofs are mentioned as separate texts. Indeed, it is true that the two 
parts of the work feature a fundamental mutual difference, thus suggesting that two different 
audiences—one consisting of local ordinary believers, the other of highly educated jurists—were 
originally envisaged. The first part bears clear traces, as we saw, of popular opinion about smoking in 
central sudanic Africa. Apart from that, its style is quite different from that of the second. It is written 
in simple words, short sentences, with repetitions and a host of references to prophetic traditions. One 
could almost imagine its being read out by a public crier in a market. The second part includes a 
polemical discussion of the treatise by al-Ajhūrī, but now in a scholarly style in which the syntax is 
often as complex as the logical and legal argumentation. However, al-Wālī started the second part with 
the words ‘I have just presented ten good reasons’, a direct and unambiguous reference to the first part 
of the work. It was therefore clearly meant as one text. And because of the content and the style of the 
second part, and because no copies of the text were found in west African libraries, it may be assumed 
that the treatise as a whole was specifically addressed to an audience of learned jurists in the Middle 
East, and perhaps was even produced there.  
 
                                                     
500 Vansina 1985, 134. 
501 D. Sperber, Le savoir des anthropologues. Paris: Hermann, 1982, 78. 
502 Paden 76, ff 4 and 6. Herskovits Library. 
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Al-Wālī’s ambition to be heard among those scholars is clearest in Valid proofs. Comparison with 
another essay against smoking that resembles the first section of the latter in some respects, indicates 
the adaptations that were made. This other essay is preserved in a manuscript (Falke 1850) that comes 
from the same region and is entitled Letter of enlightenment and advice to the brothers concerning the 
prohibition on smoking and on using tobacco as it has appeared in these times (‘Risālat al-anwār wa-
naṣīḥa li l-ikhwān fī l-nahī ʿan shurb al-dukhān wa-istiʿmāl tibgh alladhī ḥadatha shānha fī hādhā al-
zamān’). It bears no date, but it gives the names of al-Ajhūrī (‘the only faqīh who did not speak out 
against tobacco’), al-Laqānī (who is quoted with approval) and many other, mostly older, authors. The 
latest scholar who is mentioned is al-Kharāshī (a commentator on Khalīl b. Isḥāq’s Mukhtaṣar, who is 
also mentioned in Valid proofs), who died in 1689.503 There is therefore reason to believe that the text 
was written at about the same time as Valid proofs. The Barnāwī (Bornu) handwriting is large, and the 
paper measures 16 x 22 cm (see picture, annex IV).  
 
The manuscript gives the impression that it is a draft: it has many spelling mistakes, several of which 
have been corrected by the same hand, but with a thinner pen. (This hand was hesitant about the layout 
of the text: sometimes a nūn at the end of a word that did not fit on the line and had been written on 
the next line, was added again to the word to which it belonged, in the margin.) 
 
The resemblance to Valid proofs lies in the content and the organisation of the text, not in the style. 
First, whereas the first part of Valid proofs is tightly organised in a grid of ten proofs, The letter of 
enlightenment is composed in five different chapters. Such a tight organisation was rare among other 
writers on the subject anywhere, and it certainly distinguishes The letter of enlightenment from the 
nineteenth century anti-smoking texts from the region that we have seen. The first chapter gives the 
names of ʿulamā’ who prohibited smoking, the second presents legal arguments, the third is about 
ḥadīths that support the condemnation of smoking, the fourth consists of ‘questions and answers’, and 
the fifth offers advice that will make people stop smoking. Unfortunately, this advice is lost: part of 
the text, from the third chapter (folio 8v) to the end, is missing.  
 
The author of The letter of enlightenment also travelled to the Middle East, as he notes in his first 
chapter:  
 
I have travelled to Miṣr and travelled the blessed lands from Bulāq to Jirja, al-Wākh504 and 
Nala and to the sea and its shores and boundaries, in the land of Yemen, Mekka and Medina, 
and I never stopped asking about tobacco. I met pilgrims from Miṣr, Shām, Yaman, the 
Maghrib, Baghdād and Baṣra. I went round and inquired what they thought of tinbāk. I have 
not seen anyone among the fuqahā’ who allowed it, except imam ʿAli al-Ajhūrī. 
 
Like al-Wālī, this author especially intends to counter the influential opinion of al-Ajhūrī. Many of his 
arguments are the same as those in Valid proofs, namely that smoking is disgusting, harmful, 
distracting and ‘unmanly’. Letter of enlightenment is more outspoken about tobacco’s being an 
intoxicant, and adds that it leads to social unrest (fitna).  
Again like al-Wālī, the author of Letter of enlightenment is concerned with two things he sees as 
interrelated: social order and the use of the intellect. Smoking, he writes, is a sign of jāhilliya (f 2r, 
4v): it harms the intellect and therefore threatens the order of Muslim society. Chapter 2 gives 
‘irrefutable proof from the famous books of law’, each of which contains ‘proof like the shining sun’ 
that ‘there is no path there [where smoking is condoned] except for the ignorant. There is no 
contesting the evidence of their justness.’ It is because of malfunctioning intellects that the order of 
Muslim society is perturbed (see the citation in 5.4). Very cunningly, the devil therefore targets 
precisely the intellect. It is in this chapter on law—but without reference to a source—that we find the 
explanation that  
 
                                                     
503 GAL II, 318. Bivar and Hiskett 1962, 145. 
504 Cf A.I. al-Ghabbān, Les deux routes syrienne et égyptienne de pèlerinage au nord-ouest de l’Arabie Saoudite. 
Cairo: Institut Français d’Archéologie Orientale, 2011. 
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when tobacco came into being, it grew from the urine of Iblīs, may God curse him, and it 
appears of his [the devil’s] nature and his domain.505 The cursed one presented it in an 
attractive form to people who desired it, so the smell would go to their brain and cloud their 
minds and cut their minds off from what the intellect requires. Because everything that has a 
bad, forbidden smell is from the domain of Iblīs. Desiring it harms the intellect like poison. 
Everything that has a good smell increases the intellect. (f 7v)  
 
Finally, it is remarkable that the treatise opens with al-Wālī’s poem ʿAwṣikum yā’ maʿshar al-ikhwān. 
The fact that it fills the recto side of the first folio, on whose verso side the text against smoking 
begins, means that the poem was intended by the writer (a copyist or the author?) to serve here as an 
introduction to the prose that follows. Could it be that this text was written by al-Wālī himself, literally 
as an essay for his later treatise? That would mean that he had at first tried to argue that tobacco was 
intoxicating, but that he had abandoned this particular argument when he understood its weakness in a 
legal context, because the intoxicating nature was difficult to prove, while he elaborated other 
arguments. In any case, the relationship between the authors of both texts is so close that the 
differences are meaningful as well.  
 
These differences can be summarised by saying that Letter of enlightenment is less sophisticated than 
Valid proofs. Although the former gives the names of twenty ‘ulamā’ who were against smoking 
(many of whom were Shāfi‘i), it does not quote as many book titles as the latter. In the second chapter, 
legal arguments are mentioned in a haphazard way and are not developed. As we have seen, The letter 
has many spelling mistakes, and some of these seem to be based on the influence of the local 
pronunciation of Arabic words rather than slips of the pen. For example, rasāhil is written instead of 
rasā’il, tabīhi instead of tabīʿhi and qanāzir instead of khanāzīr, reflecting the absence of guttural 
sounds in the African pronunciation of the language. The letter is also less sophisticated when it talks 
rather extensively of Zaqūm, the forbidden tree in the Qur’ān, only to conclude that the tobacco plant 
is not the same; not the smartest way of structuring an argument. Describing sputum running from 
smokers’ noses (f 8r) would also have been considered less civilised by sophisticated ‘ulamā’ than just 
saying, as Valid proofs does, that smoking is disgusting. 
 
Then there are a number of terms for which Letter of enlightenment uses synonyms that are correct but 
different from those in Valid proofs. In the first place, it uses the words dukhān (smoke) and tinbāk  
(tobacco) only once— dukhān in the title, and tinbāk when the author says that on his travels in the 
Middle East he has asked ‘ulamā’ about it. In the rest of the text he speaks of tibgh or ṭāba, the word 
that is also most common in other manuscripts from the region. Valid proofs employs tinbāk. For 
‘amusement’ The letter takes ʿabath instead of laʿab; for ‘clouding the mind’ it uses tasarruf al-ʿaql 
and ghashī al-ʿaql instead of ghayyib al-ʿaql. And it uses mamnū‘ instead of ḥarām. Apparently these 
synonyms were common in the local discourse on tobacco. But they are not the words that are 
employed by Middle Eastern authors, from al-Nāfiʿ to al-Nābulūsī. They use the words of Valid 
proofs—or rather, al-Wālī has chosen in Valid proofs to use terms that correspond with the 
conventions of discussions on tobacco that were taking place in the Middle East, while The letter of 
enlightenment is close to the discourse of ordinary people.  
 
The point of this comparison is that it highlights the fact that, while they share a cultural background 
and an approach to smoking that sees it as a threat to the order of Muslim society, Valid proofs is 
situated at a cosmopolitan level, different from and more learned than the discourse reflected in the 
Letter of enlightenment. The author of the former, Muḥammad al-Wālī, seems to have made a 
conscious effort to adapt his style and argumentation to the standards of the heartlands of Islamic 
learning. 
 
It is difficult to determine whether al-Wālī’s ambitions and talents brought him the status and the 
audience he sought in Cairo and other places in the Middle East. As mentioned, only one copy of the 
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 126
Valid proofs is extant, and no references to it are known.506 When, a decade or two later, the Bornu 
scholar al-Hajrami wrote that smoking was dubious according to al-Sanhūrī, al-Laqānī and al-
Kharāshī, he did not mention al-Wālī—whose opinion, although appreciated by ordinary people, 
diverged from that of most Mālikī jurists. Ironically, it was al-Hajrami’s single remark that was taken 
up in the nineteenth century by the Egyptian Muṣṭafā al-Būlāqī (d. 1847), an opponent of tobacco, 





In seventeenth- and eighteenth-century Bornu and Baghirmi, the spread of Islam led to new 
demarcations between populations. At the same time, Islam provided the narratives that helped to 
define new loyalties. From a combination of extant manuscripts with ḥadīths or folktales about the 
origin of tobacco, and references to these tales by al-Wālī, al-Ajhūrī and al-Fakkūn, we can deduce 
what role smoking played in this process. Confronted with the arrival of the new foreign commodity 
of tobacco, in a time allegiances were being redrawn, rural people in central Sudanic Africa used these 
narratives to help them construct their identities as Muslims.  
 
The core of this chapter is about the exchange between popular and ‘high’ culture. Al-Wālī was deeply 
familiar with opinions about tobacco that represented the cultural views of Muslim society in his home 
environment. The absoluteness of these views, which literally demonised tobacco, inspired him with 
the courage and the sense of duty to proclaim among his peers in the Middle East a point of view that 
was by then long obsolete to them. The ḥadīths about tobacco provided the fundamental inspiration for 
al-Wālī’s endeavour to write a conclusive argument against smoking, intended to refute even the 
opinion of one of the most prominent leaders of his own madhhab. 
 
This analysis of the role played by narratives in Bornu and Baghirmi on the origin of tobacco does not 
explain why tobacco and smoking did fit in Islam as it was understood in neighbouring regions, at 
least in a slightly later period. In the beginning of the nineteenth century, ‘Abdallāh dan Fodio, the 
most learned theologist of the Sokoto jihād, wrote a chapter on tobacco in which he listed the health 
benefits of smoking or chewing it. In the same period Aḥmad Bābā’s Al-lam‘ fī l-ishāra li ḥukm tibgh, 
in which he had explained that smoking (not chewing) tobacco was allowed as long as it did not harm 
the mind, was copied in Sokoto. One wonders whether, here too, distinction may have been the aim, 
this time not social distinction, but political: Dan Fodio entitled his chapter on tobacco ‘Teasing’ 
(tankīt) and that must have been addressed to the opponents of tobacco, many of whom lived in Bornu, 
the state that stubbornly withstood the power of Sokoto.508  
 
Among ordinary believers, the ambivalence towards tobacco remained, in the Sokoto sultanate too.  
The attitude towards the herb of those among them who identified with Qadiriyya sufism (to which the 
Sokoto leaders as well as Aḥmad Bābā adhered) began to change in the nineteenth century, but 
Heinrich Barth still saw tobacco being cultivated mainly in pagan territories, and was surprised to find 
a field of tobacco in the neighbourhood of Muslim Katsina.509 Later, when the Tidjaniyya ṭarīqa 
rapidly gained popularity, while Qadiriyya sufism became more organised, tobacco once more became 
the object of passionate disputes between the adherents of both. The Qadiriyya then agreed that all 
plants of God’s creation, including tobacco, are lawful to man (referring to Q 2:29), while the 
Tidjaniyya fulminated that tobacco was demonic, disgusting and a source of doubt (Falke 1040, Falke 
1101). In the 1950s and 1960s, the controversy led to serious conflicts between adherents of the 
                                                     
506 The Leiden University Library bought the manuscript in 1949 from an auction of manuscripts collected by 
the orientalist P. Herzsohn, and catalogued it as Or. 8362. See Annex I. 
507 Bivar and Hiskett 1962, 132, 133. For al-Bulāqī see GAL S II, 705. 
508 I thank dr. M. Last for drawing my attention to this chapter in Ḍiyā’ al-siyāsāt wa-fatāwī l-nawāzil mimmā 
huwa fī furūʿ al-dīn min al-masā’il. Cairo: Al-zahrā’ li l-i‘lām al-‘arabī, 1988. 
509 Barth 1857 III, 90. Cf. Low 1972, 64. 
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rivalling ṭuruq in the northern Nigerian city of Gusau, conflicts that were referred to as the ‘tobacco 
crisis’.510  
 
Al-Wālī’s attitude regarding the use of tobacco was inspired from two directions, even in a literal 
sense: from his home environment and from ideas that lived in the centres of the Ottoman Empire. As 
for the latter, he aligned himself with the objections of scholars in the traditional centres of Muslim 
learning, such as al-Laqānī, and with the outright rejection of tobacco among reformists such as Ibn 
Nāfiʿ and al-Aqḥiṣārī, both of whom were Ḥanafis. There are indications that al-Wālī had read the 
latter’s Epistle. Al-Laqānī’s remark that a number of honourable and virtuous Ḥanafīs had followed 
the (Mālikī) shaykh al-Sanhūrī when he had given a fatwa in which he ‘proclaimed tobacco 
unlawful’511 may have been an incitement for al-Wālī to study Ḥanafī views in particular, in order to 
find support for his personal views. Another attraction of the Ḥanafī school was perhaps the authority 
it derived from its association with the Ottoman centre of power. Whatever it was that sparked al-
Wālī’s interest, his attention to Ḥanafi scholars deserves consideration, because of a suggestion by J. 
R. Willis regarding the contacts of ‘ulamā’ in Bornu with Ḥanafis in the Ottoman centres. Willis 
proposed that, in the nineteenth century, these contacts may have been of more substance and 
consequence than historians had been able to demonstrate up to then, and that they can explain the 
conflicts between the Fulani founders of the Sokoto caliphate, with their long tradition of Maghribī 
Mālikī reformism, and Bornu under shaykh Muḥammad al-Kānemī (d.1837), who defended its 
inhabitants against Sokoto’s puritanism.’512 Political rivalry and differences in religious orientation 
would have reinforced each other. Al-Kānemī was certainly ‘in the Turkish sphere of influence’. 
When he drew up a treaty with the British, he did so ‘according to the stipulations of the Ḥanafī 
religion’.513 Other indications of such relations, from this or earlier periods, have been scarce.514 The 
more-than-fortuitous correspondences between al-Wālī’s views and writings on tobacco and those of 
Ḥanafī scholars may serve as an indication of the interest that scholars in Bornu had in their Ḥanafī 
colleagues abroad as early as the seventeenth century.  
 
It is likely that, during his two pilgrimages, more-direct and more-personal contacts with revivalists in 
the Middle East also influenced al-Wālī. His studies with al-Bābilī would likely have increased his 
interest in the independent and thorough study of the traditions of the Prophet. To support the legal 
argument against tobacco, he proposes a number of ḥadīths and some Quranic verses in Valid proofs 
that I have not found in other older texts on the subject. It shows the importance he attached to ijtihād, 
to find sources in scripture for the definition of a legal rule concerning the new legal and social 
problems that smoking presented. The issue of smoking was a framework in which revivalist ideas 
from scholars from various schools of law in the Middle East were transmitted to Bornu and 
surroundings. What al-Wālī’s contribution to the tobacco debate illustrates quite clearly is that the 
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Chapters 5 and 6 have presented a close reading of al-Wālī’s major texts, highlighting the exchange 
we find in them between popular culture and Muslim learning, between local concerns and theological 
discussions in the Middle East, and between a regional tradition and books that belonged to the canon 
of global Islamic culture. 
 
This chapter returns to the writer himself. It sets out to understand the character of his personal 
contribution to these texts and to scholarship in central sudanic Africa. Muḥammad al-Wālī has 
reached these pages because he was an author. But to what extent was he an original, individual 
author? Does he deserve the title ‘author’ in the first place? His near-contemporaries respected him   
especially for a translation from Fulfulde into Arabic. Why did he create that translation? Was it to 
disassociate the text from its original, from the oral kabbe? The question leads to the awareness that al-
Wālī lived and worked on an intersection between orality and literacy.  
 
 
1. Author and authority 
 
It is striking that almost nothing in al-Wālī’s entire oeuvre seems to show any great originality. Rather, 
this oeuvre consists mainly of commentaries, compilations, and versifications. The peerless method, 
the most widely read of his larger texts, is a commentary, as are Muʿīn al-ṭālib wa-mufīd al-rāghib, a 
commentary in the field of grammar, and the second part of Valid proofs, the treatise against smoking, 
which uses more of al-Laqānī’s (and al-Aqḥiṣārī’s) formulations than it explicitly acknowledges. 
Other works include versifications of the Ṣughra or of The peerless method. The poem about the 
creation of the world is presented as a versification ‘relying on’ a text by a certain Muḥammad b. 
Yūsuf.515 Moreover, The peerless method is even presented, not as al-Wālī’s own commentary but as 
his translation of existing comments. Of the preserved works, it seems that only the first part of Valid 
proofs and the short poem ʿAwṣikum yā maʿshar al-ikhwān were conceived primarily by al-Wālī 
himself. How could such as derivative collection of works win him the reputation of an important 
author, whose work was then frequently and carefully reproduced and preserved? For answers to these 
questions, we will start by turning our attention to the field of comparative literature, where the 
question of what makes an author has been discussed in a general way.  
                                                     
515 Verse 9: ‘I rely on the words of Muḥammad Ibn Yūsuf’, i.e. al-Sanūsī? 
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In 1968 Roland Barthes declared that the author, thought of as single source of meaning, was dead—
whereupon Michel Foucault asked, in an essay whose brevity was matched by its influence, ‘What is 
an author’?516 One of the first elements of his answer was that the author is not the same as the writer, 
and that it is more apt to speak of an author function. The point is most clearly captured in the 
following passage: 
 
 Everyone knows that, in a novel narrated in the first person, neither the first-person pronoun nor the 
present indicative refers exactly either to the writer or to the moment in which he writes, but rather to an 
alter ego whose distance from the author varies, often changing in the course of the work. It would be 
just as wrong to equate the author with the real writer as to equate him with the fictitious speaker; the 
author function is carried out and operates in the scission itself, in this division and this distance. 
 One might object that this is a characteristic peculiar to novelistic or poetic discourse [...]. In fact, 
however, all discourses endowed with the author function517 do possess this plurality of self. The self 
that speaks in the preface to a treatise [...] and that indicates the circumstances of the treatise’s 
composition, is identical neither in its position nor in its functioning to the self that speaks in the course 
of a demonstration, and that appears in the form of “I conclude” or “I suppose”. In the first case, the “I” 
refers to an individual without an equivalent [...]; in the second, the “I” indicates an instance and a level 
of demonstration which any individual could perform, provided that he accepted the same system of 
symbols, play of axioms, and set of previous demonstrations.518   
 
The author function operates in between these selves. The one who signs a text is not the only one who 
gives meaning to it. The signatory shares this function, for instance, with context, tradition, sometimes 
a patron, and always the reader. Someone is considered an author because the audience acknowledges 
the author function in work. The author function is then identified by the name of this individual 
author.  
 
Many literary critics have agreed with Foucault’s analysis. Nevertheless, his views have especially 
inspired further research—primarily with western literatures, and hardly at all in Arabic studies—to 
move in a direction that is fundamentally different from his own. Foucault’s ultimate aim was to 
investigate ‘how, under what conditions, and in what forms something like a subject appears in the 
order of discourse? [...] In short [the investigation] is a matter of depriving the subject of its role as 
originator and of analyzing the subject as a variable and complex function of discourse.’519 Foucault’s 
concepts, however, are often used—as they are here—to explore the authorship of individual writers 
and notably the relationship between the authority of texts and that of authors in different periods and 
cultural environments. Questions include: Who deserves the title ‘author’? Must he or she be 
‘original’, or can one borrow, copy, compile, scribble notes in margins and yet be an auctor, that is a 
creator and an authority? What is the relationship between the author’s intentions and the meaning of 
the text he or she wrote down, or the significance attributed to it by others? And what contributes to, 
and what establishes, the author’s authority?520 
 
As I have noted, the scholars of classical Islam set greater store by authenticated tradition than by 
originality, and this was also true of literary production in a wider sense. An important part of literary 
                                                     
516 R. Barthes, ‘The death of the author.’ In R. Barthes, Image-music-text. Glasgow: Fontana/Collins, 1977.  M. 
Foucault, ‘What is an author?’ In The Foucault reader. An introduction to Foucault’s thought. Ed. P. Rabinow. 
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517 Not all texts have the author function, notes Foucault. Most private letters e.g. have a signer, not an author; a 
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518 Foucault 1984, 112. 
519 Foucault 1984, 118. 
520 For overviews of the ongoing discussion see M. Zimmermann, ‘Ouverture du Colloque.’ In M. 
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authority521 was based on the role accorded to tradition. Even the (supposedly) pre-Islamic poet 
‘Antara, regarded in Arabic culture as one of the fundaments of literary expression, referred to what 
the ancient  poets before him had said, in the very first line of his poem (ھل غادر الشعراء من مترد , have 
the poets left anything [unsaid]?) ‘Antara is aware, writes A. Kilito in an exceptional essay about the 
relationship between the author and his authority in Arabic literature, that ‘[i]l ne sert à rien de 
composer des vers qui ne feraient que répéter d’autres vers. Mais que seraient des vers qui se 
désolidariseraient et se dissocieraient des vers anciens?’522 In fact, respect for tradition was so strong 
that it would be hard to identify authors by their individual style, because they did not aim to have 
one.523 It was usually the genre that set the rules for the style of a text. At the same time, convention 
dictated that a name be attached to a text, especially a scholarly one. But it was not uncommonor for 
the producer of a text to bring it out under the name of a distinguished dead colleague, or ascribe it to 
an anonymous ‘ancient’ author. 524 Both options were chosen by one of the greatest authors of the 
classical period, al-Jāḥiẓ, when he wished to be spared the jealousy of the intellectuals of his own 
generation.525 The past itself conferred authority on those texts, and much more so than the name of 
any author. It was by borrowing and quoting from predecessors, and showing that one could occupy a 
place in a venerated tradition, that an author could build up his authoritativeness. 
 
Also, in the Islamic tradition, with its strong roots in the oral transmission of hadīth and poetry, the 
idea of transmission was linked to the possibility that the transmitter would improving the material by 
correcting elements and adding others. Thus, written texts were often collective works, in which the 
roles of copyists, editors, commentators and authors were virtually indistinguishable.526 It was 
common practice that someone published a work which consisted to a large extent of text that he had 
not composed himself, but to which he had made his own contributions. Ideas about plagiarism or 
forgery were very different from modern ideas on the subject, at least as long as an author did not put 
his name under the text of one of his own contempories (as al-Maqrīzī, for instance, was accused of 
doing). These cultural values explain why, in classical Arabic culture, which provided the model for 
al-Wālī’s writing, the authority of comments or even glosses was not fundamentally different from the 
authority of an ‘original’ text. 
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work worthy of imitation or implementation. Cf A.J. Minnis, Medieval theory of authorship. Scholastic literary 
attitudes in the later Middle Ages. London: Scholar Press, 1984. Chapter 1.   
522 A. Kilito, L’auteur et ses doubles. Essai sur la culture arabe classique. Paris: Editions du Seuil, 1985. 19. 
523 F. Rosenthal, The technique and approach of Muslim scholarship. Rome: Pontificium Institutum Biblicum, 
1947, 48 ff; See also R. Allen, An Introduction to Arabic Literature. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2005 (4th ed), 135.  
524 Kilito 1985, 72-80. 
525 Al-Ğāḥiẓ, Quatre essais. Traduction française par Charles Vial. Caire: Institut Français d’Archéologie 
Orientale du Caire. 1976-1979. I, 159-162. To a certain extent, Arabic culture shared this respect for the 
authority of past littérateurs with European medieval culture. Michel Zimmermann, summarizing views from 
contributors to the book Auctor & auctoritas, wrote that the desire of the European medieval author was to 
participate ‘à l’oeuvre de création continue qui est la destinée de l’homme; d’où le souci de se soumettre aux 
modèles et précedents qui donnent autorité au discours. Le poids des auctoritates est déterminant; l’auteur 
s’efface derrière l’auctoritas.’525 It sounds idealistic compared to the words of one who sometimes made the 
choice of giving up his voice altogether, that is of Adélard of Bath. His considerations were similar to those of 
his contemporary al-Jāḥiẓ, but he was more conscise when he wrote, in J. le Goff’s translation:  
Notre génération a ce défaut ancré qu’elle refuse d’admettre tout ce qui semble venir des modernes. 
Aussi quand je trouve une idée personelle si je veux la publier je l’attribue à quelqu’un d’autre et je 
déclare: ‘C’est un tel qui l’a dit, ce n’est pas moi.’ Et pour qu’on me croie complètement, de toutes mes 
opinions je dis: ‘C’est un tel l’inventeur, ce n’est pas moi.’ Pour éviter l’inconvenient qu’on pense que 
j’ai, moi, ignorant, tiré de mon propre fond mes idées, je fais en sorte qu’on les croie tirées de mes 
études arabes. Je ne veux pas que si ce que j’ai dit a déplu à des esprits attardés ce soit moi qui leur 
déplaise. Je sais quel est auprès du vulgaire le sort des savants authentiques. Aussi ce n’est pas mon 
procès que je plaide, mais celui des Arabes. (J. le Goff, Les Intellectuels au Moyen Age. Paris: Editions 
du Seuil. 1985, 60.) 
526 See G. Schoeler 2006, 65-72. 
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In al-Wālī’s case, however, we need to understand not only why an oeuvre consisting mainly of 
commentaries and versifications gave him any authority in the first place, but also how he was able to 
build up so much of it. Let us return for a moment to Foucault. He identified a specific kind of author, 
whom he called founders of discursivity. ‘They are unique in that they are not just the authors of their 
own works. They have produced something else: the possibilities and the rules for the formation of 
other texts.’527 Foucault gives Marx and Freud as examples. They were not only the authors of famous 
books—they also established further discursive possibilities, both in their own and numerous other 
fields.  
 
These remarks are not meant as a first step to try to raise al-Wālī to the level of a Marx or a Freud. It is 
simply that the concept of discursivity gives us a tool with which to understand his success. One of the 
theorists who adopted it was Edward Saïd, although in a way his approach is also the opposite of 
Foucault’s. In Beginnings, Saïd asks, not about the author as a function of discourse, but about how 
and where one can identify the beginnings of a historical movement or a realm of thought. By contrast 
with Foucault, he looks for agents. To identify a beginning is to identify an actor with outstanding 
authority, and to find out how this authority was created. Authority, for Saïd, lies in a unique and 
‘original achievement that gains in worth, paradoxically, precisely because it is so often repeated 
thereafter.’528 Repeated, that is, by others; this is where he adopts Foucault’s term, discursivity. This 
new achievement, however, must be connected to tradition, to established authority. Continuity and 
conformity with tradition constitute one part of the authority of an author. Discontinuity (giving the 
tradition a new twist) distinguishes a great author from others who worked in that tradition, and makes 
for the second part of his authority. The third part, the proof of the pudding, lies in discursivity, in the 
possibilities that others find in an author’s work to elaborate on it and to transpose it to other realms of 
communication, outside literary or scientific discourse. Al-Wālī did these three things, and all of them 
in The peerless method. Let us turn to him again, beginning with a look at his authority and his 
authorship. 
 
Al-Wālī vested his authority in the first place in God. As had been the convention in Islamic writing 
since the beginning, all his works open with the basmallah and salutations addressed to the Prophet, 
his family and companions. In Mu‘īn al-ṭālib he adds soon after that: ‘I have written this purely for 
God. May anyone who comes across it with a peaceful heart benefit from it. Success is with God; to 
Him I turn.’529 Similar remarks are made in other texts, and this of course is in keeping with the 
convention among writers, especially on religious matters, in the pre-modern Muslim world.  
 
In none of the works that have been preserved does al-Wālī mention a patron or a destinataire. But 
that does not mean that he had no links to power at all. Although he lived far from Birni Gazargamu, it 
may be assumed that he received some ‘presents’ from its royal court and, of course, from the sultan 
of Baghirmi, whose predecessor had also given the community of which al-Wālī was a religious leader 
its land, in return for religious support for his political authority. But these resources were most 
probably not enough to sustain a living on the one hand, or, on the other, to dictate what al-Wālī 
wrote. It seems that in writing his work he was quite independent from patrons. Rather than his work’s 
deriving its authority from them, it was the other way round: it bestowed authority on them. 
   
Al-Wālī sought to derive authority from the classical tradition in which he placed his own work, and 
writing commentary was perhaps the best way to do this. It has been suggested that, in Islamic 
scholarship and literary culture, writing a commentary, whether on grammar, theology, law or another 
science, entailed claiming status and authority within a particular field. In the absence of rites of 
passage or rules establishing the status of scholars (considering that an ijāza did nothing more than 
bestow authority to transfer knowledge of a particular book), writing a commentary may have had the 
function of passing a public examination, thus giving proof of one’s capacity to understand, interpret 
                                                     
527 Foucault 1984, 114. 
528 E.W. Said, Beginnings. Intention and Method. London: Granta Books, 1997. (Second ed. First ed. 1995), 
32. 
529 Kaduna N/AR2/47, first page of copy after basmallah (p 2), line 14. 
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and discuss a work of repute. The ideal acknowledgement of this claim was someone else’s 
commentary on the commentary.530  
 
As a genre, commentary writing in Arabic has not been widely studied. As I have mentioned, western 
scholarship long regarded its thriving as a sign of cultural stagnation and intellectual decline. 
Challenging that notion, R. Wisnowsky argues that commentaries were in fact a motor of intellectual 
innovation starting in the ninth century, and he reckons that, from 1100 to 1900, roughly half of the 
philosophical activity in Islamic intellectual history was expressed in some form of exegetical work.531 
The Arabic term for commentary, sharḥ, is fluid. There were no rules that determined how 
commentaries should be written, and the art was never taught in formal institutions. 532 Commentaries 
may rearrange the text that they are responding to, and select from or add to it, and the results may 
range from simplifications of the original text (although a commentary is distinct from an 
abridgement, mukhtaṣar) to fundamentally new texts, with a new character, new content, and new 
goals. In all cases the commentary was accepted as entirely the product of its composer.533  
 
Trying to distinguish, then, between al-Wālī’s personal voice and those of the earlier authors of a text 
that carries his name—in this case we will focus again on The peerless method—is a modern concern, 
pace Foucault, and was not a concern for al-Wālī’s contemporaries. It is relevant here because we 
wish to understand how al-Wālī positioned himself as a scholar in his environment, and because a 
possible distinction between his and others’ voices will affect our evaluation of this particular text and 
its significance. Al-Wālī the individual, living in a particular period, allows us to verify when and in 
what context the meanings in his work have crystallised. So we will try to determine how much of The 
peerless method he actually formulated. The first element of the answer is simple: al-Wālī wrote an 
Arabic version of a text or pieces of text and ideas that existed in Fulfulde. To paraphrase 
Zimmermann, writing in a language that one does not speak creates in itself a ‘way of writing’, an 
écriture.534 Moreover, transferring a text from one language to another is itself a statement about the 
value one wishes to attribute to it in a new environment. As such, the mere act of translating in the first 
place can be a sort of commentary, meant to influence opinions.  
 
Then things become a bit more complex. Since the precursors of The peerless method were oral  
texts, we cannot hope to know just what was translated: was it only the idea of commenting on the 
Ṣughra, or a type of text with certain features, or complete sentences? In any case, while he was 
writing, translating and committing an oral text to paper, al-Wālī himself made many choices 
regarding the text. At the same time, parts of The peerless method so much resemble explanations 
from other texts by al-Sanūsī, that it seems unlikely that they were not taken directly from the original 
Arabic source, without the ‘interference’ of Fulfulde, by the author of the Arabic Peerless method 
himself. Although the Fulani used a peculiar word-by-word method to translate canonical texts 535, 
translation from Arabic to Fulfulde and back again would certainly have led to much more variation in 
those paragraphs.  
                                                     
530 This idea was elaborated by L. Conrad in ‘Commentary Culture and the shaping of Academic Culture in 
Medieval Islam.’ Lecture during the conference Beyond Hadith: Writing the Tradition of Early Islam, in memory 
of Gautier Juynboll and organised by Leiden University Centre for Islam Studies (LUCIS), dec 2011. 
531 Wisnowsky 2004, 149-191. 
532 D. Gutas notes that in Ibn al-Nadīm’s Kitāb al-Fihrist, sharḥ is considered as a form of tafsīr (explanation), 
next to ta`līq (annotation) and that Ibn Rushd made the distinction between al-sharḥ `alā’l-lafẓ (ad litteram) and 
al-sharḥ ‘alā l-ma‘nā (ad sensum). In this classification The peerless method would count as a commentary ad 
litteram. D. Gutas 1993, 33.  
533 Sometimes authors wrote a commentary to their own text or poem, especially when the first text made liberal 
use of the most uncommon phrases, to prove the erudition of the author. It was a popular habit in west-Africa. 
Al-Sanūsī also wrote a comment to his own Ṣughra. 
534 ‘[...] la période est parcourue par deux mouvements de sens contraire qui ne manquent pas d’avoir des 
incidences sur l’expression: dans un premier temps, écrire une langue qu’on ne parle pas; dans un second, se 
risquer à écrire la langue qu’on parle. Dans les deux cas, il s’agit bien d’inventer une écriture.’ 2001, 11. 
535 P. Eguchi, Notes on the Arabic-Fulfulde translational reading in northern Cameroun. Kyoto: Kyoto 
University African Studies, 9 (1975), 177-250. 
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And there is more. As we saw in chapter 5, commentaries on the Ṣughra began to be composed soon 
after this work appeared, very early in the sixteenth century, and the roots of the Fulfulde text that al-
Wālī translated may indeed go back that far. Some elements in The peerless method, however, were 
definitely added well after 1600. There are no physical elements in the manuscripts that indicate this. 
Each of the versions I have seen is written entirely in one hand, without marginal notes. In the text, 
however, a reference to tobacco (‘the venerable and righteous scholar is he who does not commit 
corruption, adultery, theft, slander and defamation, or tobacco-smoking’ 536), is certainly from after 
1600. The same is true of references to al-Laqānī (d. 1631) and the historian and poet al-Maqqārī (d. 
1631). At a number of points, sentences in The peerless method are followed by ‘here ends what I 
have added’. This ‘I’ who added bits of text is an individual writer ‘without equivalent’ in Foucault’s 
terms. What we would like to know is whether ‘I’ is al-Wālī or another contributor to the text, whose 
words al-Wālī translates, because the additions tell us something about the character of this ‘I’. The 
nature of the insertions is sometimes legal (description of the mukallaf in legal terms, f16) and, more 
often, logical (explanation of the relation between substantive and ideal attributes, f23; explanation of 
the impossible attributes of God in logical steps, f 32; explanation of the attributes of prophets and the 
faults that would contradict these attributes, f 39, 40). Most often the additions are anecdotes or quotes 
that expand on information for the reader and indicate the erudition of the author. The first addition, in 
the preface, is the statement that an anecdote about al-Sanūsī also occurred in the life of Abū Zaid al-
Qurṭubī. Then, showing his familiarity with various scholarly sources, ‘I’ adds: ‘And I say that this 
commentator remains silent about things that other comments mention and that indicate his holiness’. 
The next addition is an anecdote (about how al-Sanūsī turns into a stone to avoid meeting a sultan) for 
which the source is not given, but which probably comes from the North African al-Abbadī. In the 
second half of the text, many quotes are added from verses by al-Maqqārī, and two phrases (about the 
attributes of the messengers of God) of which ‘I’ says that he took them from what al-Maqqārī wrote.  
 
Who is the person who added these learned references? In theory, ‘I’ could have been anyone. Even 
copyists could add to a text they had at hand, although it was not considered best practice in their 
profession.537 But these marked additions in The peerless method are the same in all four versions, 
which means that they were not made by different copyists. They may have been made by a single 
early copyist, a possibility which cannot be ruled out. However, if the author of the additions was 
another contributor to the text or a copyist, and not al-Wālī, it was nevertheless someone who was 
contemporary to him, and who shared his passions for study and against smoking. Ockham’s razor 
suggests that it was al-Wālī himself. He was demonstrating his capacity to read the auctores of Islam, 
as a means to reinforce his own authority. Other strategies he employed in his oeuvre as a whole 
include the demonstration of his capacity to engage with authoritative works by means of 
commentary, of his mastery of various branches of the Islamic sciences and his choice of al-Ajhūrī – a 
scholar of the highest status – as an adversary. 
 
As mentioned in chapter 5, by contrast with commentaries on the Ṣughra by al-Laqānī or by al-Sanūsī 
himself, The peerless method did not discuss abstract concepts such as kasb, causality or 
predestination. On the other hand, it did refer to prominent authors and theological discussions in the 
heartlands of Islam, for instance on the question of whether existence is a divine attribute or the 
essence of God; or the question of whether God punishes ‘at will’ or according to a law; or the 
question whether the shahāda is part of the Muslim faith or a condition of being a believer. Two 
approaches are at play in The peerless method: one of bringing a theological text to ordinary people, 
the other of integrating the commentary back to into scholarly discourse. While the first was the 
approach taken by the oral Fulfulde commentaries, the latter seems to have been al-Wālī’s. 
 
                                                     
536 Hunwick 178, 9. 
537 Rosenthal 1947, 22. Cf. P. Burke and R. Po-Chia Hsia (eds.), ‘Cultures of translation in early modern 
Europe.’ In Cultural Translation in Early Modern Europe. Cambridge, New York: Cambridge University Press, 
2007, 31, 34. 
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The question remains whether The peerless method’s most outstanding element, that is its discussion 
of the ‘imitator’ and the idea that faith and adherence to the norms of a group of convinced Muslims 
can be tested with the help of a series of simple questions, was incorporated into it by al-Wālī himself 
or had already been part of the Fulfulde commentary. It would be difficult to answer. The notion that a 
lack of knowledge of the philosophical approach to tawḥīd amounted to unbelief also occurred in the 
western Sahara, among an unidentified group of ‘ulamā’ in Sijilmasa, in a period—when al-Yūsī (d. 
1691) was alive—that does not predate al-Wālī’s.538 We do not know to what extent the notion had 
developed before that. What we can say is that it was ‘in the air’ in the second half of the seventeenth 
century, and that it was a concern of certain scholars of al-Wālī’s generation. Although the themes of 
doubt and imitation do not seem to be mentioned in the twentieth-century kabbe versions, and was 
perhaps no part of this oral tradition, the repeated formula adressing the imitator does suggest that it 
arose in some oral environment, before al-Wālī wrote it down. He captured it, and incorporated it into 
a large commentary with a long tradition, which he raised to the level of mainstream scholarship by 
translating it into Arabic. It subsequently spread. By 1800 the testing of knowledge of the Muslim 
religion had developed into a popular practice in central sudanic Africa, as we saw in chapter 5.539 
Another way of saying this is: the idea that one’s degree of faith could be and had to be tested in this 
way had been discursively enabled. In chapter 6 we discussed one reason why the theme of ‘imitation’ 
versus ‘knowing’ became so popular: it was linked to a concern among ordinary believers with the 
instability of their Muslim identity—an instability that threatened to relegate them to the status of 
pagan, black, filthy, and enslavable people. Another reason why the theme was important for al-Wālī 
and other ‘ulamā’ is investigated below.  
 
 
2. Why did al-Wali translate The peerless method? 
 
To raise it to the level of mainstream scholarship – was that what motivated al-Wālī to translate a text 
for the instruction of Islam from Fulfulde into Arabic? To translate (from Latin transferre) means to 
bring something across, from one place to the next. What did al-Wālī cross, and to address whom? For 
centuries, the Fulani had translated the other way around: from Arabic to Fulfulde and other 
languages, the mother tongues of people they aimed to teach and convert. The earliest written religious 
educational poems in Fulfulde date from the eighteenth century, but they had circulated orally long 
before that.540 Although not considered as sacred as Arabic, Fulfulde had the status of a language of 
learning and no objection was felt against its use for religious text. Around 1800 Dan Fodio and his 
co-jihadists wrote much of their work in Fulfulde and also in Hausa, so that their message could reach 
a majority of the people in the Hausalands.  
 
In al-Wālī’s time, the autochthonous inhabitants of Bornu and Baghirmi, whether Muslim or not, 
spoke Kanuri, Barma, Hausa and other local languages. Some Shuwa Arabic may have been spoken in 
the region, because, as we know from the oral history about the foundation of the village of Abgar, 
there were Arabs there in the beginning of the seventeenth century. But they were not there for long. 
In Bornu, west of Lake Chad, Arab tribes did not arrive before the second half of the eighteenth 
century.541 It is not likely that many others spoke their language in the first period of their presence. 
And even then, those who did speak Shuwa Arabic did not speak fuṣḥā’ Arabic, the language of the 
study of Islam. Al-Wālī’s translation must therefore have been intended not so much for the benefit of 
new converts, but on the one hand for a local audience of people who were already rather advanced in 
their studies of Islam, and on the other hand to reach a wider audience of people who did not 
understand Fulfulde, that is for instance of colleagues in the Middle East. Their appreciation of this 
particular commentary would support the status of the Barnawi and Fulani scholars there, and also 
further enhance the status of the text in its original environment.   
                                                     
538 Al-Hajj 1974/77, 7. 
539 What we do not know is whether the questions were put in Arabic, the language of learning about Islam, or in 
Kanuri, Fulfulde or another language of daily oral communication.  
540 Haafkens 1983, 8-11, 25; Hiskett 1975.  
541 J.-C. Zeltner 2002, 7-20. 
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If learned colleagues and advanced students in al-Wālī’s own environment formed the largest audience 
of the translation, the next question is what the Arabic language meant to them. It is a tenet of Islam 
that, in order to obtain a thorough understanding of theology (and religion), one has to be well versed 
in fuṣḥā’ Arabic. Al-Wālī was well aware of this. Other languages are an obstacle to learning about 
religion, a source of innovation and confusion, he said. That was the reason he wrote two texts of 
instruction of various aspects of the Arabic language. In one of them, Tadrīb al-ṭullāb ʿalā ṣināʿat al-
iʿrāb, he writes: ‘[acquiring] the knowledge of inflection (i‘rāb) is a duty of students, an instrument to 
understand preaching and to distinguish bad from good, and a condition for the study of all other 
sciences, notably of tawḥīd, hadith and fiqh.’542 In Muʿīn al-ṭālib he is even sharper: ‘He who is 
ignorant of grammar (naḥū) is scorned among scholars. Verily, all sciences require the science of 
grammar’.543 For those who might still shrug their shoulders, he quotes an anonymous poet who states 
that ‘the student of hadith who does not know grammar and does not master it is like a donkey with a 
nosebag attached to its head without any barley in it.’544 Indeed, the study of grammar, syntax, 
morphology and rhetoric had an elitist aspect. Classical works on these subjects, such as those by al-
Wardī (d. 1290) and Ibn Ᾱjurrūm (d. 1223), on which al-Wālī’s two language books are based, are 
steeped in the idea of distinguishing an intellectual elite, who knew how to speak and write the 
language correctly, from common people. A recurring theme in these works is that of laḥn al-‘āmma, 
the mistakes that are made by ordinary people, which intellectuals should avoid. With his books about 
the Arabic language, al-Wālī was certainly addressing a social elite of well-educated, pious Muslims, 
which he also hoped to reinforce  
 
So The peerless method, in Arabic, was not primarily addressed to run-of-the-mill believers, but rather 
to relatively advanced students of Islam. More precisely, it was addressed to students who envisaged a 
career as preachers and leaders of Muslim communities, and who would recite and explain it to 
ordinary believers. However, this does not answer all the questions regarding the translation. For 
instance, there had been advanced students and future ‘ulamā’ before, even if not as many as there 
were now. If the Arabic language was so important for the study of Islam, then why had the Fulani 
scholars’ commentary not been put into Arabic a century-and-a-half earlier? The moment the Arabic 
version was in fact written falls in the period when Islam was starting to spread outside the cities and 
royal courts to rural populations. Is there a relationship between the two? But why would students 
from a peasant background be more in need of Arabic than more urban Muslims? We can come closer 
to an answer if, instead of asking, ‘Why did al-Wālī translate this text?’, we ask, ‘Why did he write it 
down?’ The fact that he wrote in Arabic is, in a way, of secondary importance. To write, one had to 
write in Arabic. Other languages were not written.545 The fundamental question, then, is why al-Wālī 
transformed an oral ‘textbook’ into a written textbook.  
 
 
3. From orality to literacy 
 
An obvious goal would have been to promote literacy, as the vehicle par excellence of the values and 
norms of the religion of the Book that Islam is. If the ‘ulamā based their authority over people on their 
understanding of the holy texts and the long tradition of scholarship about them, it meant that they 
needed an audience of –partially?- literate believers to recognise and appreciate the significance of that 
understanding.  
 
                                                     
542 Kaduna N/AR2/47. p 2, line 10, 11, 12. 
543 Kaduna D/AR7/4. p 4, line 13. 
544 Idem, p 3, line 19, 20. 
545 Other languages—primarily Hausa—could be written in Arabic script, but the first time this was done, was a 
century later. In Birni Gazargamu Old Kanembu was written, in Arabic script, early in the 17th century and 
perhaps before. However, this language was used exclusively for Qur’ān exegesis. It translated words and 
grammatical structures on a one-to-one basis and did not exist without the source Arabic language. Bondarev, 
2006, 142-153. 
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However, since the 1990’s the groundbreaking work of scholars like G. Schoeler and S. Leder has 
made us realise with more clarity than before how complex the relation is in the Muslim tradition 
between literacy and the transmission of knowledge, between literacy and orality. 546 Schoeler has 
demonstrated that in the formative period of Islam a combination of writing and lecturing 
characterised the model of transmission of knowledge. The publication of literary works was oral. 
Reciting these works (or poetry, or any other genre of adab) was by preference done from memory. 
Written texts functioned as mnemonic aids and for the preservation of texts in order to transmit them 
further, but not in the first place for learning or reading individually. The standard methods of teaching 
consisted of lecturing (from memory) by a teacher while students listened (samā‘) or of students 
reciting (from memory) after which a teacher would correct them (qirā’a). It has remained the model 
of teaching in Islam until today, in many places.547 And we saw in chapter 5 that The peerless method 
was also taught orally. ‘Wake up from your sleep, rouse your brain and understand what I say,’ the 
teacher would instruct his audience, ‘so that the beginning of the speech does not escape you, for he 
who lets the beginning slip and [then] listens to the middle or another part, will not understand a 
thing.’548 There was no question of leafing back, and al-Wālī and subsequent copyists retained the 
warning in the written version. Apparently, the text was not written to substitute its oral teaching.  
 
What else may have motivated al-Wālī? There is the possibility that literacy represented to him an 
attitude towards knowledge that was fundamentally different from that pertaining to the oral culture of 
his wider environment; an attitude which, in that case, he wanted to enhance. The transition from 
primary orality to literacy – from the situation of cultures that are totally unfamiliar with writing to 
that of cultures in which literacy dominates – has been regarded as one of the most sweeping 
transitions in the history of different civilisations, at various moments in time. Shortly after the middle 
of the twentieth century (perhaps not surprisingly in the period when an interest in human 
consciousness pervaded many realms in western societies) social scientists have given much attention 
to the meaning of this transition for cognitive processes and the organisation of knowledge, at a 
philosophical level as well as the social level. Questions regarding such issues were first raised within 
the field of literary studies, and since then they have been discussed throughout the humanities, from 
anthropology to psychology and history.549  
 
Pioneers in the field have proposed that where literacy spread widely among a previously illiterate 
population, it changed the character of consciousness of time and historicity, of subject, object and 
objectiveness and of ‘logic’, and that it did this not only for those who were actually literate, but for 
cultures at large.550 The anthropologist Goody illustrated the latter point with the example of an 
illiterate American who is asked to name the states of his country and starts with ‘Alabama, Alaska, 
Arizona...’. It showed, he argued, how literacy determines cognitive processes and the representation 
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1968), 198-265. J. Goody, The domestication of the savage mind. (Cambridge, 1977). W.J. Ong, Orality and 
literacy: The technologizing of the word. (London and New York, 1982). 
550 Havelock 1963; J. Goody and I. Watt, ‘The Consequences of Literacy’ in J. Goody (ed.), Literacy in 
traditional societies. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1968c. And The domestication of the savage 
mind. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1977; Ong 1982. 
 138
of the world in modern cultures—that is the way in which a literate or illiterate member of a literate 
society ‘segments events, groups them or organises, condenses and transforms them.’ Literacy is 
understood by these authors as the essential technique that facilitated abstract and analytic discourse, a 
feature unknown in cultures of primary orality. Therefore, the transition from orality to various stages 
of literacy offered better explanations of cultural shifts that had been labelled before as shifts from 
magic to science, or from the so-called ‘pre-logical’ to the increasingly ‘rational’ state of 
consciousness, or from Lévi-Strauss’s ‘savage’ mind to domesticated thought.551  
 
This understanding of the relationship between literacy and a change in the attitude towards 
knowledge was much inspired by a reading by the historian and classicist E. Havelock of Plato’s 
Republic. Living in the time (fifth to fourth century BC) when literacy had begun to dominate orality 
in Hellenic culture, Plato wrote about his ideal system of education. It would form an elite of people 
who could think critically, rationally and as autonomous individuals, a system he juxtaposed to the 
role of poets, and of the emotional, uncritical, automatic identification with the message in their 
poetry, which they summoned from their audience. The oral art of poetry belonged to ancient society 
and should play no significant role in his envisaged modern republic.  
 
Explaining Plato’s objection to poetry in terms of orality and literacy, Havelock put forward that in 
oral society the transmission and preservation of knowledge depended on acoustics, that is on an 
evanescent phenomenon. Retrieving such knowledge depended on ritualised performance, on memory 
facilitated by rhyme and rythm, and therefore on collective forms of consciousness of the tradition and 
on the automatic identification (or ‘imitation’, incidentally) by each member of society with it.552 
Aphorisms, verse, stories, were constantly present with him in his acoustic reflexes and also visually 
imagined before his mind’s eye. In short, he went along with tradition.553 An individualistic and 
critical attitude towards knowledge was not possible. Knowledge written down, however, could be 
literally objectified, seen as a physical object and as part of a ‘body of knowledge’ that was separate 
from the human body. Its transmission did not depend any more on hearing and performances that 
linked one to other keepers of a tradition. With a book at hand, or even the idea of a book, one could 
literally ‘take a second look’ at things and reflect on them as autonomous critical individuals.  
 
One of the implications of this concept of knowledge, that Goody and Watt hypothesised, was that in 
societies where literacy first became widespread (such as Plato’s Greece), it could have the effect of 
reducing social stratification, because it introduced a new possibility of achieved status besides the 
ascribed status of traditional chieftanship.554 However, they did not see this happening in traditional 
societies they studied, such as that of Muslim societies in Northern Ghana. There, this potential was 
curtailed by what Goody termed ‘restricted literacy’. This referred to a situation in societies where the 
technology of writing is known, but where the spread of literacy is restricted by other factors, and he 
indicated first, the cultural limitation of literacy to sacred uses (for instance in amulets, ‘ilm al-ḥurūf, 
or the practice of keeping the Qur’ān hidden from believers and showing it only once a year); 
secondly, a restricted social distribution of literacy skills in a specialist group (as was the case for the 
                                                     
551 Goody 1977, chapter 5. 
552 In Plato’s treatise, mimesis (imitation) plays an important – negative – role. In Arabic commentaries, by Ibn 
Rushd e.g., it was translated as takhyīl. (See Averroes’ Middle Commentary on Aristotle’s Poetics. Translated, 
with introduction and notes, by C.E. Butterworth. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1986.  
553 Havelock 1963, 199. 
554 Goody and Watt 1968, 55. These views have been criticized by anthropologists and sociolinguists of a next 
generation, among whom B. Street is prominent. The main objection of these protagonists of New Literacy 
Studies is that an over-emphasis on a cultural divide between orality and literacy, by the focus on cognition, is 
not useful. It is evolutionist, they say, in that it assumes a cognitive advance in the transition, and sustains a 
dichotomy between languages and cultures, often between the literate cultures of western civilisation and those 
that were mainly oral, in countries that were colonised in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. To them, a more 
important issue to study when literacy and orality are concerned, is power and the fact that literacy practices, 
their acquisition, use and meaning, ‘are saturated with ideology’. B. Street, ‘Introduction: the new literacy 
studies.’ In B. Street (ed.) Cross-cultural aspects to literacy. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993, 1-
21: 9. 
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Dyula and the Fulani scholarly ‘clans’ in West Africa. Goody called it a ‘guru system’555); and thirdly, 
the guarding of the skills and knowledge pertaining to literacy as the secrets of the literate few, the 
idea, that is, that there were layers of learning that were suitable for different layers in society, and that 
not all knowledge can be ‘handled’ by just anybody. As Ibn Rushd wrote, there was a difference 
between the class of men whose religious belief was based on the result of reasoning from syllogism, 
and those whose faith must be based on the authority of the teacher.556 In short, in traditional societies, 
literacy was often restricted precisely because it was religious literacy: having been introduced 
together with Islam, it had great attraction as a means of communication with the supernatural and was 
thus associated with priesthood, while at the scholarly level it was dominated by the study of the 
Qur’ān. Although Goody did not argue that the restrictive factors were only found in Islam, his and 
other case studies in the same volume, as well as studies inspired by it, emphasised the relationship 
between Islam and restricted literacy.557  
 
This final aspect raised perhaps the main objection against the widely adopted concept, or at least one 
that is of significance for the study of al-Wālī. It was formulated by B. Messick, who argued that 
restricted literacy did not so much pertain to Islamic culture, but rather to another characteristic of the 
situation Goody and other contributors to his influential book studied, notably the fact that literacy 
occurred there in a foreign language (Arabic), in societies on the margin of the Muslim world.558 
 
It all leads to the question how al-Wālī understood the relation between writing and knowledge, 
religion and social roles, and whether he wished to somehow influence it with his conversion of a 
well-known oral text to a written book. Can a certain concept of knowledge be discovered in his work? 
With all his insistence on reason, did he want his students to adopt a more autonomous and critical 
attitude towards knowledge? Or did he think of literacy as a secret skill that was to be restricted to 
specialised groups of people?  
 
 
4. Knowing and the knower 
 
Al-Wālī’s interest in literacy is not a sign of an intention to promote a critical attitude towards 
knowledge among ordinary Muslims. And when he demanded that people do not ‘imitate’, but use 
reason or intellect, he did not mean that they should use reason autonomously, but rather that they use 
it to follow the reasoning of the specialists. It was not just literary convention that demanded that, in 
The peerless method, all the answers to questions about God’s attributes be dictated: ‘if you are asked 
this and that, then answer, so that you are not an imitator: ...’559 For al-Wālī, the relationship these 
specialists had to religious knowledge was exclusive, and the ordinary believer could not master it 
independently. Knowledge was not at all separate from the knower, but tightly linked to the ʿulamā’, 
the specialists of knowing. This is not something he expounds on explicitly, but he gives it away in a 
revealing passage in The peerless method that was intended to explain a different issue, that is the 
distinction between the substantive and ideal attributes of God: 
 
If you ask about the difference between substantive and ideal [attributes], I say: substantive 
attributes are those that determine the essence. That by which the essence is named, is ideal. It 
is like weaving and the weaver, or knowing (‘alima) and the scholar (or ‘knower’, ʿālim). 
Weaving is the description of an act, not of an essence. I have finished. A substantive attribute 
                                                     
555 Goody 1968a, 13. 
556 Goody 1968b, 238. 
557 I. Wilks, ‘The transmission of Islamic learning in the Western Sudan.’ In Literacy in traditional societies, ed. 
J. Goody. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1968. 161-198. I.M. Lewis, ‘Literacy in a nomadic Society: 
the Somali Case.’ In Literacy in traditional societies, ed. J. Goody. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1968. 265-277. C.H. Bledsoe and K.M. Robey, ‘Arabic Literacy and Secrecy among the Mende of Sierra 
Leone.’ In Man, New Series 21,2 (1986): 202-226. 
558 B. Messick, ‘Legal documents and the concept of ‘restricted literacy’ in a traditional society.’ In International 
Journal of Social Linguistics, 42 (1983): 41-52. 
559 In fact, the formula ‘if you are asked ..., then say’ goes back to the Qur’ān. 
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is a condition, an ideal attribute is conditional. The conditional cannot exist without the 
condition, and this is necessarily so for the seven [ideal attributes of God’s Being].560  
 
Here, al-Wālī has added an example (ending with the words ‘I have finished’) to the text he translated, 
to illustrate the relation between condition and the conditional. But his remark discloses two more 
fascinating insights. First, the comparison reveals how he sees the relation between knowledge and the 
knower: knowing is conditional, meaning that it cannot exist without the ʿālim. Knowing is not what 
makes the knower—it is the other way around. Knowing is what the knower does, it is his profession, 
and knowledge is what he produces, just as the weaver produces textiles. Knowledge is not something 
one can attain independently or intuitively, and not a truth to which one can assent incidentally. It is to 
have an expalanatorily based understanding of the ‘why’ of facts and truths. And it is exclusively up to 
the ʿālim, the professional knower, to hand that knowledge down. And, if we think of the identification 
of the scholar with the weaver in terms of the manual work each does—imagining the weaver weaving 
and the scholar writing—we can say that, as textile is what is woven, knowledge is what is written.561  
 
Perhaps al-Wālī did want to drive a wedge between believers and a sort of automatic identification 
with the traditions of their predominantly oral culture. But he did not want people to change their 
attitude towards knowledge such. In fact, his concept of knowledge is not unlike that in traditional 
African cultures. Authors in different fields have pointed out that in pre-colonial and in pre-Islamic 
societies in Africa, knowledge was not available to everyone in the same way.562 Much of it was 
hidden to ordinary people. Knowledge was conceived of as existing at different hierarchical levels, the 
highest of which are in the supernatural realm of spirits and deities. It could be obtained from them 
only by specialists—of religion but also of medicine, hunting, midwifery or other fields—through the 
intervention of ancestors or other spirits. The specialists could then produce this knowledge for others, 
to whom it could be transmitted by initiation. To the uninitiated, specialised knowledge remained 
secret, invisible, hidden. The division between manifest and secret knowledge marked the esoteric 
episteme of many traditional African cultures. Religious specialists held the monopoly over the 
knowledge that was most important to a community, the knowledge they received from the 
supernatural realm, for instance about causes and remedies for illness and other threats to the 
community’s welfare. The difference between ‘ulamā’ and the priests of local religions was that the 
knowledge of the former did not come from communication with spirits through divination, trance or 
sacrifices, but from the communication through study with the scholars of global Islam, in the Arabic 
language that was in this region almost completely restricted to this study. Like traditional priests 
however, and partly like the spirits and ancestors themselves, they kept control over the knowledge the 
believer needed for his personal welfare and that of the community, and transmitted it piecemeal to an 
elect group of followers.563 Without the ‘ulamā’, in al-Wālī’s view, there was no knowledge in a 
transmissible form.  
 
In other words, my argument here is, that al-Wālī’s ‘knower’ is one who belongs, not to the logical 
category of (just) anyone who knows, but to the social category of the scholar. It was the status of a 
particular model of the scholar that al-Wālī wished to promote. As I argued in chapters 2 and 4, the 
authority of ‘ulamā’ as men of undoubted moral standing who possessed unique religious knowledge 
was challenged on a number of fronts, and in The peerless method al-Wālī seems to be offering an 
answer to their need to renegotiate their role. Basically, his solution was that, to be a Muslim, one had 
to have knowledge ‘from reason’ and thus could not do without the ‘ulamā’, who were the only 
                                                     
560 Hunwick 187, f 23: 
ق بین المعانى والمعنویة نقول المعنى كل صفة تقوم بالدات فتتصف بھا ھى المعانى تسمیة الدات بھا ھى المعنویة كالنسج مع عن الفر )لتس(أوان 
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561 Al-Wālī’s comparison must be related to the Latin culture where the word text, from the Latin textum, is 
derived from texere, weaving. 
562 Paden 1973; R. Shaw, ‘Splitting truths from darkness: epistemological aspects of Temne divination.’ In 
African Divination Systems. Ways of Knowing. P.M. Peek (ed.). Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 
1991; Brenner 2000, Chapter 1. 
563 Cf Levtzion 1985, Last 1979, Brenner 2000.  
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dispensers of it. In his work it becomes quite clear who he believes deserves the title,‘ālim: not just 
any popular preacher, nor a healer or a diviner using the technology of writing without having a good 
command of the Arabic language, but a classically schooled mutakallim, who has read the 
foundational books of Islamic learning (whichever ones these were considered to be), who is precise in 
his references, verifies opinions, stories and ḥadīths (as he himself did, for instance, concerning the 
story of the Negus and some of the biographical information about al-Sanūsī in The peerless method, 
and the ḥadīth about the origin of tobacco in Valid proofs), who operates in a cosmopolitan 
environment, and who is a specialist in the most highly intellectualised fields of scholarly practice, 
such as that of ḥadīths, kalām, taḥqīq and naẓarī knowledge. These norms defined the model that 
scholars themselves pursued. For the general public, literacy, as a skill and an intellectual orientation, 
was the one emblem that distinguished this type of ‘ālim from other types of specialists of Islamic 
knowledge, whose numbers rapidly increased in the seventeenth century. In this context, transferring 
the Fulfulde commentary on al-Sanūsī’s Ṣughra to written text was a way of claiming it for this class 
of ‘ulamā’. This claim emphasised that only they had access to the meaning of religious literature, and 
were therefore most able to be complete Muslims. In times of social changes related to the 
popularisation of Islam, it was part of a movement to assert the ‘ulamā’s social status.  
 
 
In al-Wālī’s view, literacy skills were not restricted to a ‘sacred’ use in amulets or ‘ilm al-ḥurūf, and 
script was not an artefact with supernatural powers in itself, whereby their meaning was partly hidden 
to those who benefitted from them. On the contrary, the use of literacy for openly communicating and 
studying the meaning of the Qur’ān and ḥadīths was much more important. But in al-Wālī’s work we 
can recognise something of an ideological foundation under the historical fact that literacy was 
socially restricted to a group of specialists, and was used as a means to keep a religious hierarchy in 
place in which the literate ranked highest. Decisive for the choice of literacy to this end, I suggest, was 
the need of the social class of ‘ulamā’ to defend its position in this particular period in the history of 
central sudanic Africa.  
 
The precise extent to which al-Wālī was regarded as a spokesman by his colleagues, and the degree to 
which his work reflected the strategy of a regional group of ‘ulamā’ to collectively maintain their 
power, would be difficult to establish. Not enough texts by other scholars from the same period are 
available for comparison, and in Abgar, al-Wālī lived an isolated life for much of the time. But his 
understanding of the scholar’s authority over believers was certainly welcomed by the many copyists 
of his work.  
 
Al-Wālī’s almost chance remark comparing knowledge with woven material raises the question of 
how he related to previous discussions about the nature of knowledge in Muslim scholarship. As I 
mentioned in chapter 4, the questions of how intellectual cognition comes about, how human 
understanding relates to God’s truth, and what the relations are between knowledge, faith and reason, 
were extensively discussed starting in the first century of Islam.564 However, al-Wālī does not seem to 
have had much opportunity to study the subject in detail. None of the authors or book titles that 
Rosenthal designates as leading in these discussions is to be found in Hall and Stewart’s ‘core 
curriculum’ or in the WAAMD. A faint trace, however, of his reading in this field may be recognised in 
the few verses at the end of Ibn Zakrī’s Muḥaṣṣil, quoted in chapter 3. If they are indeed by al-Wālī, 
they demonstrate that he thought about the differences and correspondences between Ash‘arism and 
the Māturīdīya, two schools that are in many respects not far apart. A marked difference between them 
concerned the sources of knowledge of God, but also the obligation to acquire knowledge in general, a 
subject to which al-Māturīdī himself attached considerable importance. He was, as far as we know, the 
first to begin a treatise on theology with a consideration of the theory of knowledge.565 For the 
Māturīdīya, as well as the Mu‘tazila, we must ultimately believe in God because reason forces us to. 
                                                     
564 For a study of the debates see F. Rosenthal, Knowledge Triumphant. The concept of knowledge in medieval 
Islam. Leiden: Brill, 2007. Black, D. ‘Psychology: soul and intellect’ in The Cambridge Companion to Arabic 
Philosophy. P. Adamson and R.C. Taylor (eds). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005. 
565 Rosenthal 2007, 210, 211. 
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For Ash‘arism we must believe in God because it is written in the holy sources, and ‘knowing God 
through revelation is possible’, as is asserted in the lines attributed to al-Wālī.  
 
As we saw in chapters 5 and 6, al-Wālī did attach considerable importance to the study of these 
sources. But the scriptures were to be approached with reason, logic and verification. Like the 
revivalists in circles of al-Bābilī, he was of the opinion that the meaning of the Qur’ān and the ḥadīths 
is not hidden and should not be sought out by intuition or metaphorical interpretation, but can always 
be understood intellectually. And even in instances where the divine sources are silent, reason could 
be their ventriloquist: ‘although evidence (for the prohibition of tobacco) is not present in the literal 
text of the Qur’ān and the Sunna, it is not hidden from all those who possess reason,’ as the author 





This chapter has focussed on two things: first, it has sought an explanation for al-Wālī’s reputation as 
an author of renown, in terms of literary criticism and by considering how he positioned himself as a 
scholar on a supra-regional level. Second, it has argued that in a time when Islam, and therefore 
literacy, were popularising, al-Wālī wrote The peerless method down as part of an effort to ascribe the 
‘best’ knowledge of Islam to the ‘ulamā’, the only ones who could write books, because they had a full 
command over the medium of communication with the elite of global Islam, and in popular views with 
God himself.  
 
In previous chapters I have shown that al-Wālī’s reputation ‘at home’ was important because of his 
excellent appreciation of what concerned ordinary believers and because of the way in which he 
reflected and addressed those concerns in his work. But his talent lay not only in addressing the right 
audience on the right issues: as my readings of Foucault and Saïd have made clear, it also lay in his 
capacity to formulate new ideas and link them to established traditions, and in his ability to combine 
continuity and discontinuity in a way that others elaborated and transposed to other realms of 
communication. This last is most visible in The peerless method. It derived its authority from the 
Ṣughra and employed the kabbe tradition for a new beginning. In it, al-Sanūsī’s notion of the duty of 
the mukallaf, who should learn about the attributes of God and the prophets, was reformulated in terms 
of questions to be answered by those who do not want to be accused of imitation and cast out as 
unbelievers. The idea, based in the concept of the imitator, that true believers could be distinguished 
from unbelievers posing as Muslims, was emerging in an oral environment in various regions, 
including in the western Sahara, but its formulation in written Arabic, and in terms that echoed a 
theological discussion among revivalists in the historic heartlands of Islam, allowed a new discourse to 
gain ground—a discourse on testing the religious knowledge of people who claimed to be Muslims.  
 
The peerless method does not have one specific author. The text is a composite work to which many 
have contributed, and its authorship is distributed. To use Foucault’s term, however, it was the author 
function in al-Wālī’s work, and the meaning this had for its audience, that were important in central 
sudanic Africa at the end of the seventeenth century—and later, when it was often copied. Al-Wālī’s 
genius—and his interest for the historian today—lie in the way he registered significant social and 
cultural shifts. At the same time, if ‘only’ a versifier, a commentator and a ‘scribe who recorded’ 
existing oral comments, he had a hand in the course of history, because he turned sentiments and 
elements of oral discourse into elements of scholarly discourse. While other influential scholars in the 
region wrote especially about governance and law (addressing in the first place the elite who were in 
the position to govern, control and judge), al-Wālī chose to write about beliefs and behaviour, about 
the cultural picket poles of Muslim society as a whole. And because society was as at that time taking 
new shapes – Muslim society primarily, but since it involved a separation of waters, traditional society 
was affected as well – his writings were significant. 
 
                                                     
566 Or. 8362, 8r. 
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When in the seventeenth century Islam spread farther into rural areas of west and central sudanic 
Africa, it also brought with it a modest spread of literacy. Al-Wālī lived in an environment that was 
marked as much by orality as by literacy. Society at large, including small Muslim communities, 
functioned as primarily oral societies. The author’s own education, profession and ambitions were 
rooted in literacy. His work is situated at the intersection of orality and literacy. In his versifications, 
he made available to orality what was written before. With his works on grammar, he taught literacy. 
In The peerless method he wrote down what had been oral. He must have done so in response to a 
demand from believers. But most of all he wished to channel that demand, and restrict it within the 
frame-work of classical Muslim learning. Quoting from the Ṣughra as well as from al-Sanūsī’s 
Muqaddima and adding numerous references to other literary sources and scholarly discussions, he 
transposed the oral commentary from an environment of vulgarisation to an environment of literacy 
and learning.  
 
His thoughts about literacy may have served al-Wālī as a stepping stone to thinking more generally 
about modes of knowing and learning. It is possible that he saw literacy as a wedge that could pry 
believers loose from their automatic identification with traditional cultures and their religion. With his 
insistence, in several of his works, on the need to study, he may have juxtaposed two modes of 
cognition, that of the imitator and that of the Muslim student; that of the member of oral culture and 
that of the literate individual. However, al-Wālī did not promote a new mode of cognition or a 
sceptical attitude towards knowledge. In fact, he offered only an alternative source of identification. 
Instead of the cultural code of the traditional ethnic community, he offered the knowledge that 
members of his class of ‘ulamā’ had produced and controlled, to be memorised by their followers. 
Making The peerless method less available to the illiterate proved the middle term of the dialectical 
thesis that is central to it: if one’s status as a believer depended on knowledge, and if knowledge 








































































































Working in times of political unrest and economic decline, spending a good part of his life in a village 
far removed from any centre where ‘history’ was made, and producing mainly commentaries and 
versifications of pre-existing texts, Muḥammad al-Wālī nevertheless became one of the most 
important scholars of the region in his day. With so many odds against him, how did he do it?  
 
First, he devoted his work to themes that appealed strongly to his audience while he was alive, and that 
would continue to do so in the centuries that followed. Second, he made excellent use of his position 
on the boundary between different cultures. He was a fine translator, especially in the sense of 
transferring meaning from one context to another. In so doing, he answered the needs of his home 
audience and presented himself as someone who could operate at a cultural level that was beyond the 
grasp of most of its members. Third, he was eclectic and chose from various Muslim schools and 




The themes that pervade al-Wālī’s commentaries and his one original poem have to do with the 
Muslim identity: with the unity of the Muslim community, the firmness of belief (truth versus 
falsehood), and the fight against doubt. These themes corresponded to a social need of Muslims 
around him—some whose families had been Muslim for generations, while others were new 
converts—who experienced the changes in identity and loyalty that were occurring on a large scale in 
that period, as Islam spread out of the town centres to rural areas, and as economic and political 
certainties were declining.  
 
The problems around Muslim identity were in themselves not new. One challenge to that identity was 
the attractiveness of the traditional religions, which were so interconnected with social life, values, 
views on life after death and the fertility of land and other resources, that it was hard to give up one of 
the elements without losing the others. Islam could only compete with this complex of identity, 
security and welfare, when all the stops were pulled out on its side too: when economic benefit, social 
and political security and a new worldview went hand in hand. But the mix of benefits was often not 
decisive, and many new converts returned to their old beliefs. However, what was new in the 
seventeenth century were scale and urgency. Over five centuries Islam had developed from one of 
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several sources of authority into the main or even the unique source of legitimacy for the ruling classes 
in Muslim states. As a result, growing numbers of peasants outside the urban centres of these states 
saw a political interest in having a Muslim identity. Consequently, Islam spread to rural areas, where 
many converted. At that point, lapsing back into old belief systems, that is, the instability of the 
Muslim identity—which in West Africa was a collective identity—became a social problem. And in 
Bornu and its surroundings, where slaves (as a commodity) and slave labour formed the basis of the 
economy, it became an urgent social problem. The Muslim identity gave some protection against slave 
raiders to rural communities in or near the state of Bornu, because, in principle, those with a firm 
Muslim identity were not raided and robbed of their strongest people. Communities that had a Muslim 
identity had a serious interest in not letting it be contaminated by doubt, be it their own or that of 
others. What al-Wālī offered were certainties in times of choice, and—for the reader on whom he has 
not made a favourable impression—tools to draw new lines between ‘us’ and ‘them’.  
A second theme lived among a group of people even closer to al-Wālī: the authority of the ‘ulamā’ of 
the type to which he belonged, the scholars of the old school, who could boast a classical education of 
book-learning in which the canon consisted of books from the Middle East and North Africa. Of 
course, ‘ulamā’ had always had a special place anywhere in Islam, but in seventeenth-century West 
Africa the status of their profession was affected in a number of ways. First, as a result of the spread of 
Islam to rural populations, there were an increasing number and variety of Muslim storytellers, 
healers, diviners and teachers who lacked the classical education of the ‘ulamā’, but who competed 
with them as specialists of religious knowledge. Secondly, the ‘ulamā’’s moral leadership was 
challenged by a new trend in mysticism that played down the role of book-learning. Thirdly, as a 
result of political instability in Bornu, their relations with the ruling class became less self-evident.  
 
A close reading of al-Wālī’s work shows that he made the ‘ulamā’’s concerns his cause, and related it 
to the first theme, of separating true Muslims from others. He emphasised that one could be counted a 
true Muslim only if one followed the ‘ulamā’, because being a true Muslim was not just to confess 
belief, but to understand the intellectual foundation of what one confesses. What that was, was only 
taught by those ‘ulamā’ who specialised in knowledge that comes from reason (‘aql) and reflection 
(naẓar). In fact, he said, there was no religious knowledge without them, just as there is no cloth 
without a weaver.  
 
Reason, or intellect, is al-Wālī’s third major theme. The fact that the intellect could be damaged by 
smoking tobacco, as many believed, gave him an extra motive to fight that habit, and lent a remarkable 
coherence to his oeuvre. 
 
Underneath these themes, another is hidden: boundaries. To become a Muslim was ‘to enter Islam’ 
(dakhala fī dīn), that is to cross a threshold. Al-Wālī’s environment was one in which rapidly 
increasing numbers of people were confronted with this moral, social, and cultural border between the 
religion of their ancestors and the new religion of Islam. Some crossed it, while others did not, but 
regardless—they all had to consider the consequences of choosing or being obliged to follow this way 
or that. This was an environment in which the new religion brought its adherents new norms and the 
notion of a different centre of civilisation, geographically as well as culturally; in which rural 
populations could win opportunities for emancipation and better relations with the ruling classes; and 
in which literacy started to play a role next to orality, not only as the skill of a small minority of 
learned Muslims, but as a mark of Islam and of new social attitudes, and perhaps even as the 




Borders were not discussed explicitly by al-Wālī. But he was a master at joining elements from 
different cultural realms: popular culture and Muslim learning, local concerns and theological 
discussions in the Middle East, tradition and idiosyncrasy. Al-Wālī’s strength as a scholar and more 
particularly as an author lies in the way he was able to negotiate between the elements in these realms, 
always retaining what he found most valuable.  
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With The peerless method, the text that more than any other made his name, al-Wālī based himself on 
two great traditions of teaching Islam—the first embodied in a text that was successful throughout the 
Muslim world, the second with its point of origin near the coast of West Africa, and having, since the 
sixteenth century, conquered other West African regions stretching all the way to Lake Chad. From 
both, al-Sanūsī’s Ṣughra and the Fulani kabbe, al-Wālī took what he needed: their pedagogical 
approach and their canonical renown. But where the latter were intended to include as many people as 
possible in the community of believers, his Peerless method aimed to define who belonged to it and, 
even more pointedly, who did not, because this was a deep concern in his own local environment. The 
central message that The peerless method added to the texts that it translated and discussed was that 
the muqallid, the ‘imitator’—someone who does not seek religious knowledge but mimics and goes 
through the motions of Islam without conviction—was without any doubt an unbeliever. That was an 
unorthodox point of view for any school of thought with a firmly established status in Islamic history. 
 
Al-Wālī invented neither this notion of the imitator, nor the idea that faith should be tested. It emerged 
at about the same time among a group of fanatical Muslims in the Western Sahara, and seems to have 
been part of the oral discourse of ‘ulamā’ in central sudanic Africa, too, before he wrote it down. But 
his capturing it in the framework of a written canonical tradition made it suitable for debate among 
scholars and common people alike, an accepted tool, both to renegotiate the role of the ‘ulamā’ and to 
distinguish between true and false Muslims. In this form, it stimulated the development of questioning 
believers’ knowledge and judging their faith so that this practice became a habit that was widespread 
in the eighteenth century (too widespread, according to ‘Uthmān dan Fodio) and that persisted to the 
present day. Unfortunately, it also contributed to firmly linking ideas about the imagined inferiority of 
‘others’ to religious doctrine – an effect that was also realised in the text against tobacco.  
 
The exchange between popular culture and a ‘high’ culture of learning is even more pronounced in al-
Wālī’s Valid proofs for announcing the prohibition of smoking. This plea mixes elements generated by 
popular anguish with state-of-the-art tropes taken from theology, logic, verification and the 
independent study of the Qur’ān and of ḥadīths as sources of jurisdiction. Among common believers in 
Bornu and Baghirmi, the importance of single-minded loyalty to Islam was expressed through the 
stigmatisation of smokers as unbelievers, and of tobacco as demonic. Since its introduction, Muslims 
here saw tobacco as a tangible sign of disturbance and fitna, of a changing world in which the religion 
and cultures of Jews, Christians and ‘Jebel Inklīz’ were approaching and creating a new challenge to 
their dearly won Islamic culture. That a majority of mainstream ‘ulamā’ in the historic heartlands of 
Islam as well as farther west in sudanic Africa had no problem with tobacco, did not impress them. Al-
Wālī’s treatise against tobacco reflects the function that shunning tobacco had in his home 
environment for the self-representation of new Muslims as not filthy and uncontrolled, but united in an 
exclusive top layer of society and firmly dedicated to their new community. He must have hoped that 
he could help end the fitna that threatened his followers, if only he could tackle the problem of tobacco 
at its root—that is, if only he could convince important jurists at al-Azhar to counter the opinion of the 
late Mālikī authority al-Ajhūrī, who had allowed tobacco. Therefore he collected the best arguments 
and addressed the scholarly elite in their own terms, with a treatise of irreproachable scholarly quality.  
 
Another border over which al-Wālī deliberately crossed back and forth is that between orality and 
literacy. Although there was a small group of (mostly male) Muslims who could read, societies in the 
region had a fundamentally oral culture. Educated as he was in the long-standing Fulani tradition of 
reading, writing and oral teaching, al-Wālī worked at the intersection between literacy and orality. He 
translated oral works and ideas in which he himself was deeply imbued, into written text, for the 
benefit of the learned audience that was the guarantor of his scholarly status. At the same time, with 
his versifications of important theological texts, he made literary works available for oral recitation—
that is, for memorisation by preachers and teachers who could repeat them to the ordinary, illiterate 
Muslims, for whom the versifications functioned as a gateway to the literate culture of Islam.  
 
The question is: Why was it important for al-Wālī to transfer oral discourse to written? Straddling two 
cultures, as he did, he may have felt that the power of orality, with its memorisation, its performances 
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and the collective experience of language, tied people to the collective consciousness of their language 
community, and that this was an important obstacle to the unity of the overarching Muslim 
community. More certain is that he wanted to strengthen the image of the kind of scholar he was, the 
kind that had studied the canonical texts of Islam, and could operate at the highest level of 
contemporary scholarship, and not least because he had mastered an impeccable Arabic; more 
particularly, he helped to articulate the model of the scholar as a highly lettered expert of Islam who 
had been trained in the methods of kalām, was up to par with the movements of ijtihād and taḥqīq, and 
could discuss topical issues with peers among the cosmopolitan elite in the historic heartlands of the 
religion. It was the duty of such a scholar to be a moral guide to other Muslims, no matter where they 
lived. Writing—that is, producing knowledge— was the emblem of these ‘ulamā’, which 
distinguished them from popular preachers, mystics and other types of specialists of Islam.  
 
That he did his best to conform to this model of the scholar is clear from most of his works, and indeed 
from his oeuvre as a whole, situated as this was in the core fields of Islamic learning: tawḥīd, language 
and jurisprudence. With his choice of books for commentary and versification, and with his references 
to numerous authors, both of the stock of books that had long been part of the canon of West African 
Muslim learning and of some famous contemporary works, al-Wālī placed himself in a tradition of 
global Islamic learning, from which he derived authority. At the same time, he had the courage to be 
eclectic. 
 
Like most learned Muslims in West Africa of his day, al-Wālī adhered to the Ash‘arī school of 
theology and the Mālikī school of jurisprudence. However, he did not follow all of their tenets 
indiscriminately. In accordance with Ash‘arism he did believe that reason and tradition provide proof 
of God’s being, and also, for instance, that God does have substantive attributes. His profound interest, 
however, in the role of reason and knowledge in theology may be the reason why he was never 
dismissive of the Mu‘tazila, as greatest examples (al-Sanūsī and al-Laqānī) were. He was interested in 
their point of view, as well as in that of the Mātūridīs. For both these schools, reason was in the end 
more important than tradition as a source of knowledge about God and his laws. The ultimate reason 
why we must believe in God, they argued, is that intellect forces us to. This dove-tailed with al-Wālī’s 
ambition to strengthen the authority of the ‘ulamā’, which was based on their professional monopoly 
when it came to supplying both reason and knowledge based on its use. It is remarkable, also in view 
of the lack of enthusiasm that Maghribī Malikism had for kalām, that The peerless method and 
especially Valid proofs reveal such an interest in this approach, in which appeals to reason reign 
supreme. 
 
Indeed al-Wālī takes a critical position towards Malikism too. Some aspects that mark West African or 
Maghribī Malikism, and that distinguish it from Malikism in the Mashriq, such as a very strict 
interpretation of social and legal principles, may be recognised in his thought. However, unlike the 
majority of scholars in the Hausalands (or later in the Sokoto caliphate) and farther west, al-Wālī does 
not draw exclusively on sources from the Mālikī school. And unlike other West African Mālikī 
scholars, notably from a generation that succeeded his (and to which the Bornu scholar al-Hajrami and 
the leaders of the Sokoto jihād belonged), he was not interested in matters such as taxes, inheritance or 
the question of whether men and women could mix during funerals. He was certainly interested in the 
formation of Muslim society —and more than he was, ultimately, in scholastic ruminations about 
God’s attributes-  but at a more fundamental level. He was concerned with questions such as who 
belonged to the Muslim community and who did not, and why was it up to him, as a scholar, to 
determine that.  
 
For his interest in reason and his rejection of ‘imitation’ (taqlīd) al-Wālī found inspiration in the 
theological discussions in circles of religious revivalists in the Middle East, who reviewed the relation 
between the believer and religious knowledge. The members of a circle around Muḥammad b. ‘Alā al-
Dīn al-Bābilī in particular, a Shāfi‘ī scholar of ḥadīth with whom al-Wālī spent an unknown period of 
time, propagated ijtihād—that is, the effort to return to the sources of the revelation themselves, 
independent of the thick volumes and long traditions of exegesis that separated believers from them. 
Ijtihād and taqlīd were to them communicating vessels: as the first was advanced, the second was 
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suppressed. They also criticised forms of mysticism that tended to deny the importance of the study of 
the outer truths and laws of God’s creation. Students of al-Bābilī came from all four legal schools, and 
it may have been there that al-Wālī  also learned more of Ḥanafī puritans whose writings underpinned 
an aversion to tobacco and whom he quoted in his treatise against it. Another reason he was interested 
in Ḥanafī views may of course have been the association of this madhab with the highest level of 
political authority in the Muslim Middle East, that of the Ottoman rulers. His orientation was toward 
the Middle East, more than toward the West African centres of learning. We do not know to what 
extent al-Wālī’s interest was exceptional among Bornu scholars of his time, but his advance towards 
the Ḥanafī school and his putting Malikism into perspective must have facilitated the political 
orientation of Bornu’s later elite, which turned to Istanbul in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries as 




This study has taught us that learned Muslims in seventeenth-century central sudanic Africa—al-Wālī 
himself and his direct audience—participated in the Muslim scholarly culture of that time, on a small 
scale perhaps, but at a level that shows less limitation than might be expected considering the distance 
between their homeland and the metropolitan centres where hundreds of scholars were concentrated. 
Al-Wālī, for one, participated in the trend that developed in global Islam in the seventeenth century, 
favouring logic, other rational sciences and the verification of received scholarly opinions (trends that 
still need analysing in terms of their relation to what was simultaneously happening in Europe, where 
theologians also turned back to reading the works of the Church fathers to go beyond the exegeses 
from the Middle Ages and verification was deployed against scholasticism, but where knowledge 
came to be seen as based on personal observation and understanding, and humanism was kindling the 
first sparks of the Enlightenment). It is fascinating to see how al-Wālī was part of these developments. 
But he participated on his own terms. He borrowed from the library of global Islam, from the 
‘sections’ of kalām and story-telling, from Ḥanafīs and Mālikīs, whatever was relevant for his own 
work. Ultimately, his choices were inspired by the circumstances of his immediate environment, and 
most of all by the need of ‘ulamā’ of that time to reassert their authority and their power.  
 
A limitation of this study is that al-Wālī could hardly be put in the perspective of contemporary peers. 
It is difficult, therefore, to say to what extent he was exemplary for his environment. On the other 
hand, we do know that his contemporaries and his later readers considered his work to be highly 
relevant as well as of outstanding quality. I hope that the examination of how he positioned himself as 
a scholar in this environment has contributed to our insights into social processes in the central sudanic 
Africa of al-Wālī’s day, and that it has thrown more light on the complex history of Islam in the region 
in the seventeenth century, a century that has been relatively hidden from the modern historian’s view, 
but was crucial, because of the increasing number of Muslims and the shaping of the debate about 
what that meant.   
 
In particular, al-Wālī has afforded us a view of the interaction between global Islam and local Muslim 
identity in the context of a local society situated between traditional culture and a globalising economy 
and culture. The conclusion in this respect is not surprising: precisely on the frontiers of a cultural 
realm, and at the moment when new boundaries were being formed, the development of thought 
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